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Judgment
Srinivasan, J.—Madras Act XI of 1954, the Madras Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act, confers by Section 3 thereof power
upon the State Government to acquire land for the purpose of clearing or improving an area, where such area has been notified to be a slum area.
A notification published u/s 3(1) vests the land in the State Government. Section 5 provides that every person whose right, title or interest in any
land is acquired under the Act, shall be entitled to receive and be paid compensation as provided. Section 6 of the Act lays down that the amount
payable as compensation shall be lesser of the two amounts : (i) an amount equal to five times the net annual average income derived from such
land during the period of five consecutive years immediately preceding the publication of the notice ; (ii) the amount that would have been payable
as compensation under the land Acquisition Act, 1894, in respect of such lands, had such land been acquired under that Act. The net average
annual income has to be calculated in the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in the Schedule to the Act. The prescribed authority
has to hold an enquiry in the prescribed manner and determine, for the purpose of computing the amount payable as compensation (i) the net
average annual income and (ii) the amount that would have been payable as compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Under Sub-
section (3) of Section 6, the prescribed authority has to publish a notice in the Fort St. George Gazette, setting out the amount so determined and
calling upon every person interested to intimate before specified date whether such person agrees to the amounts determined and, if not, what
amount he claims to be the net average annual income or the amount that would be payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Sub-section
4(a) provides for an appeal to the Court, and it is in these terms (amended Madras Act XXXII of 1959).
Any person who does not agree to the amount of the net average annual income or to the amount that would have been payable as compensation
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as determined by the prescribed authority under Sub-section (3) and claims a sum in excess of that amount,
may prefer an appeal to the Court within thirty days from the date specified in the notice referred to in that sub-section.
Sub-section (b) provides for a second appeal on any question of law in certain cases.
The present Civil Revision Petition arises from the decision of the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, Madras, holding that the court-fee
payable on a memorandum of appeal u/s 6(4)(a) of the Act should be computed on the difference between the amount fixed as the net average
annual income and the'' amount claimed in the appeal. The learned Principal Judge relied upon Section 51 of the Madras Court Fees Act in coming
to this conclusion. It is the correctness of that decision that is canvassed in this Revision Petition, the contention of the Petitioner being that the
appeal is not against the amount awarded but against the computation of a different sum. That being so, Section 51 will not apply and the Court-
fee payable on the memorandum of appeal must, according to the Petitioner be only under Article 3 of Schedule II to the Court Fees Act.
Section 51 of the Court Fees Act is in these terms:
The fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for
the acquisition of property for public purposes shall be computed on the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the
Appellant.
Article 3 of Schedule II which according to the Petitioner, is the relevant article applicable to the present case, reads thus:
Memorandum of appeal from an order, inclusive of an order determining any question u/s 47 or Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
and not otherwise provided for, when presented--(1) to any court other than the High Court or to any executive officer other than the Board of
Revenue or Chief Executive Authority--One rupee.
The question to be decided is whether it is Section 51 that would apply to the present case or the article extracted above.
The order of the Principal Judge is in these terms:
It cannot be disputed that the Slum Improvement Act is an enactment which provides for the acquisition of property for public purposes and that
the order appealed against is an order which relates to compensation within the meaning of the said section. It may be said that no compensation
had actually been awarded in this case, that the order had merely fixed the basis thereof and that the compensation would be awarded later by
multiplying the amount fixed by five times. I am not however inclined to uphold the technical objection. The term awarded may be legitimately
construed to mean fixed. I, therefore, hold that the court fee payable in this case will be the difference between the amount fixed and the amount
claimed in appeal.
The last sentence is clearly erroneous, for the court fee is to be paid on the difference and is not the difference itself. But the under lying implication
of the order is fairly clear.
Before proceeding to examine the exact import of Section 51 of the Court Fees Act, reference may be made to a few other provisions of the
Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act. Section 7 of the Act provides for apportionment of compensation and states that where there are
several persons interested, the prescribed authority shall determine the persons who, in its opinion, are entitled to the compensation and the amount
payable to each of them. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 states that if there is any dispute as to the apportionment of compensation or as to the
persons to whom it is payable, the prescribed authority may refer such dispute to the Court and the Court shall in deciding such a dispute follow so
far as may be the provisions of Part III of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 8 deals in particular with the payment of compensation or
deposit of the amount into Court. Section 8(1) reads:
The prescribed authority shall tender payment of the compensation to the persons entitled thereto and shall pay it to them.
Sub-section (2) provides for deposit of the amount of compensation into Court if the parties entitled thereto shall not consent to receive it or the
person is incompetent to alienate the land or if there is any dispute as to title to receive compensation or as to the apportionment of the
compensation. It is noteworthy that a dispute as to the adequacy of the compensation is not covered by this or any other provision. It is necessary
at this stage to point out certain differences in the language employed in Section 6(3) of the Act and Section 8(1). While Section 6(3) empowers
the prescribed authority to determine (i) the net average annual income and (ii) the amount of compensation as payable under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 and calls upon the persons interested to state whether they agree to the amounts determined, Section 8(1).
provides for the actual tendering of the amount computed to be the amount of compensation payable to the persons entitled. The Act nowhere
uses the expression award in the sense of an award that is made by the acquiring authority under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Decisions have
laid it down that an award even under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is only an offer and when Section 8(1) of the Slum Improvement Act
provides for offering the amount to the persons interested, it seems reasonable to hold that that offer is in the nature of an award. The distinction in
the language employed between Sections 6(3) and 8(1) of the Act is very material, for, upon a proper understanding of that distinction rests the
determination of the further question whether Section 51 of the Court-Fees Act would apply to an appeal u/s 6(4)(a) of the Slum Improvement
Act.
It is commonplace that a taxing statute has to be interpreted strictly. There can be no question of leaning in favour of the subject any more than
there can be any weight age in favour of Revenue. If the facts of any particular case fall clearly within the language of the taxing provision, then the
subject cannot escape. Equally if the facts of the ease will not fit in with the language employed in a taxing provision, the subject will be out of it.
The words of the taxing provision have to be given their natural meaning and no strained construction should be placed upon the language in order
to bring in any particular case within its scope.
Turning now to Section 51, it is true that the order determining the amount specified in Section 6(3) of the Slum Improvement Act may be
termed an order relating to compensation under any Act for the time being in force for the acquisition of property. Even assuming so much, the next
question is whether the latter part of the provision is satisfied. It requires that the fee payable shall be computed on the difference between the
amount awarded and the amount claimed by the Appellant. It is the contention of Mr. A. Doraiswami that the stage of an award has not been
reached in the proceeding and until an offer is made u/s 8(1) of the Act, there is no amount which can in law be said to have been awarded. The
stage at which the matter reaches the Civil Court by way of an appeal u/s 6(4)(a) is only at the stage of determination of the two amounts relevant
to the computation of the compensation. Though it is true that the quantum of compensation is reached by a mechanical multiplication of the net
average annual income by five times, or the amount that would be awardable under the Land Acquisition Act if that amount should be less,
nevertheless, there has been no award, and no amount having been awarded, the latter part of Section 51 will not apply. On the other hand, it is
pointed out Article 3 of Schedule II clearly covers all appeals not otherwise provided for when presented to any Court other than the High Court.
Notwithstanding, therefore, that an order relating to compensation is specifically mentioned in Section 51 since the dispute is not with regard to the
amount awarded but only with regard to the determination of a different sum, so it is argued, Section 51 does not apply.
Learned, Counsel appearing for the Government Pleader contends on the other hand that since the amount determined as the net average annual
income virtually determines also the quantum of compensation, amount awarded appearing in Section 51 must mean the amount determined to be
the compensation payable. It is urged that when once the net average annual income has been determined, there is no further step to be followed in
the computation of the amount to be awarded as compensation and, therefore, the dispute is really with regard to the amount awarded.
I am unable to accept the contention on behalf of the Revenue. As I said, the expression have to be given their normal meaning. When a
provision speaks of an amount awarded, it means that a certain sum has been offered as compensation to the persons interested. Had the Slum
Improvement Act made no provision for the making of such an offer independently of the provisions contained in Section 6 of the Act, the
argument on behalf of the Revenue may have some force. But, as I have pointed out, Section 8(1) of the Act specifically provides for offering the
amount to the persons interested. That is the stage at which the amount is awarded. It cannot be said, therefore, that the mere determination of the
net average annual income or some other figure which is but a step towards the ascertainment of the quantum of compensation is the same thing as
an award of the amount of compensation.
There is no direct authority. Learned Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner has referred to certain decisions. In Hirji Virji v. The Government of
Bombay ILR 1946 Bom. 709, the interpretation of Section 8 of the Court-Fees Act of 1870 was in question. That provision is in terms identical
with Section 51 of the Madras Court-Fees Act. The point that had to be decided was whether an award of an arbitrator u/s 19 of the defence of
India Act fixing the amount of compensation is or is not an order within the meaning of Section 8 of the Court-Fees Act. The learned Judge
pointed out that Section 8 of the Court-Fees Act is not a charging section and that it merely provides a rule for computing the ad valorem Court-
fee payable in certain classes of cases on the assumption that under some other provisions of the Act a fixed fee is chargeable. The expression
order appearing in Section 8 of the Court-Fees Act was held by the learned Judge to mean an order which has the force of a decree. Since an
arbitrator is not a Court, an award made by him would not be an order in the sense stated. In Crown v. Chandrabhanlal ILR (1956) Nag. 471 a
similar question arose. There also it was the award of the arbitrator u/s 19 of the defence of India Act that was in question, and the appeal was by
the Government for reducing the compensation awarded. A Bench of the Nagpur High Court approved of the principle of the Bombay decision
referred to earlier and held that since the award of the arbitrator cannot be deemed to be an order within the meaning of Section 8 of the Court-
Fees Act, that provision would not apply, and that the Court-fee payable would be the fixed Court-fee prescribed in Schedule II to the Court-
Fees Act. These two decisions appear to support the contention of the Petitioner, though it was upon the interpretation of the expression order that
the decisions proceeded. Learned Counsel also referred to another decision which is against him. That is Satya Charan Sur Vs. State of West
Bengal, . In that case, a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court did not agree with the Bombay decision. His reasoning was that the expression
order is not used by itself in Section 8 of the Court-Fees Act but is qualified by the further expression relating to compensation under any Act for
the time being in force. That being so, the learned Judge thought that the expression order in Section 8 need not necessarily be an order of the
nature specified in Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judge''s view was that an award through the medium of an arbitrator
u/s 7 of the Requisitioning and the Acquisition of Immovable Property Act is an order within the meaning of Section 8. None of these decisions to
my mind affords any real assistance for the determination of the question that arises in this Civil Revision Petition. Giving every word in Section 51
its appropriate meaning, I am of the view that the dispute which is brought before the Court u/s 6(4)(a) of the Slum Improvement Act, though it
may arise out of an order relating to compensation, does not involve, a dispute regarding the award of any amount, and that being so, there can be
no question of a difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed. The latter part of Section 51 cannot in terms be applied to a
case like the present.
The learned Principal Judge thought that it was a technical objection that was raised by the Petitioner. That view cannot be supported. A party
affected by a taxing provision is entitled to demand that the terms of the statute should be strictly construed and if such a construction does not
bring him within the terms of the section, he cannot be subjected to the tax. An objection of that kind is not a technical objection.
It is not denied that in a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where a person interested objects to the quantum of compensation
and claims a larger amount, he makes an application to the acquiring authority and that authority makes a reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act to the Court and the Court thereupon proceeds to determine the correct amount of compensation. The dispute in such a case relates to the
quantum of compensation, the interested party claiming a larger amount than that awarded by the acquiring officer. The position there is precisely
the same as that which obtains in a dispute with regard to the determination of the amount specified in Section 6(3) of the Slum Improvement Act
though this dispute is not directly against the quantum of compensation. I have already pointed out that this Act contains no provision for an appeal
or a reference regarding a dispute about the quantum of compensation as such. Had it been a case of an acquisition under the Land Acquisition
Act, the person interested who raises the dispute with regard to the amount of compensation is not called upon to pay any Court-fee. He has only
to make an application to the acquiring officer asking for a reference to be made to the Court. If it is the view that Section 51 applies to the instant
case and the person interested should pay Court-fee on the difference between the amount awardable as compensation on the basis of five times
the net average annual in come as determined by the prescribed authority and the amount claimed by the Petitioner, then a person whose property
is being acquired under the Slum Improvement Act is called upon to pay Court-fee, while a person whose property is acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act has to pay no Court-fee for an adjudication about the quantum of compensation. The two persons are similarly situated and there
is no reason why the provision should be so interpreted that it casts a burden upon the one and not upon the other. This also seems to me to be
relevant in construing the precise scope of Section 51 of the Court-Fees Act.
In the view that I have taken the proper Court fee payable upon the memorandum of appeal u/s 6(4)(3) of the Slum Improvement Act is under
Article 3 of Schedule II to the Court-Fees Act. The order of the Court below is set aside. The petition is allowed with costs.