Ram Rattan and another vs State of Punjab

Surinder Singh, J.

The prayer made in this petition under section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure is for quashing of First Information Report No. 547, dated November 19, 1982, of Police Station City, Ferozepur, in which allegations of commission of an offence under section 406, Indian Penal Code have been made against the petitioner.

The sole submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the aforesaid Information Report and the proceedings if launched in consequence thereto, would be an abuse of the process of law and that the same may, therefore, be quashed. The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the observations in the Full Beach decision of this Court, Vinod Kumar Sethi and others v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1982 Punjab and Haryana 372, wherein it was held as follow :

"A plain reading of the definition of dowry under the Act would show that it means any property given directly or indirectly as a consideration for the marriage of the said parties. Now once that is so, dowry of this kind is in fact a quid pro quo for the marriage itself. Inevitably it would follow that whatever is given as consideration for the marriage itself cannot possibly be deemed in the eye of law as an entrustment or passing of dominion over property. The necessary result, therefore, is that the same set of facts allegedly constituting an offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act cannot possibly come within the ambit of Section 406, Indian Penal Code. This would be plainly a contradiction in terms. One offence is rested on property forming the consideration for the marriage as such whilst the other visualises the entrustment and passing of dominion over property individually owned. The offences under the Dowry Prohibition Act under section 406, Indian Penal Code thus cannot stand together on the same set of facts.

In view of the above observations the argument advanced is that there was no prima facie case made out under section 406, Indian Penal Code, from the facts as alleged in the First Information Report and on that score, the said report should be quashed. On the other hand, a reply to the petition has been filed on behalf of the respondent in which it is asserted that the property mentioned in the First Information Report is not necessarily dowry and that the matter should be allowed to be investigated further in order to determine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. It is also stated that the petitioners have not joined the investigation of the case so far. The learned, State counsel has further submitted that even in Vinod Kumar Sethi''s case (supra), the Court sounded a strong note of caution where the prayer was for quashing of the First Information Report. The relevant observations in this behalf may be noticed :

"Having opined as above, I must strike the strongest note of caution in this context. Though I have held that the High Court would have the inherent jurisdiction to quash the investigative process in a proper case, it does not mean that this power is to be exercised indiscriminately. It follows that even a more stringent criterion would apply in quashing a first information report and the subsequent police investigation before a chargesheet is filed. One must strongly hearken to the warning in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed''s case that in India the police have statutory right to investigate cognizable offences under the Code and the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within, their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of an enquiry."

Advancing his argument further, the learned State counsel then referred to the following observations made in the Full Bench case above :

"To conclude, I see no blanket bar against the quashing of a first information report and the consequent investigation (even before a chargesheet is filed in Court), provided that the requisite preconditions formulated above for the exercise of the power stand satisfied. Without being exhaustive. those may be briefly summarised as under :

(i) When the first information report, even if accepted as true, disclosed no reasonable suspicion of the commission of a congnizable offence;

(iii) When the materials subsequently collected in the course of an investigation further disclosed no such cognizable offence at all;

(iii) When the continuation of such investigation would amount to an abuse of power by the police thus necessitating interference in the ends of justice; and

(iv) that even it the first information report or its subsequent. investigation purports to raise a suspicion of a cognizable offence, the High Court can still quash if it is convinced that the power of Investigation has been exercised mala fide."

In the wake of the above position of law, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the State that in so far as the present case is concerned, the investigation into the matter has yet to be made and it is to be determined whether it is a case of mere entrustment of property or that of entrustment of dowry items; and the quashing of the First Information Report would impede a proper investigation.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties. I find that the contention of the learned State counsel is quite sound. In the circumstances of the present case, it would not be in the interest of justice to exercise extraordinary powers vested in this Court for quashing the First Information Report. The petition is consequently dismissed.