AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
24 paragraphs · 1,901 wordsSunil Kumar Sinha, J.—Heard. The petitioner has filed this petition for quashment of the first information report (annexure-P/12) dated 10.1.2010 registered at crime no. 11/2010 in police station Bhilai Nagar, district Durg. The F.I.R. has been registered u/ss 448 & 506 part-II/34 IPC. The petitioner has also prayed for registration of the F.I.R. on his report dated 15.01.2010 (annexure- P/13) and the report lodged by her daughter on 18.01.2010.
According to the F.I.R. (annexure-P/12), on 10.1.2010 at about 9.10 a.m., the petitioner and the other unknown persons went to the quarter of respondent no. 3, took out house hold articles and threw them on the road. On resistance, the petitioner said that the said quarter has been allotted to him therefore, respondent no. 3 should vacate the quarter the allegations are that on resistance of respondent no. 3, the petitioner caught her by hair and took her out of the premises. According to respondent no. 3, the petitioner also took mobile-set of respondent no. 3, but later on, when the petitioner went to the police station, he handed over to the same to her father. The petitioner also threatened the life of respondent no. 3.
Mr. Uttam Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently argued that the said report is a false report, as totally false allegations have been made against the petitioner therefore, the same should be quashed. He submitted that F.I.R. is an outcome of malafide in account of direction for vacating the quarter by respondent no. 3 which has been allotted to the petitioner by the concerned authority.
The position in law regarding quashment of the F.I.R. and the criminal prosecution is wall settled. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal, AIR 1992 SC 604, the apex court said that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kings of cases where in such power should be exercised, but it gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such powers can be exercised either to prevent abuse of process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
(i) Where the allegations made in the First information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(ii) Where the allegations in the first information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, Justifying an investigation by police officers u/s 156 (1) of the code accept under an order of a magistrate within the preview of Section 155 (2) of the Code.
(iii) Where the uncontroverted allegation made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(iv) Where, the allegation in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without and order of a magistrate as contemplated u/s 155 (2) of the code.
(v) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complained are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceeding and/or where there is a specific provision in the code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. However the apex Court also gave a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegation made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and the extraordinary or inherent power do not confirm arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.
In the present case, it does not appear that on the above principles the F.I.R. may be quashed. Mr. Pandey has mainly argued that the allegation made in the F.I.R. are false. This Court, sitting in write jurisdiction, cannot record a finding at this stage regarding the correctness of the allegation made in the F.I.R. as the same has to be investigated by the police in accordance with law. The allegations made in the F.I.R. are not so absurd and inherently improbable. It is not a case that the allegation made in the F.I.R. do not disclose the commission of any offence. Mr. Pandey has also argued that the report has been lodged with malafide for wreaking vengeance. Many documents have been filed to show that there was a dispute about the possession of a quarter. On the basis of those documents, though it appears that there was a dispute regarding possession of a quarter but it does not appear that on account of such dispute only, the report has been maliciously instituted. Respondent No. 3 has alleged about the acts committed by the petitioner which are still to be investigated. Therefore, I am not inclined to entertain this petition for quashment of the F.I.R. lodged by respondent No. 3.
So far as non-registration of the F.I.R. is concerned, it has also been dealt by the supreme Court in many cases. In Aleque Padamsee and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , the apex Court held vide paras 7 & 8 as follows:
Whenever any information is received by the police about the alleged commission of offence which is a cognizable one there is a duty to register the F.I.R. there can be no dispute on that score. The only question is whether a writ can be issued to the police authorities to register the same. The basic question is as to what course is to be adopted if the police does not do it. As was held in all India Institute of medical Sciences case (2) and reiterated in Gangadhar case (3) the remedy available is as set out above by filing a complaint before the magistrate. Though it was faintly suggested that there was conflict in the views in all India institute of medical sciences case, Gangadhar case, Hari Singh case (5), Minu Kumari case (4) and Ramesh Kumari case (1), be find that the view expressed in Ramesh Kumari case related to the action required to be taken by the police when any cognizable offence is brought to its notice In Ramesh Kumari case, the basic issue did not relate to the methodology to be adopted which was expressly dealt with in all India Institute of Medical Sciences case, Gangadhar case, Minu Kumari case and Hari Singh case. The view expressed in Ramesh Kumari case was reiterated in Lallan Chaudhary V. State of Bihar (6) the course available, when the police does not carry out the statutory requirements u/s 154 was directly in issue in all India Institute of Medical Sciences case, Gangadhar case, Hari Singh case, and Minu Kumari case. The correct position in law, therefore, is that the police official ought to register the FIR whenever facts Brought to their notice show that cognizable offence has been made out. In case the police officials fail to do so, the modalities to be adopted are as set out in section 190 read with section 200 of the code. It appears that in the present case initially the case was tagged by order dated 24.02.2003 with WP(c) No. 530 of 2002 and W.P. (c) No. 221 of 2002. Subsequently, these writ petitions were delinked from the aforesaid writ petitions.
The writ petition are finally disposed of with the following directions:
(1) If any person is aggrieved by the inactions of the police officials in registering the FIR, the modalities contained in section 190 read with section 200 of the code are by to be adopted and observed.
(2) It is open to any person aggrieved by the inaction of the police officials to adopt the remedy in terms of the aforesaid provisions.
(3) So far as non-grant of sanction aspect is concerned, it is for the government concerned would do well to deal with the matter within three months from the date of receipt of this order.
(4) We make it clear that we have expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.
Further in Sakiri Vasu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 2 Supreme Court cases 409 the Apex Court held vide paras 26, 27, & 28 as follows.
"If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police station his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of police u/s 154 (3) Cr.P.C. or other police officer referred to in section 36 Cr.P.C. If despite approaching the superintendent of police or the officer referred to in section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a magistrate u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. instead of a petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. Moreover, he has a further remedy of filling a criminal complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. Why then should writ petitions or section 482 petition be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies?
As we have already observed, the Magistrate has very wide power to direct registration of an FIR and to ensure proper investigation and for this purpose he can monitor the investigation to ensure that the investigation is done properly (though he cannot investigate himself). The High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or after been registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies u/s 36 & 154 (3) before the police officers concerned, and if that is of no avail, u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. before the magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. and not by filing a writ petition or a petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C.
It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition, but it is equally well settled that if there is an alternative remedy the High Court should not ordinarily interfere.
In view of the above discussion, a petition for issuance of a writ to the police authority to register the F.I.R. on the reports submitted by the petitioner and his daughter cannot be entertained. The writ petition, therefore, is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed summarily. However, the petitioner shall be at liberty to avail the other appropriate remedies in accordance with law so far as non-registration of the F.I.R. is concerned.
