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Judgment
Srinivasan, J.—Madras Act XI of 1954, the Madras Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Lands) Act, confers by S. 3 thereof power upon
the State Government to acquire land for the purpose of clearing or improving an area, where such area has been notified to be a slum area. A
notification published under S. 3 (1) vests the land in the State Government. S.5 provides that every person whose right, title or interest in any land
is acquired under the Act, shall be entitled to receive and be paid compensation as provided. S. 6 of the Act lays down that the amount payable as
compensation shall be lesser of the two amounts : (1) an amount equal to five times the net annual average income derived from such land during
the period of five consecutive years immediately preceding the publication of the notice ; (2) the amount that would have been payable as
compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in respect of such land, had such land been acquired under that Act. The net average annual
income has to be calculated in the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in the Schedule to the Act. The prescribed authority has to
hold an enquiry in the prescribed manner and determine, for the purpose of computing the amount payable as compensation (1) the net average
annual income and (2) the amount that would have been payable as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Under Sub-S. (3) of S.
6, the prescribed authority has to publish a notice in the Fort St. George Gazette setting out the amount so determined and calling upon every
person interested to intimate before a specified date whether such person agrees to the amounts determined and, in fact, what amount he claims to
be the net average annual income or the amount that would be payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Sub-S. 4(a) provided for an appeal
to the Court and it is in these terms:
Any person who does not agree to the amount of the net average annual income or to the amount that would have been been payable as
compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as determined by the prescribed authority under Sub-S. 3 and claims a sum in excess of that
amount, may prefer an appeal to the Court within 30 days from the date specified in the notice referred to in the Sub-section.
Sub-S. (b) provides for a second appeal on any question of law in certain cases.
The present civil revision petition arises from the decision of the Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, holding that the court-fee payable on
a Memorandum of Appeal under S. 6 (4) (a) of the Act should be computed on the difference between the amount fixed as the net average annual
income and the amount claimed in the appeal. The learned Principal Judge relied upon S. 51 of the Madras Court Fees Act in coming to this
conclusion. It is the correctness of that decision that is canvassed in this revision petition, the contention of the petitioner being that the appeal is not
against the amount awarded, but against the computation of a different sum. That being so, S. 51 will not apply and the court-fee payable on the
Memorandum of Appeal must, according to the petitioner, be only under Art. 3 of Sch. II to the Court Fees Act.
S. 51 of the Court Fees Act is in these terms:
The fee payable under this Act on a Memorandum of Appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force
for the acquisition of property for a public purpose shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by
the appellant.
Art. 3 of Sch. II, which according to the petitioner, is the relevant Article, applicable to the present case, reads thus:
A Memorandum of Appeal from an order, inclusive of an order determining any question under S. 47 or S. 144. C.P.C., 1908 and not otherwise
provided for, when presented (1) to any Court other than the High Court or to any executive officer other than the Board of Revenue or Chief
Executive authority�Re.1.
The question to be decided is whether it is S. 51 that would apply to the present cases or the Article extracted above.
The Order of the Principal Judge is in these terms:
It cannot be disputed that the Slum Improvement Act is an enactment which provides for the acquisition of property for public purposes and that
the order appealed against is an order which relates to compensation within the meaning of the said Section. It may be said that no compensation
had actually been awarded in this case, that the order had merely fixed the basis thereof and that the compensation would be awarded later by
multiplying the amount fixed by five times. I am not however inclined to uphold the technical objection. The term ""awarded"" may be legitimately
construed to mean ""fixed"". I therefore hold that the court-fee payable in this case will be the difference between the amount fixed and the amount
claimed in appeal.
The last sentence is clearly erroneous, for the court-fee is to be paid on the difference and is not the difference itself. But the underlying
implication of the order is fairly clear.
Before proceeding to examine the exact import of S. 51 of the Court Fees Act, reference may be made to a few other provisions of the Slum
Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act. S. 7 of the Act provides for apportionment of compensation and states that where there are several
persons interested, the prescribed authority shall determine the persons who, in its opinion, are entitled to the compensation and the amount
payable to each of them. Sub-S. (2) of S. 7 states that if there is any dispute as to the apportionment of compensation or as to the persons to
whom it is payable, the prescribed authority may refer such dispute to the Court and the Court shall in deciding such a dispute follow so far as may
be the provisions of Part III of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. S. 8 deals in particular with the payment of compensation or deposit of the amount
into Court. S. 8 (1) reads-
The prescribed authority shall tender payment of the compensation to the persons entitled thereto and shall pay it to them.
Sub-S. 2 provides for deposit of the amount of compensation into Court if the parties entitled thereto shall not consent to receive it or the
person is incompetent to alienate the land or if there is any dispute as to title to receive compensation or as to the apportionment of the
compensation. It is noteworthy that a dispute as to the adequacy of the compensation is not covered by this or any other provision. It is necessary
at this stage to point out certain differences in the language employed in S. 6 (3) of the Act and S. 8 (1), While S. 6 (3) empowers the prescribed
authority to determine (1) the net average annual income and (2) the amount of compensation as payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
and calls upon the persons interested to state whether they agree to the amounts determined. S. 8 (1) provides for the actual tendering of the
amount computed to be the amount of compensation payable to the persons entitled. The Act nowhere uses the expression ""award"" in the sense of
an award that is made by the acquiring authority under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Decisions have laid it down that an award even under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is only an offer and when S. 8(1) of the Slum Improvement Act provides for offering the amounts to the persons
interested, it seems reasonable to hold that that offer is in the nature of an award. The distinction in the language employed between S. 6 (3) and 8
(1) of the Act is very material, for, upon a proper understanding of that distinction rests the determination of the further question whether S. 51 of
the Court Fees Act would apply to an appeal under S. 6 (4) (a) of the Slum Improvement Act.
It is commonplace that a taxing statute has to be interpreted strictly. There can be no question of learning of leaning in favour of of the subject
any more than there can be any weightage in favour of Revenue. If the facts any particular case fall clearly within the language of the taxing
provision, then the subject cannot escape. Equally if the facts of the case Will not fit in with the language employed in a taxing provision, the subject
will be out of it. The words of the taxing provision have to be given their natural meaning and no strained construction should be placed upon the
language in order to bring in any particular case within its scope.
Turning now to S. 51, it is true that the order determining the amount specified in S. 6 (3) of the Slum Improvement Act may be termed an
order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of property. Even assuming as such, the next question is
whether the later part of the provision is satisfied. It requires that the fee payable shall be computed on the difference between the ""amount
awarded"" and the ""amount claimed"" by the appellant. It is the contention of Mr. A. Doraiswami that the stage of an award has not been reached in
the proceeding and until an offer is made under S. 8 (1) of the Act, there is no amount which can in law be said to have been awarded. The stage
at which the matter reaches the civil Court by way of an appeal under S. 6 (4) (a) is only at the stage of determination of the two amounts relevant
to the computation of the compensation. Though it is true that the quantum of compensation is reached by a mere mechanical multiplication oft the
net average annual income by five times, or the amount that would be awardable under the Land Acquisition Act if that amount should be less,
nevertheless, there has been no award, but no amount having been awarded, the latter part of S. 51 will not apply. On the other hand, it is pointed
out. Art. 3 of Sch. II clearly covers all appeals ""not otherwise provided for"" when presented to any Court other than the High Court.
Notwithstanding therefore, that an ""order relating to compensation"" is specifically mentioned in S. 51, since the dispute is not with regard to the
amount awarded but only with regard to the determination of a different sum, so it is argued, S. 51 does not apply.
Learned Counsel appearing for the Government Pleader contends on the other hand that since the amount determined as the net average
annual income virtually determines also the quantum of compensation, ""amount awarded"" appearing in S. 51 must mean the amount determined to
be the compensation payable. It is urged that when once the net average annual income has been determined, there is no further step to be
followed in the computation of the amount to be awarded as compensation and therefore, the dispute is really with regard to the amount awarded.
I am unable to accept the contention on behalf of the Revenue. As I said, the expressions have to be given their normal meaning. When a
provision speaks of an amount awarded, it means that a certain sum has been offered as compensation to the persons interested. Had the Slum
Improvement Act made no provision for the making of such an offer independently of the provisions contained in S. 6 of the Act, the argument on
behalf of the Revenue may have some force. But, as I have pointed out, S. 8 (1) of the Act specifically provides for offering the amount to the
persons interested. That is the stage at which the amount is awarded. It cannot be said, therefore, that the mere determination of the net average
annual income or some other figure, which is but a step towards the ascertainment of the quantum of compensation is the same thing as an award
of the amount of compensation.
There is no direct authority. Learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner has referred to certain decisions. In Hirji Virji v. Govt. of Bombay
AIR 1946 Bom. 348, the interpretation of S. 8 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 was in question. That provision is in terms identical with S. 51 of the
Madras Court Fees Act. The point that had to be decided was whether an award of an arbitrator under S. 19 of the Defence of India Act fixing
the amount of compensation is or is not an order within the meaning of S. 8 of the Court Fees Act. The Learned Judge pointed out that S. 8 of the
Court Fees Act is not a charging section and that it merely provides a rule for computing the at valorem court-fee payable in certain classes of
cases on the assumption that under some other provisions of the Act a fixed fee is chargeable. The expression ""order"" appearing in S. 8 of the
Court Fees Act was held by the learned Judge to mean an order which has the force of a decree. Since an arbitrator is not a Court, an award
made by him would not be an order in the sense stated. In The Crown v. Chandrabanlal AIR 1957 Nag. 8, a similar question arose. There also it
was the award of the arbitrator under S. 19 of the Defence of India Act that was in question, and the appeal was by the Government, for reducing
the compensation awarded. A Bench of the Nagpur High Court approved of the principle of the Bombay decision referred to earlier and held that
since the award of the arbitrator cannot be deemed to be an order within the meaning of S. 8 of the Court Fees Act, that provision would not
apply, and that the court-fee payable would be the fixed court-fee prescribed in Sch. II to the Court Fees Act. These two decisions appear to
support the contentions of the petitioner, though it was upon the interpretation of the expression ""order"" that the decisions proceeded. Learned
Counsel also referred to another decision which is against him. That is Satya Charan Sur Vs. State of West Bengal, . In that case, a single Judge of
the Calcutta High Court did not agree with the Bombay decision. His reasoning was that the expression ""order"" is not used by itself in S. 8 of the
Court Fees Act, but is qualified by the further expression ""relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force."" That being so, the
learned Judge thought that the expression ""order"" in S. 8 need not necessarily be an order of the nature specified in S. 2 (14), C.P.C. The learned
Judge''s view was that an award through the medium of an arbitrator under S. 7 of the Requisitioning and the Acquisition of Immoveable property
Act is an order within the meaning of S. 8. None of these decisions to my mind affords any real assistance for the determination of the question that
arises in this civil revision petition. Giving every word in S. 51 its appropriate meaning, I am of the view that the dispute which is brought before the
Court under S.6 (4) (a) of the Slum Improvement Act, though it may arise out of an order relating to compensation, does not involve, a dispute
regarding the award of any amount, and that being so, there can be no question of a difference between the ""amount awarded"" and the ""amount
claimed"". The latter part of S. 51 cannot in terms be applied to a case like the present.
The learned Principal Judge thought that it was a technical objection that was raised by the petitioner. That view cannot be supported. A party
affected by a taxing provision is entitled to demand that the terms of the statute should be strictly construed and if such a construction does not
bring him within the terms of the section, he cannot be subjected to the tax. An objection of that kind is not a technical objection.
It is not denied that in a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where a person interested objects to the quantum of compensation
and claims a larger amount, he makes an application to the acquiring authority and that authority makes a reference under S. 18 of the Land
Acquisition Act to the Court and the Court thereupon proceeds to determine the correct amount of compensation. The dispute in such a case
relates to the quantum of compensation, the interested party claiming a larger amount than that awarded by the acquiring officer. The position there
is precisely the same as that which obtains in a dispute with regard to the determination of the amount specified in S. 6 (3) of the Slum
Improvement Act though this dispute is not directly against the quantum of compensation. I have already pointed out that this Act contains no
provision for an appeal or a reference regarding a dispute about the quantum of compensation as such. Had it been a case of an acquisition under
the Land Acquisition Act, the person interested who raises the dispute with regard to the amount of compensation is not called upon to pay any
court-fee. He has only to make an application to the acquiring officer asking for a reference to be made to the Court. If it is the view that S. 51
applies to the instant case and the person interested should pay court-fee on the difference, between the amount awardable as compensation on
the basis of five times the net average annual income as determined by the prescribed authority and the amount claimed by the petitioner, then a
person whose property is being acquired under the Slum Improvement Act is called upon to pay court-fee, while a person whose property is
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act has to pay no court-fee for an adjudication about the quantum of compensation. The two persons are
similarly situated and there is no reason why the provision should be so interpreted that it casts a burden upon the one and not upon the other. This
also seems to me to be relevant in construing the precise scope of S. 51 of the Court Fees Act. In the view that I have taken, the proper court-fee
payable upon the Memorandum of Appeal under S. 6 (4) (3) of the Slum Improvement Act is under Art. 3 of Sch. II to the Court Fees Act. The
order of the Court below is set aside. The petition is allowed with costs.