Ranganayakiammal (died) and another vs R. Srinivasaraghavan and another

Interpretation of Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, with reference to the facts of the case arises in this Second Appeal.

It appears 35 cents of land of one Ramaswamy Iyengar was acquired by the Government under Land Acquisition Act and an award was

passed for Rs. 2,181/-. There were two claimants for this amount. One is Ranganayakiammal -- Ramaswamy Iyen-gar''s second wife and the

other is Srinivasa-raghavan -- son of Ramaswamy Iyengar through his first wife, each of them making a claim for the entire amount. Because of this

dispute the matter was referred to the Court.

The said Ramaswamy Iyengar had executed a Will Ex. B2 dated 8-8-1943. The said land acquired by the Government was one of the items

scheduled in the Will. As per the terms of the Will Ranganayakiammal is to enjoy the land during her life time and after her Srinivasaraghavan is to

take the property absolutely. Ranganayakiammal will have no right to dispose of the land. Ranganayakiammal contended that though she has been

given life estate in the Will, by virtue of S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she had become the full owner and therefore she was entitled

to the entire award amount. As against this Srinivasaraghavan contended that to the device under the Will subsection (1) of S. 14 will not apply

and subsection (2) will apply, and that being the case there is no question of Ranganayakiammal becoming full owner under sub-section (1) of S.

14, and therefore she is only a limited owner of the land and hence the award amount has to be invested and Ranganayakiammal will be entitled to

the interest thereon till her life-time.

The trial Court accepted the case of Ranganayakiammal holding that by virtue of S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she has become

absolute owner of the property and therefore she is entitled to the full award amount. On appeal by Srinivasaraghavan the first appellate Court did

not agree with the trial Court and instead held that the device under the Will comes under S. 14(2) and not S. 14(1) and therefore

Ranganayakiammal will be entitled to interest alone till her life-time. As against this judgment of the first appellate Court the second appeal has

been filed.

It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the second appeal Ranganayakiammal died and one S. Raghavan, her grand-son through

her daughter, in whose favour Ranganayakiammal had executed a Will, has got himself impleaded as an appellant. As to the genuineness of the said

Will this Court called for a finding from the trial Court and the trial Court has given a finding that the Will is a genuine one and that finding is not

canvassed here. Therefore if it is found that Ranganayakiammal was at the time of her death absolute owner of the property, then the second

appellant S. Raghavan will be entitled to the compensation.

Ex. B2 Will executed by Ramaswamy lyengar clearly reads that on asking by Ranganayakiammal that some properties must be given separately

for her maintenance, in this Will she is given right to enjoy the income of the properties for her life-time. Thereafter, as per the Will. ''A'' schedule

property must straightway go to Srinivasaraghavan and ''B'' schedule also will go to him absolutely subject to some condition of payment of Rs.

3,500/- to the testator''s daughter Janaki etc. The relevant portion in the Will (in Tamil) reads thus :

(Matter in vernacular omitted)

Before we take up the contentions of Mr. M. R. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the appellant, it would be convenient to refer to some of

the submissions made by Mr. R. S. Venkatachari, learned Counsel appearing for Srinivasaraghavan, the first respondent in this appeal. He would

submit that the word ''kalakshepam'' does not mean maintenance but it only means ''ones way of life''. I find absolutely no merit in this submission.

No such plea has been taken in the two Courts below. A reference to Tamil Lexicon Vol. II, Part I, published under the authority of the University

of Madras, at page 897, would show that the word ''Kala-kshepam'' has several meanings and one of them is ''means of subsistence''. If we are to

understand the word ''kalakshepam'' in the context in which it is used in Ex. B2 Will, it would only mean ''Means of Subsistence'' and nothing else.

The words (Matter in vernacular omitted) manifestly indicates that Ranga-nayakiammal wanted some properties for her maintenance after the

death of Ramasamy Iyengar. Then Mr. R. S. Venkatachari would argue that in the document Ranganayaki-ammal is given right to the income from

the properties not only for her ''kalakshepam'' but also to pay wages to her attendants and also for doing ''dharma'' and therefore in any event it

cannot be said that the right in the property was given to her only for her maintenance. But payment of wages or salary to her attendants and doing

some ''dharma'' can justifiably be construed as part of her maintenance and not different. Therefore without any hesitation it can be safely

concluded that Ranganayakiammal was given right in the property for her maintenance during her lifetime.

With this position we have to examine whether the limited right given to Ranganayakiammal in the Will, by virtue of Sec. 14 of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956, has become absolute right. Mr. M. R. Nara-yanaswamy, learned Counsel for the appellants contends that the limited right

given to Ranganayakiammal in Ex. B2 Will being in lieu of maintenance, that right would come within the scope of S. 14(1) read with the

Explanation thereunder and thus the limited right has blossomed into a full or absolute right. On the other hand Mr. B. S. Venkatachari, learned

Counsel for the respondent (Srinivasaraghavan) would submit that the right given to Ranganayakiammal in the Will is a restricted right, in that, she

is to enjoy only the income of the property during her lifetime and that after her life-time Srinivasaraghavan will become the absolute owner of ''A''

schedule property and ''B'' schedule property also would go to him absolutely with some conditions and therefore the Will comes under S. 14(2)

and not under S. 14(1) and hence there is no question of the limited right of Ranganayakiammal enlarging into an absolute right. As regards the

contention that only the right to the income from the property is given to Ranganayakiammal and thus she is not entitled to any right to the corpus, I

think there is no tenable point. The right to the income of the property till her life-time is itself a right in the property and that is a limited right

coming within the scope of S. 14(1). As regards the next contention that after her lifetime ''A'' schedule property shall absolutely go to

Srinivasaraghavan and ''B'' schedule property also shall go to him subject to some conditions to be fulfilled by him and this would show that the

right given to Ranganayakiammal is a restricted one contemplated under S. 14(2), of course the right given to Ranganayakiammal is restricted one.

But the point is whether this restricted right, considering the other circumstances stated in the document particularly that the limited estate was given

in lieu of maintenance, comes under S. 14(1) read with the Explanation thereunder or under S. 14(2).

At this juncture it would be convenient to read Sec. 14 which is as follows :--

PROPERTY OF A FEMALE HINDU TO BE HER ABSOLUTE PROPERTY... (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether

acquired, before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

EXPLANATION : In this sub-section, ""property"" includes both moveable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or

devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after

her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property

held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under a

decree or order of a Civil Court of under an award where the terms of the gift, Will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a

restricted estate in such property.

Mr. M. R. Narayanaswami, in support of his contention relies on ""V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddy (dead) by L.Rs"", AIR 1977 SC 1944. This

decision had been brought to the notice of the first appellate Court also but however the learned District Judge had the view that this decision will

not apply to the facts of the present case. On a careful reading of the said decision of the Supreme Court I am clearly of the view that the learned

District Judge is not correct. In this decision the ambit and scope of the entire Sec. 14 i.e., S. 14(1) with Explanation thereto and also S. 14(2) has

been discussed, and what has been held is quite relevant to our case. The judgment has been rendered by a Bench of three learned Judges and of

them Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) has rendered a judgment which has been concurred by A. C. Gupta, J., and Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. has given a

separate judgment but concurring with the findings of Bhagwati, J.

In that case the appellant Tulasamma claimed maintenance out of the joint family properties in the hands of the respondent who was her husband''s

brother. The claim was decreed in favour of the appellant and in execution of the decree for maintenance a compromise was arrived at between

the parties allotting the properties in question to the appellant for her maintenance and giving her a limited interest in the said properties. The

appellant contended that by virtue of S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, her limited right in the property has become absolute one. This

was disputed by the respondent. The question was whether the limited right fell within S. 14(1) or came under S. 14(2).

Bhagwati, J., discussing the scope of subsection (1) of S. 14 read with the Explanation thereunder, stated that,

Sub-section (1) of S. 14, is wide in its scope and ambit and uses language of great amplitude.

Then the learned Judge proceeds to state (at p. 1947 of AIR 1977 SC 1944,

It will, therefore, be seen that subsection (1) of S. 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu

including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or was

subsequently acquired and possessed she would become the full owner of the property.

And then referring to sub-section (2) of S. 14 the learned Judge would observe that AIR 1977 SC 1944

This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Seth Badri Prasad

Vs. Srimati Kanso Devi, .

Then applying the rules of interpretation of Sections he would state that (at p. 1948 of AIR),

Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to subsection

(1) and so read it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing

right, under a gift. Will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property."" (underlining mine)*

Then the learned Judge after referring to the dictum in Seth Badri Prasad Vs. Srimati Kanso Devi, proceeds to observe that (at p. 1948 of AIR),

Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of a right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and

such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property

prescribes a restricted estate in the property.

Fazl Ali, J. in his judgment, in paragraph 52 (44), would lay down that,

Section 14(2) applies only to cases where the grant is not in lieu of maintenance or in recognition of pre-existing rights but confers a fresh right or

title for the first time and while conferring the said title certain restrictions are placed by the grant of transfer. Where, however, the grant is merely in

recognition or in implementation of a pre-existing right to claim maintenance, the case falls beyond the purview of Sec. 14(2) and comes squarely

within the Explanation to S. 14(1)

In paragraph 70 the learned Judge would point out that,

... the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right...

This being the position of law enunciated by the Supreme Court, in the present case the limited estate having been given in lieu of maintenance, it is

not a new grant but in recognition of a pre-existing right. Therefore Sec. 14(1) only would apply and not S. 14(2).

In view of the arguments advanced by Mr. R. S. Venkatachari, it may be stated here that in the usual course Ramaswami Iyengar''s son

Srinivasaraghavan would be entitled to the property under the Will, but the intervention of law, as Sec. 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, alters

that course and makes the limited estate of Ranganayaki-ammal as absolute one.

Mr. M. R. Narayanaswami, in support of his contention also relies on Bai Vajia (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Thakorbhai Chelabhai and Others, . In that

decision, after referring to Tulsamma''s case (AIR 1977 SC 1944) (supra), it was held that,

A combined reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and the Explanation following sub-section (1) makes it

clear, that sub-section (2) does not operate to take property acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance (which is

property specifically included in the enumeration contained in this Explanation) out of the purview of subsection (1).

A Division Bench of this Court in Venugopala Pillai Vs. Thayyanayaki Ammal and Others, , wherein Thulasamma''s case had been relied on, laid

down as follows :--

In the light ot the meaning which has always been attributed to the technical expression ''widow''s estate or woman''s estate'' the mere fact that

under the deed, such a right to which A was entitled to was eontcrred on her by reason of a mutual arrangement or a compromise would not mean

that such an estate was conferred on her for the first time under the deed or created primarily thereunder. It is a reiteration and a declaration of a

pre-existing right of a Hindu widow to take therein a widow''s estate subject to the limitation and restriction. Consequently she will become the full

owner of the property.

Mr. R. S. Venkatachari, learned Counsel for the respondent would also rely on some authorities, but in my view none of them would help him in

view of the decision in Tulasamma''s case AIR 1977 SC 1944The first decision relied on by the learned Counsel is K.S. Subramania Pillai and

Others Vs. E.S.R. Packirisami Pillai, In that case, plea that in the Will a life estate was given in lieu of maintenance was negatived on the ground

that there was no recital in the deed that it was to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise any pre-existing right of the wife of the legator, nor there

was any pleadings or proof in that regard. But that is not the position in the present case. The Will in the present case contains a clear recital that

on the wife''s asking for some properties for her maintenance she is being given a life interest in the properties.

The next case is Mst. Karmi Vs. Amru and Others, . In that case under S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act a full right was claimed by the widow

on the basis of a will executed by her husband giving her a life estate. This was refused. In that case it was not the case of the widow as in the

present case that the life estate given to her was in lieu of her maintenance or in recognition or in confirmation of any other pre-existing right.

So also in Kothi Satyanarayana Vs. Galla Sithayya and Others, , a Hindu settled certain properties on the widow of his brother with life interest

and upon her death those properties were to revert to the settlor or his heirs and there was no question of execution of the settlement in recognition

of any pre-existing right. Therefore rightly the Court held that the limited right of the widow comes under sub-section (2) of S. 14 and not sub-

section(1).

Similarly in A. Venkataraman Vs. S. Rajalakshmi and Others, , there was no question of giving life estate under the Will in question to a daughter in

lieu of or in recognition of any pre-existing right such as maintenance. Therefore rightly it was held that the limited estate given to the daughter falls

under S. 14(2) and not under S. 14(1).

Yet another decision relied on by Mr. R. S. Venkatachari is a Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana in Smt. Jaswant Kaur Vs. Harpal Singh

and Others, . In that case a Will had been executed by the husband in favour of his wife as per which the wife shall have the property for her life-

time and shall maintain herself and bring up her daughters from the income of the property and that she would not be competent to transfer any

property. It was held that subsection (2) of S. 14 would apply to the limited estate and not sub-section (1). In that case the facts are different from

the facts of Tulas-ammal''s case, AIR 1977 SC 1944 (supra) as well as the present case, in that in the Punjab and Haryana case life estate is given

to the donee for the purpose of her own maintenance and also for bringing up her daughters. Whatever may be the position of law with regard to

this, in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Tulasammal''s case the Punjab and Haryana decision cannot be considered.

Thus the judgment of the first appellate Court that the limited right of Ranga-nayakiammal under the Will comes under S. 14(2) and not under

S. 14(1) cannot be upheld as correct.

In the result the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored.

There will be no order as to costs.

Appeal allowed.