Ranganayakiammal (died) and Another vs R. Srinivasaraghavan and Another

Interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, with reference to the facts of the case arises in this second appeal.

It appears 35 cents of land of one Ramaswamy Iyengar was acquired by the Government under Land Acquisition Act and an award was passed for Rs. 2,181. There were two claimant''s for this amount. One is Ranganayakiammal - Ramaswamy Iyengar''s Second wife and the other is Srinivasaraghavan - son Ramaswamy Iyengar through his first wife, each of them making a claim for the entire amount. Because of this dispute the matter was referred to the Court.

The said Ramaswamy Iyengar had executed a will Ex.B2 dated 8-8-1943. The said land acquired by the Government was one of the items scheduled in the will. As per the terms of the will Ranganayakiammal is to enjoy the land during her life-time and after her Srinivasaraghavan is to take the property absolutely. Ranganayakiammal will have no right to dispose of the land. Ranganayakiammal contended that though she has been given life estate in the will, by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she had become the full owner and therefore she was entitled to the entire award amount. As against this Srinivasaraghavan contended that to the device under the Will Sub-section (1) of Section 14 will not apply and Sub-section (2) will apply, and that being the case there is no question of Ranganayakiammal becoming full owner under Sub-section (1) of Section 14, and therefore she is only a limited owner of the land and hence the award amount has to be invested and Ranganayakiammal will be entitled to the interest thereon till her life-time.

The trial Court accepted the case of Ranganayakiammal holding that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she has become absolute owner of the property and therefore she is entitled to the full award amount. On appeal by Srinivasaraghavan the first appellate Court did not agree with the trial Court and instead held that the device under the Will comes u/s 14(2) and not 14(1) and therefore Ranganayakiammal will be entitled to interest alone till her life-time. As against the Judgment of the first appellate Court the second appeal has been filed.

It may be mentioned here that during the pendency of the second appeal Ranganayakiammal died and one S.Raghavan, her grand-son through her daughter, in whose favour Ranghanayakiammal had executed a Will, has get himself impleaded as an appellant. As to the genuineness of the said will this Court called for a finding from the Trial Court and the Trial Court has given a finding that the Will is a genuine one and that finding is not canvassed here. Therefore if it is found that Ranganayakiammal was at the time of her death absolute owner of the property, then the second appellant S.Raghavan will be entitled to the compensation.

Ex.B2 Will executed by Ramaswamy Iyengar Clearly reads that on asking by Ranganayakiammal that some properties must be given separately for her maintenance, in this Will she is given right to enjoy the income of the properties for her life time. Thereafter, as per the Will, ''A'' schedule property must straight away go to Srinivasaraghavan and ''B'' schedule also will go to him absolutely subject to some condition of payment of Rs. 3,500, to the testator''s daughter Janaki etc. The relevant portion in the Will (in Tamil) reads thus:

Before we take up the contentions of Mr. M.R.Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the appellant, it would he convenient to refer to some of the submissions made by Mr.R.S.Venkatachari, learned Counsel appearing for Srinivasaraghavan, the first respondent in this appeal. He would submit that the word ''kalakshepam'' does not mean maintenance but it only means ''ones way of life''. I find absolutely no merit in this submission. No such plea has been taken in the two Courts below. A reference to Tamil Lexicon Vol.11, Part I, published under the authority of the University of Madras at page 897, would show that the word ''Kalakshepam'' has several meanings and one of them is ''means of subsistence''. If we are to understand the word ''kalakshepam'' in the context in which it is used in Ex.B2 Will, it would only mean ''Means of Subsistence'' and nothing else. The words manifestly indicates that Ranganayakiammal wanted some properties for her maintenance after the death of Ramasamy Iyengar. Then Mr.R.S.Venkatachari would argue that in the document Ranganayakiammal is given right to the income from the properties not only for her ''kalakshepam'' but also to pay wages to her attendants and also for doing ''dharma'' and therefore in any event it cannot be said that the right in the property was given to her only for her maintenance. But payment of wages or salary to her attendants and doing some ''dharma'' can justifiably be construed as part of her maintenance and not different. Therefore without any hesitation it can be safely concluded that Ranganayakiammal was given right in the property for her maintenance during her life-time.

With this position we have to examine whether the limited right given to Rangayanakiammal in the Will, by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has become absolute right. Mr.M.R.Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel for the appellants contends that the limited right given to Ranganayakiammal in Ex.B2 will being in lieu of maintenance, that right would come within the scope of Section 14(1) read with the Explanation thereunder and thus the limited right has blossomed into a full of absolute right. On the other hand Mr.B.S.Venkatachari, learned Counsel for the respondent (Srinivasaraghavan) would submit that the right given to Ranganayakiammal in the Will is a restricted right, in that, she is to enjoy only the income of the property during her lifetime and that after her life-time Srinivasaraghavan will become the absolute owner of ''A'' schedule property and ''B'' schedule property also would go to him absolutely with some conditions and therefore the Will comes u/s 14(2) and not u/s 14(1) and hence there is no question of the limited right of Ranganayakiammal enlarging into an absolute right. As regards the contention that only the right to the income from the property is given to Ranganayakiammal and thus she is not entitled to any right to the corpus, I think there is no tenable point. The right to the income of the property till her life-time is itself a right in the property and that is a limited right coming within the scope of Section 14(1). As regards the next contention that after her life-time ''A'' schedule property shall absolutely go to Srinivasaraghavan and ''B'' schedule property also shall go to him subject to some conditions to be fulfilled by him and this would shew that the right given to Ranganayakiammal is a restricted one contemplated u/s 14(2), of course the right given to Ranganayakiammal is restricted one. But the point is whether this restricted right, considering the other circumstances stated in the document particularly that the limited estate was given in lieu of maintenance, comes u/s 14(1) read with the Explanation thereunder or u/s 14(2).

At this Juncture it would be convenient to read Section 14 which is as follows:

Property of a Female Hindu to be her absolute Property...(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation: In this Sub-section, "property" includes both moveable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as Stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

(2) Nothing contained in Sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court of under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.

Mr. M.R. Narayanaswami, in support of his contention relies on V. Tulasamma and Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddy, (Dead) by L.Rs. (1978)1 S.C.J.39 : (1978) A.W.R. (S.C.) 6 : AIR 1977 S.C. 1944. This decision had been brought to the notice of the first appellate Court also but however the learned District Judge had the view that this decision will not apply to the facts of the present case. On a careful reading of the said decision of the Supreme Court I am clearly of the view that the learned District Judge is not correct. In this decision the ambit and scope of the entire Section 14 i.e., Section 14(1) with Explanation thereto and also Section 14(2) has been discussed, and what has been held is quite relevant to our case. The Judgment has been rendered by a Bench of three learned Judges one of them Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) has rendered a Judgment which has been concurred by A.C.Gupta, J., and Murtaza Fazl, Ali, J. has given a separate Judgment but concurring with the finding of Bhagwati, J.

In that case the appellant Tulasamma claimed maintenance out of the joint family properties in the hands of the respondent who was her husband''s brother. The claim was decreed in favour of the appellant and in execution of the decree for maintenance a compromise was arrived at between the parties allotting the properties in question to the appellant for her maintenance and giving her a limited interest in the said properties. The appellant contended that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, her limited right in the property has become absolute one. This was whether the limited right fell within Section 14(1) or came u/s 14(2).

Bhagwati. J., discussing the scope of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 read with the Explanation there under, stated that,

Sub-section (1) of Section 14, is wide in its scope and ambit and uses language of great amplitude.

Then the learned Judge proceeds to state,

It will, therefore, be seen that Sub-section (1) of Section 14 is large in its amplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of property by a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu of maintenance and where such property was possessed by her at the date of commencement of the Act or was subsequently acquired and possessed she would become the full owner of the property.

And then referring to Sub-section (2) of Section 14 the learned Judge would observe that,

This provision is more in the nature of a proviso or exception to Sub-section (1) and it was regarded as such by this Court in Seth Badri Prasad Vs. Srimati Kanso Devi, .

Then applying the rules of interpretation of Sections he would state that,

Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of Sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to Sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the First time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property.

(Underlining mine.)

Then the learned Judge after referring to the dictum in Seth Badri Prasad Vs. Srimati Kanso Devi, proceeds to observe that,

Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of a right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Sub-section (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a restricted estate in the property.

Fazl Ali, J. in his Judgment, in paragraph 52. would lay down that,

Section 14(2) applies only to cases where the grant is not in lieu of maintenance or in recognition of preexisting rights but confers a fresh right or title for the first time and while conferring the said title certain restrictions are placed by the grant or transfer. Where, however, the grant is merely in recognition or in implementation of a pre-existing right to claim maintenance, the case falls beyond the purview of Section 14(2) and comes squarely within the Explanation to Section 14(1).

In paragraph 78 the learned Judge would point out that,

... the claim for maintenance is doubt-less a pre-existing right...

This being the position of law enunciated by the Supreme Court, in the present case the limited estate having been given in lieu of maintenance, it is not a new grant but in recognition of a preexisting right. Therefore Section 14(1) only would apply and not Section 14(2).

In view of the arguments advanced by Mr. R.S. Venkatachari, it may be stated here that in the usual course Ramaswami Iyengar''s son Srinivasaraghavan would be entitled to the property under the Will, but the intervention of law, as Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, alters that course and makes the limited estate of Ranganayakiammal as absolute one.

Mr. M.R. Narayananaswami, in support of his contention also relies on Bai Vajia (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Thakorbhai Chelabhai and Others, . In that decision, after referring to Tulasamma''s case (1978)1 An.W.R. 6: (1978)1 S.C.J. 39: AIR 1978 S.C. 1944 : it was held that,

A combined reading of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act and the Explanation following Sub-section (1) makes it clear, that Sub-section (2) does not operate to take property acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance (which is property specifically included in the enumeration contained in this Explanation) out of the purview of Sub-section (1)

A Division Bench of this Court in Venugopala Pillai v. Thayyanayaki Ammal and Ors. AIR 1979 Mad.124 : 92 L.W.84, wherein Thulasamm''s case (1978)1 S.C.J. 39: (1978)1 A.W.R. 6: AIR 1977 S.C. 1944 had been relied on, laid down as follows:

In the light of the meaning which has always been attributed to the technical expression ''widow''s estate or woman''s estate'' the mere fact that under the deed, such a right to which A was entitled to was conferred on her by reason of a mutual arrangement or a compromise would not mean that such an estate was conferred on her for the first time under the deed or created primarily thereunder. It is a reiteration and a declaration of a pre-existing right of a Hindu widow to take therein a widow''s estate subject to the limitation and restriction. Consequently she will become the full owner of the property.

Mr. R.S. Venkatachari, learned Counsel for the respondent would also rely on some authorities, but in my view none of them would help him in view of the decision in Tulasamma ''s case AIR 1977 S.C. 1944. The first decision relied on by the learned Counsel is K.S. Subramania Pillai and Others Vs. E.S.R. Packirisami Pillai, . In that case, plea that in the Will a life estate was given in lieu of maintenance was negatived on the ground that there was no recital in the deed that it was to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise any preexisting right of the wife of the legator, nor there was any pleadings or proof in that regard. But that is not the position in the present case. The will in the present case contains a clear recital that on the wife''s asking for some properties for her maintenance she is being given a life interest in the properties.

The next case is Mst. Karmi Vs. Amru and Others, . In that case u/s 14 of the Hindu Succession Act a full right was claimed by the widow on the basis of a Will executed by her husband giving her a life estate. This was refused. In that case it was not the case of the widow as in the present case that the life estate given to her was in lieu of her maintenance or in recognition or in confirmation of any other pre-existing right.

So also in Kothi Satyanarayana Vs. Galla Sithayya and Others, a Hindu settled certain properties on the widow of his brother with life interest and upon her death those properties were to revert to the settlor or his heirs and there was no question of execution of the settlement in recognition of any pre-existing right. Therefore rightly the Court held that the limited right of the widow comes under Sub-section (2) of Section 14 and not Sub-section (1).

Similarly in A. Venkataraman Vs. S. Rajalakshmi and Others, there was no question of giving life estate under the Will in question to a daughter in lieu of or in recognition of any pre-existing right such as maintenance. Therefore rightly it was held that the limited estate given to the daughter falls u/s 14(2) and not u/s 14(1). Yet another decision relied on by Mr.R.S. Venkatachari is a Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana in Smt. Jaswant Kaur Vs. Harpal Singh and Others, . In that case a will had been executed by the husband in favour of his wife as per which the wife shall have the property for herlife-time and shall maintain herself and bring up her daughters from the income of the property and that she would hot be competent to transfer any property. It was held that Sub-section (2) of Section 14 would apply to the limited estate and not Sub-section (1). In that case the facts are different from the facts of Tulasammal''s case (1978)1 S.C.J. 39: (1978) An.W.R. (S.C.) 6: AIR 1977.S.C. 1944 as well as the present case, in that in the Punjab and Haryana case life estate is given to the donee for the purpose of her own maintenance and also for gringing up her daughters. Whatever maybe the position of law with regard to this, in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Tulasammal''s case (1978)1 S.C.J. 39: (1978) An.W.R. (S.C.) 6: AIR 1977 S.C. 1944 the Punjab and Haryana decision cannot be considered.

Thus the Judgment of the first appellate Court that the limited right of Ranganayakiammal under the Will comes u/s 14(2) and not u/s 14(1) cannot be upheld as correct.

In the result the Judgment and decree of the first appellate Court are set aside and the Judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored.

There will be no order as to costs.