High CourtsSingle Bench

S. Ramachandran vs The Special Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Administration and Perumal Naidu

Madras High Court · Decided on 20 September 2006 · Citation: (2006) 4 LW 390

HON’BLE JUDGES
F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 14(1), 5
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 37076 of 2005 and W.P.M.P. No. 14283 of 2006
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35 paragraphs · 776 words

F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.—By consent of learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the writ petition itself is taken up for disposal.

2.

The challenge in the writ petition is to the order of the first respondent, dated 18.10.2005, holding that the revision petition filed by the petitioner

as against the order of the District Revenue Officer, dated 30.6.2005, was not filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. Since

there was a delay of four days, the revision petition was to be rejected as time barred.

3.

It is not in dispute that the first respondent had no authority to entertain the revision petition after the prescribed period of 30 days. However,

the question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act and seek for condonation of

delay in filing the revision petition.

4.

In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in P. Sarathy Vs. State Bank of India, . In that case,

the suit came to be filed after the prescribed period of limitation and the appellant therein took a stand that the period during which he was agitating

before the appellate authority constituted under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, should be excluded while working

out the period of limitation. The Supreme Court accepted the claim of the appellant. The Supreme Court, while construing Section 14(1) of the

Limitation Act, where the expression ""Court"" has been used, held that the said expression would take within its fold all those quasi-judicial

authorities who have all the trappings of the Court. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment of the Supreme Court is relevant for our present purpose,

which reads as under:

13.

In Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha Vs. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Another, this Court, while considering the question under

the Contempt of Courts Act, held that the Registrar under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act was a court. It was held that the

Registrar had not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he was given the same powers as was given to an ordinary civil court by the

CPC including the powers to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents and to hear the parties. The

Court referred to the earlier decisions in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees AIR 1960 SC 188 : 1950 SCR 459; Maqbool Hussain Vs. The State of

Bombay, and Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain, . The Court approved the rule laid down in these cases that in order to constitute a court in the

strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to

give a decision or a definitive judgment which has Finality and Authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.

5.

If the principles set out in the said paragraph are applied to the facts of this case, it can be safely held that the jurisdiction exercisable by the first

respondent as a revisional authority would satisfy all the requirements that have been set out in the above referred to decision of the Supreme

Court. Even u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, the expression used is only ""Court"" and not a ''Civil Court''. Therefore, it can be safely held that there is

every jurisdiction vested in the first respondent to condone the delay involved in preferring the revision petition by invoking Section 5 of the

Limitation Act.

6.

Having regard to the said legal position, it is just and proper that the petitioner is permitted to move the first respondent by way of an application

u/s 5 of the Limitation Act seeking for condonation of the delay in filing the revision petition by adducing the reasons which prevented the petitioner

from filing the revision within the prescribed period of 30 days. Accordingly, while setting aside the order impugned in this writ petition, and

permitting the petitioner to file appropriate application for condonation of delay, along with the revision petition, the first respondent is directed to

dispose of the petitioner''s application for condonation of delay, in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders before entertaining the

petitioner''s revision petition and to decide the same on merits. The petitioner shall re-present the revision petition along with the application for

condonation of delay within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

7.

The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs. W.P.M.P. is closed.