Seethalakshmi Ammal vs The State of Tamil Nadu and Another

Mishra, J.—A Bench of this Court in a batch of writ petitions in W.P. No. 865 of 1982 etc. and W.P. No. 3137 of 1983, etc. held in its

judgment dated 8.1.1988 and 21.1.1988 that a subsequent purchaser of a property notified for acquisition u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1

of 1894 and then followed up by Section 6 declaration, cannot have any locus standi to question the acquisition. Venkataswami, J. and Abdul

Hadi, J. found however that they were unable to agree with the said view.

Speaking for the Bench in W.P. No. 865 of 1982, Mohan, J. (as he then was) observed:

W.P. No. 865 of 1982: This is a case in which the petitioner with open eyes when the properties have been notified for acquisition by Section 4(1)

notification and then followed up by Section 6 declaration which is conclusive u/s 6(3), has come to purchase the property and wants to say that he

could question the validity of the acquisition. In support of the argument, a judgment reported in Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Others Vs. Municipal

Committee, Bhatinda and Others, , is cited.

The relevant paragraph on which reliance is placed, is paragraph 17 at page 805; thus reads as follows:

It was urged by Mr. Hazarnavis on behalf of the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, that the three appellants were purchasers of the lands claimed by

them after the notification u/s 4 was issued and they had no right to challenge the issue of the notification. If, however, the notification u/s 4 was

vague, the three appellants who are purchasers of the land had title thereto may challenge the validity of the notification. The appellants have spent

in putting up substantial structures considerable sum of money and we are unable to hold that merely because they had purchased the lands after

the issue of the notification u/s 4 they are debarred from challenging the validity of the notification, or from contending that it did not apply to their

lands.

Venkataswami, J. in the Order of Reference, dated 15.2.1991 has upon this said:

Following the abovesaid ratio, the same Bench has taken the same view in W.P. 3137 of 1983. After going through the judgment of the Supreme

Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Others Vs. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda and Others, , we are unable to agree with the view taken by the

earlier Division Bench of this Court holding that the subsequent purchaser has no locus standi to file the writ petition at all. Such a proposition as

stated above is too bread in our opinion, having regard to the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Others Vs.

Municipal Committee, Bhatinda and Others, . There is a mention in the order of reference of the judgment of this Court in Kuppuswamy v. Special

Tahsildar (1967)2 M.L.J. 329, in which a learned single judge of this Court has taken the view that the agreement-holder can challenge the land

acquisition proceedings as he stepped into the shoes of the original owner.

Article 226(i) of the Constitution nowhere states that the High Court could exercise its power to issue writ only on an application of a person

aggrieved. There is no such inhibition even for the exercise of power of superintendence by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India. This is a concept derived from the English decisions. In Dwarka Nath Vs. Income Tax Officer, Special Circle D-ward, Kanpur and

Another, , it has been explained by the Supreme Court that the founding fathers of the Constitution have designedly couched Article 226 of the

Constitution in a comprehensive phraseology to enable the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs.

Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, , the Supreme Court has said:

In a sense, the scope and nature of the power conferred by the Article is wider than that exercised by the writ courts in England. Howaever, the

adoption of the nomenclature of English writs, with the prefix ""nature of superadded indicates that the general principles grown over the years in the

English Courts, can, shorn of unnecessary technical procedural restrictions, and adopted to the special conditions of this vast country, in so far as

they do not conflict with any provision of the Constitution, or the law declared by this Court, be usefully considered in directing the exercise of this

discretionary jurisdiction in accordance with well recognised rules of practice.

This is thus one of the rules of practice that courts ask the question who is the petitioner and how he is aggrieved. A detailed study of this rule of

practice has been made by the Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, , and it is observed:

According to most English decisions, in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an, ""aggrieved

person"" and, in a case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as, a matter of course, but if he does not fulfil

that character, and is a ""stranger"", the court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very special circumstances.

In short, who is a person aggrieved or in other words, who will have the locus standi to invoke the High Court''s jurisdiction under Article 226

has been answered by the Supreme Court in several judgments, but in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and

Others, , this has been summarised as follows:

This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226,

an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the application, though in the case of some of

the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or

prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter (See U. Unichoyi and Others Vs. The

State of Kerala, ,, The Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, , Ram Umesh-wari Suthee v.

Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa (1967)1 S.C.A. 413, Godde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, , State of

Orissa and Others Vs. Rajasaheb Chandanmull Indrakumar (P) Ltd. and Others, , Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha Vs. S. Lal and Company (P) Ltd., .

The expression ""ordinarily"" indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the application has been

prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter.

That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and

genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above,

are not inconsistent with it.

Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, , has also taken notice of the practice in the United States of

America and stated that in the United States of America also, the law on the point is substantially the same and thus stated,

It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories; (i) person

aggrieved; (ii) stranger; (iii) busybody or meddlesome. interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under

the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things Which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to

act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of

meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper notices. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap

popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court

should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold.

The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were,

two concentric zones; Asolid central zone of certainty, and a gray outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost

nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the. central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants

undoubtedly stand in the category of ''persons aggrieved''. In the gray outer-circle the bounds which separate, the first category from the second,

intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer-zone may not"" be ""persons aggrieved"". To distinguish

such applicants from ""strangers"" among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute

and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be

considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the

sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he

a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person ""against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of

something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own

beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the

authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction

on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words ""persons aggrieved"" is being considered, a social welfare

measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of

particular individuals?

The principles enunciated in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, , have been reiterated so many times

by, now that no one entertained any doubt to the proposition that the meaning of the words ""person aggrieved"" may vary according to the context

of the statute and that even a stranger may be found to have locus standi although he may not have any personal interest of his own, provided he is

not a busybody or meddlesome interloper, and although a stranger, he moves the Court for right in common with the general public.

The question as to locus standi had arisen in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, , on the objection that

a competitor in a cinema business had no right to invoke the writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court noticed in substance that Jabhai Desai''s stand

was that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town would adversely affect his monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and

Joss of business from competition and held,

Such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law because it does not, result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest the business

competition causing it being a lawful activity the term injuries being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. The reason why the law

suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an

individual is a gain to society at large.

In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained

injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect

his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to

hang on Therefore he is not ""person aggrieved"" and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the No Objection Certificate.

The reason why the Supreme Court took the above view in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, , is

explained by it in these words:

It is true that in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general, and certiorari in particular is discretionary. But in a country like

India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the

standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon. The broad guidelines indicated by us, coupled with other

well-established self-devised rules of practice, such as the availability of an alternative remedy, the conduct of the petitioner etc. can go a long way

to help the courts in weeding out a large number of writ petitions at the initial stage with consequent saving of public time and money.

While a procrustean approach should be avoided, as a rule, the court should not interfere at the instance of a ''stranger'' unless there are

exceptional circumstances involving a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse impact on public interests. Assuming that the appellant is a

stranger, and not a busybody, then also there are no exceptional circumstances in the present case which would justify the issue of a writ of

certiorari at his instance. On the contrary, the result of the exercise of these discretionary powers, in his favour, will, on balance, be against public

policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the

appellants'' monopoly of cinema business in the town; and above all, it will in effect, seriously injure the fundamental rights of respondents 1 and 2,

which they have under Article l9(1)(g) of the Constitution, to carry on trade or business subject to ''reasonable restrictions imposed by law.

It is also useful to refer to a judgment of a Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta Vs. President of India and Others, ,

wherein the Supreme Court has pointed out the exceptions to the rules relating to affidavit, locus standi and the like in the case of a class of

litigations which have acquired classification as public interest litigation'' that is, where the public in general are interested in the vindication of some

right or the enforcement of some public duty. Following the observation of the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta Vs. President of India and Others,

and its reiteration in Sheela Barse Vs. State of Maharashtra, and Mrs. Veena Sethi Vs. State of Bihar and Others, , High Courts have started

entertaining such applications where public interest is undermined by arbitrary, and, perverse executive action. But even in such case, the courts

have insisted that, there should be satisfactory credentials of the petitioner, that the nature of information given by him is at least prima facie true

and is not vague and indefinite, that the information is grave or serious and that there are clear circumstances to show that the Court should

intervene.

In Chaitanya Kumar and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, , it has been pointed out that in a public interest litigation, the Court has to

strike a balance between two conflicting interests; (a) Nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the

character of others; and (b) avoidance of public mischief and to prevent publicly mischievous executive actions. In such cases, however, the court

cannot afford to be liberal. They have to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressings public grievance, it does not fencroach

upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature.

With the above rule of practice as to locus standi of a petitioner in view when such a question is asked with respect to any notification,

declaration or proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, one has to take notice of the fact that this law is made for compulsory acquisition of

land by the State for public purposes. There can be no acquisition unless there is a publication of a preliminary notification, that the land in any

locality was needed or was likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company. Upon such a publication of a preliminary notification, it

shall be lawful for any officer either generally or specially authorised by the appropriate Government in this behalf and for his servants and

workmen to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality to dig or bore into the sub-soil, to do all other acts necessary to

ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of work, if

any, proposed to be made thereon; to make such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches; and where otherwise the

survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence

or jungle; provided that to do so, it will not be lawful to enter into any building or upon any enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling-house,

unless with the consent of the occupier thereof, without previously giving such occupier at least seven days'' notice in writing Of his intention to do

sq. The provisions of this Act have a scheme of giving opportunity of being heard to any person interested in any land and only thereafter to make

declaration of intended acquisition u/s 6 of the Act followed by an order for acquisition and notice to persons interested for final claims to

compensation, for all interests in such land, enquiry and award of compensation with the exception of the cases falling u/s 17 of the Act under

which in cases of urgency, the appropriate Government may direct the Collector to take possession of any land needed for a public purpose or for

a company. The Land Acquisition Act contains a definition of the expression ""person interested"" in these words:

The expression ""person interested"" includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under

this Act; and person shall be deemed to be interested in an easement affecting the land;

Except in cases of urgency, the ownership of the property and that interest in the property is not transferred to the Government until award u/s

11 of the Act is made. Section 16 of the Act states,

When the Collector has made an award u/s 11 he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free

from all encumbrances.

Section 17 is couched in such words that unless the Government takes possession of land needed for a public purpose, the ownership does not

vest in the Government:

The expression ""Vest absolutely in the Government"" on taking possession of the same in Section 16 of the Act fell for consideration by a Full

Bench of the Patna High Court in State of Bihar Vs. Dr. G.H. Grant and Another, . The question posed was:

In a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, does title to the land pass to the State as soon as award u/s 11 is made and filed u/s 12 or is it

deferred till possession is taken u/s 16 of the Act.

The Patna Full Bench has said:

On consideration of the various provisions of the Act, my concluded opinion is that title to the land acquired vests in the Government only when

possession of the same is taken by the Government, and not on the making of the award itself. This view gains support from a Bench of the

Calcutta High Court in Nrishinha Charan Nandi Chaudhuri Vs. Nagendra Bala Debee and Another, in that case, the respondents were owners of

a certain tauzi, and were also gantidars of the lands in a village lying within that tauzi. On the 11th of December, 1924, some lands of that village

were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. On 28.3.1925, there was default in payment of the arrears of revenue by the Proprietor of the

tauzi, and the same was sold and purchased by the appellant on 18.9.1925. Two days before that, that is, on 16.9.1925, the Collector took

possession of the tauzi and possession over the rest of the lands acquired, was taken by him on 22.12.1925. The award of the Collector gave to

the respondents certain amount of compensation as proprietors of the tauzi, and some further amount of compensation for their gantidari interest.

On the 3rd of October, 1925, the appellant applied to the Collector for a reference to be made to the Court praying that the whole amount of

compensation awarded by the Collector was payable to him. The District Judge allowed compensation for the proprietary interest to the appellant

and that for the gantidari interest to the respondents. On appeal, the High Court held that the respondents were entitled to proprietary

compensation for the lands of which possession was taken by the Collector before the revenue sale, but the compensation for the proprietary

interest with respect to the lands of which possession was taken by the Collector after the revenue sale was payable to the appellant. The High

Court, therefore, accepted the principle that title to the lands acquired vested in the Government only on taking of possession of the same,

otherwise the compensation money could not have been awarded to both the respondents and the appellant accordingly as possession was taken

by the Government before or after the revenue sale. The case of The State of Bihar Vs. Dr. G.H. Grant and Another, , therefore, has in my

opinion, been rightly decided. I would accordingly answer the question referred to the Full Bench as under:

In a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, title to the land does not pass to the State as soon as award u/s 11 is made and filed u/s 12, but it

is deferred till possession is taken u/s 16 of the Act. 15. It is not necessary to refer to a large number of decisions on the point of different High

Courts as some landmark judgments of this Court and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis

Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., , have almost settled the dispute in this regard. In M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar (1967)1 M.L.J.

329 : 80 L.W. 114, a judgment of this Court which learned Judges making the instant reference have also noticed, has proceeded upon the

definition in Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is observed in the said judgment.

The only question for consideration, therefore, is whether petitioner is a person interested, as defined in Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.

The definition sections says that the expression ''person interested'' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account

of the acquisition of land under the Act. The expression ''person interested'' is very comprehensive and it does not profess to give an exhaustive

definition. The expression ''person interested'' has been interpreted by various Courts, and the trend of the opinion seems to be that I should give a

liberal interpretation.

xx xx xx

On a review of the case-law on the subject, it seems to me that the expression ''person interested'' does not require that a person must really have

an interest in the land sought to be acquired. It is enough if he claims an interest in compensation, as distinguished from an interest in the property

sought to be acquired. As long as a person claims an interest in the compensation, he is a person interested within the meaning of the definition of

the expression.

Petitioner in the said case was a person, who had entered into a valid registered agreement to purchase the property from the original owners of

the property. He had paid a sum of Rs. 3,000 towards the sale price. He had also spent considerable amount in improving the property. When the

property was acquired thus, he was a person interested in the compensation amount. This court held that he was thus a person interested to claim

compensation along with others. This judgment this court has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P)

Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., . The appellant Company therein had moved the Government for acquiring additional land for

the purpose of its existing factory and accordingly notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were duly issued and the proceeding culminated

in an award u/s 12 of the Act. This acquisition was challenged by some of the land owners by way of a writ petition in the Bombay High Court

inter alia on the ground that the land was not required for any public purpose as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act and Government was not

competent to acquire the same for the purpose of a company, which could not be said to be a public purpose. In this writ petition, the appellant

company was impleaded as a party though expressly no relief was claimed against it. The learned single judge, before whom the matter came

initially, quashed the acquisition proceedings. The appellant company then preferred a Letters Patent Appeal. Therein an objection was taken on

behalf of the respondents that the appellant company had no locus standi to maintain the Letters Patent Appeal. This objection was upheld by the

Letters Patent Bench primarily on the ground that the appellant Company as such was not a ''person interested'' within the meaning of Section l8(1)

of the Act. The appellant Company moved the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in its judgment said,

It seems to us that the definition of ''person interested'' given in Section 18 is an inclusive definition so as to embrace all persons who may be

directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the lands

were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the

company under the agreement entered into between the company and the Government. Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim or

title to the land at all.

xx. xx xx

Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of ''person interested'' must be liberally construed so as to

include body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired. and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation.

In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the

land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a ''person interested'' even though its stake may be extremely vital?

In Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., , the expression ''person interested'' in Section l8 (1) of

the Land Acquisition Act had fallen for interpretation, which section says,

Any person interested, who has not accepted the award, may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the

Collector for the determination of the Court whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons

to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

This section, according to the Supreme Court, has envisaged that there can be more than one person interested in the compensation. 17. In coming

to the above concluded view besides the judgment of this Court in the case of M. Kuppuswami v. The Special Tahsildar (1967)1 M.L.J. 329 :90

L.W. 114, the Supreme Court also took notice of similar views expressed in the case of Sunder Lal Vs. Paramsukhdas, , in The Hindustan

Sanitary-ware and Industries Ltd. and Another Vs. The State of Haryana and Others, and Comilla Electric Supply Ltd. Vs. East Bengal Bank Ltd.

and Others, . 18. Precedent so far has not taken a contrary view except some observations in a short order passed by the Supreme Court in the

case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel . The total discussion in the Supreme Court''s order in this

case is as follows:

The Municipal Corporation was impleaded as the fourth respondent before the High Court, but no relief was claimed against the Municipal

Corporation. The property, it is true, was notified for acquisition by the State Government for the use of the Municipal Corporation after it was

acquired by the Government, but that, in our judgment, did not confer any interest in the Municipal Corporation so as to enable it to file an appeal

against the order of the High Court allowing the petition. Substantially grounds on which the petition was filed were that the notifications were

invalid on account of diverse reasons. Some of these reasons have been upheld and some have not been upheld, but all those grounds related to

the validity of the Notifications issued by the Government of Bombay and the Government of Gujarat. Not even an order of costs has been passed

against the Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad. We fail to see what interest the Municipal Corporation has, which would sustain an

appeal by it against the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the first respondent.

Some Courts, particularly, the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Amar Singh Yadav and Another Vs. Shanti Devi and Others, , noticed a

direct conflict on the question of locus standi of the Government or the corporation for whose benefit the acquisition was made between the view

expressed in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs.

Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., . To us, it however, appears that there is no conflict at all. A question of this kind in an appeal against a

judgment of the court allowing a writ petition will be different from a question as to locus standi to invoke writ jurisdiction. While in the former, the

Court may reject the appeal even in limine at the Supreme Court did on the ground that there was nothing against the appellant in the impugned

order, in the latter case such a person for whose benefit acquisition is made would undoubtedly be a ''person aggrieved''. Even though this appears

to be the correct legal position, in Amar Singh Yadav and Another Vs. Shanti Devi and Others, , a Patna Full Bench made a long exercise how to

resolve a conflict between the two decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by co-equal Benches and stated as follows:

From the aforesaid discussions it would be manifest that the theory of pre-eminence of a judgment by virtue of its time and the latest alone has now

been conclusively laid to rest. In the present context also the anomalies inherent in such a rule would interestingly be highlighted, if one were to

interchange the dates of the two judgments in Himalaya Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LR''s., , The City of

Ahmedabad v. Chandhulal Shamadas Patel 1970 S.C.W.R. 183. If the judgment in the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad had

been delivered later, then on the time theory had to be followed, even though no intricate question of law had been considered, while disposing of a

preliminary objection. With great respect, doing so, in my view, can hardly be justified and would tend to make a mockery of the theory of

precedent, which is necessarily rested on the logic, reasoning and the ratio of a judgment. Therefore, when such a divergence arises and the

litigant''s fortune depends thereon, the issue has to be frontally adjudicated upon. Obviously, in such a situation, it is not the province of the High

Court or the Subordinate court to comment on the judgments of the Supreme court which are patently entitled to respect, is to respectfully follow

that which appears to it to state the law accurately or, in any case more accurately than the other conflicting judgment. The view I am inclined to

take is not only fortified, but in a way derived from the Full Bench judgment in Indo Swiss Time Limited Vs. Umrao and Others, . It perhaps,

deserves highlighting that though on another point the learned Judges of the Full Bench differed but on this particular momentous issue there was an

absolute unanimity. The subsequent Full Bench decision in Kulbhushan Kumar and Co. Vs. State of Punjab and Another, , is also in a way relevant

and instructive.

To conclude on this aspect, it is held that where there is a direct conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by co-equal

Benches, the High Court must follow that judgment which appears to it to state the law more elaborately and accurately.

The Patna Full Bench thus pronounced on the concept of the, ''person interested'' as follows:

Once the issue of precedent is out of the way, then, in the light of the preceding discussions, it is to be held that the concept of the person

interested in the Land Acquisition Act, has to be construed somewhat widely and literally. The mere fact that a person or a party may not have

been before the Land Acquisition Officer would not by itself conclusively bar and exclude him the ambit of being a person interested.

Having thus stated the law as above, the Patna Full Bench examined the question whether in the absence of any appearance before the Land

Acquisition Officer, a person can claim to be a party before the Court in a proceeding arising entirely from a reference made u/s 18 of the Act by

the Land Acquisition Officer. The Full Bench after taking notice of the requirements of Section 18 of the Act and a judgment of the Supreme Court

in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, , stated,

It would thus appear that the very requirements of Section 18 are clearly indicative of the assumption that the person claiming a reference has been

before the Collector and is a ''person interested'' who has not accepted the award and has specific objections to make with regard thereto.

Now apart from the above a combined reading of Sections 19 and 20 is equally instructive. For making the reference the Collector is enjoined to

indicate the name of the person who, he has reason to think is interested in such land and shall also attach a schedule giving particulars of the

notices served upon and the statement in writing made or delivered by the parties interested respectively. This in a way is again a pointer to the fact

that the parties before the court are those which have been before the Collector whom he either things to be ''persons interested'' or who have

already been duty served with notices in the proceeding. Yet again, the service of notice by Section 20 is enjoined only upon the applicant, the

person interested in the objection, and the Collector, if necessary. On the basis of these provisions it was argued and, in my view rightly, that the lis

before the Court is in a way confined to the person indicated in Sections 19 and 20 and rank outsiders cannot later trespass into the special

jurisdiction on the plea of being persons interested despite the fact that they may have never chosen to appear before the Collector.

Proceeding further to examine the provisions of Sections 21 and 25 of the Act, the Patna Full Bench observed,

It seems somewhat patent that entertaining and allowing persons who were not before the Collector to become parties to the proceeding before

the District Judge would run counter to the letter and spirit of the statute and is bound to enlarge the arena and bring in issues which would be

extraneous to what had been earlier considered by the Collector. Doing so would be deviating from the very nature of the special jurisdiction, and

would, thus, be opening a Pandora''s Box of ills on which later the lid cannot be pressed down. Learned Counsel form the opposite parties were at

pains, therefore, to highlight the difference between the general proceedings in a civil suit governed by the CPC and the special nature of the

proceedings under the Act under Sections 18 to 25. These in essence provide for Land Acquisition Judge as a special court in a limited jurisdiction

confined to the matters specifically referred by the Collector based upon the application by the objector. This has to be kept in focus because if it

were not to be so, then there would remain no difference in essence between a title suit by the parties laying out claims and rights quo the acquired

land and a reference u/s 18 specifically.

The Patna Full Bench also took notice of the difference in the two provisions, namely, Sections 18(1) and 30 of the act and the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar, , in which the difference between the two provisions had been pointed out in these words:

There are two provisions, Sections 18(1) and 30, which invest the Collector with power to refer to the Court a dispute as to apportionment of

compensation or as to the persons to whom it is payable. But by Sub-section (1) of Section 18 the Collector is enjoined to refer a dispute as to

apportionment, or as to title to receive compensation, on the application within the time prescribed by Sub-Section (2) of that section of a person

interested who has not accepted the award. Section 30 authorises the Collector to refer to the Court after compensation is settled u/s 11 , any

dispute arising as to apportionment of the same or any part thereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. A person

shown in that part of the award which relates to apportionment of compensation, who is present either person-ally or through a representative, or

on whom a notice is served under Sub-Section (2) of Section 12, must, if he does not accept the award, apply to the Collector within the time

prescribed u/s 18(2) to refer the matter to the Court. But a person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector may, if

he is not served with notice of the filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable, and apply to the court for a

reference u/s 30, for determination of his right to compensation which may have existed before the award, or which may have devolved upon him

since the award. Whereas u/s 18 an application made to the Collector must be made within the period prescribed by sub-Section (2), Clause (b),

there is no such period prescribed u/s 30. Again u/s 18 the Collector is bound to make a reference on a petition filed by a person interested. The

Collector is u/s 30 not enjoined to make a reference, he may relegate the person raising a dispute as to apportionment or as to the person to whom

compensation is payable, to agitate the dispute in a suit and pay the compensation in the matter declared ''by his award,

and concluded as under:

In our judgment the powers exercisable by the Collector u/s 18(1) and u/s 30 are distinct and may be invoked in contingencies which do not

overlap.

The Patna Court thus came to the conclusion, ""It is held that person who was not before the Land Acquisition Officer cannot successfully

maintain an application for being impleaded as a party under Order 1, Rule 10 of the C.P.C., in the reference proceedings before the District

Judge u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

A Full Bench of this Court in Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Rangaswami (1989)2 L. W. 381, held that a ''person interested'' as defined

in Section 3(b) of the act will not include a person for whose benefit lands are acquired. Neyveli Lignite Corporation for whose benefit land had

been acquired raised the following points in the writ petitions filed in this Court on its behalf.

(1) u/s 3(b) of the Act, the Corporation is a person interested in the fixing of the compensation and, therefore, notice ought to have been issued to

it as required u/s 20(b) of the Act.

(2) Since the Collector overlooked this mandatory provision, the awards were liable to be quashed, and

(3) No compensation could be fixed or arrived at by a Tribunal acting under the Land Acquisition Act without the presence of the Corporation

which is a statutory mandate.

The matter, however, came up before the Full Bench as a Division Bench of this Court in Indian Rare Earths Ltd. v. The Special Collector and

Acquisition Officer 1986 Writ L.R. 146, had held that the award passed by the civil court under the Land Acquisition Act were liable to be

quashed inasmuch as those awards were passed without giving notice as contemplated u/s 20(b) of the Act to the entity on whose behalf the land

was acquired. The corporation which had lost the battle in the proceedings under the Act and in getting orders of stay in the proceedings of this

Court as a learned single Judge of this Court directed it to deposit the entire compensation amount with liberty to the land owners to withdraw

50% of the amount without security and the balance with security and the same was confirmed by a Division Bench. On appeal, it seems, thought

that it could take advantage of the judgment in Indian Rare Earths Ltd. v. The Special Collector and Acquisition Officer 1986 Writ L.R 146, and

get the awards nullified by the Order of the Court in the writ petitions. Indian Rare Earths case as well as the Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd.

v. Francis Victor Coutinbo AIR 1990 S.C. 1118, about which an elaborate reference had been made in the judgment of the Patna Full Bench

referred to above, were pressed to contend that there being no substantial difference between the acquisition made under Part II and Part VII of

the Land Acquisition Act, the rule stated in Himalaya Tiles case thus must hold the field and the Corporation accepted as a person interested. The

observations of the Full Bench in this regard are as follows:

Mr. U.N.R. Rao learned Counsel appearing for the Neyveli Lignite Corporation, who are the petitioners in these writ petitions, raised three

propositions for the consideration of this Bench. Firstly, he contended that the Sub Court, which decided the reference made by the Land

Acquisition Officer, is only a Special Tribunal and, therefore, it is amenable for jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This

submission found favour in the decision in Indian Rare Earths case and the said decision is squarely relied upon by him. Further reliance was placed

on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Hasnuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra, . In that case, the question arose was whether the

reference made beyond the period prescribed by the proviso to Sub-Section (2) of Section 18 of the Act is valid and whether the Court can go

behind the reference made by the Collector and the application on which reference has been made is beyond the period of limitation prescribed

therein. In answering the question, the Supreme Court held that the Collector acting u/s 18 of the Act is nothing but a statutory authority exercising

his own powers under the section and, therefore, the fulfilments of the conditions particularly the one regarding limitation, are the conditions subject

to which the power of the Collector u/s 18 to make the reference exists. It was further held that the making of an application for reference within

the time prescribed by Proviso to Section 18(2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. In that context, the Supreme Court held

that the Court functioning under the Act being a Tribunal of Special jurisdiction, it is its duty to see that the reference made to it by the Collector u/s

18 complies with the conditions laid down therein so as to give the court jurisdiction to hear the reference. It was further observed that in such case

the court is certainly not acting as a Court of appeal and that it is only discharging the elementary duty of satisfying itself that a reference which it is

called upon to decide is a valid and proper reference. It was, therefore, held that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the reference was

made beyond the period prescribed by the Act. We are unable to understand how the said decision will be of any use in so far as the points raised

in these writ petitions are concerned. In that decision, the Supreme Court has not gone into the question of right of the persons for whose benefit

acquisition proceedings are taken and whether such persons are entitled to challenge the quantum of compensation awarded by the Court on

reference and they are entitled to be served with notice in such proceedings. Secondly, Mr. Rao submitted that a beneficiary like the petitioner

company is an interested person eligible to participate in the compensation proceedings, and therefore, it is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the award passed by the Court. Thirdly, he submitted that such a beneficiary is entitled to file

an appeal against the quantum of compensation awarded ""by the sub court as decided by the Supreme Court in Himalaya Tiles Case. In this

connection, he referred to the later decision of the Supreme Court in Toshiba Anand Lamp Ltd. v. Verghese and Ors. : [1987]2SCR1226 ,

wherein the Supreme Court simply followed the decision of Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinbo A.I.R. 1990 S.C.

1118: 93 L.W. (S.C.) 35, and held that it is riot possible to sustain the view taken by the High Court that the appellant had no locus standi to

maintain the appeal before the High Court. Further reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v.

Kassappa Madivallappa Kulkarni 1990 Scale 546, reported wherein the Supreme Court, while dismissing the Special Leave Petition, made an

observation that the view of the High Court was in error in holding that the Union of India for whose benefit the acquisition was made by the State

Government was not entitled to prefer an appeal against the award made by the Civil Judge. We find that in those two cases, the Supreme Court

has not considered the questions raised in these cases, especially in the later case reported in Union of India and Ors. v. Kassappa Madivallappa

Kulkarni J.T. 1987(2) S.C. 390, the Supreme Court has not referred to any of its other decisions referred to above.

For the above conclusion, however, the Court found support from the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act before the Amendment Act

68 of 1984 and then observed:

The main controversy that arises for consideration in all these cases, relates to the expression ""Person interested"" found in Section 3(b) of the Act

as noticed above. A plain reading of the said definition shows that the expression ""person interested'''' refers to the persons interested in

compensation to be made on account of acquisition of land, and therefore there is no scope for holding that the said terms would take in the

persons who are liable to pay compensation and enhanced compensation. This expression should be read along with the expressions . used in

Section 5A(1) of the Act. That section speaks about the hearing of objections and, therefore, these two sections should be read conjointly, to

understand the real meaning of the expression ""person interested"". As per Section 5A(1) of the Act any person interested in any land which has

been notified u/s 4(1) may object to the acquisition of the land. Therefore notice is expected to be given to the persons who are entitled to raise

objections for the acquisition. Therefore, there are two types of persons interested, one a person who is interested in compensation and another, a

person interested in the land. There may be cases where a person may not be interested in the land but may be interested in the compensation

alone. We find that the expression ""persons interested"" in ""compensation"" is confined to Section 5A(3) of the Act. When we look at the

subsequent provisions of the Act, we find Section 9of the Act contemplates, issuance of notice only on the persons who are interested in the land

under acquisition including the occupier, if any. Statement are required to be given only by the persons who have got some interest in the land. The

procedure for an award enquiry u/s 11 contains no provisions for hearing persons for whose benefit lands are sought to be acquired. The Land

Acquisition Officer is not expected to deal with the interest of such persons in the award to be passed by him. It is specifically declared u/s 12 that

the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer is final between the Collector and the persons interested in the land and in receipt of the

compensation. Coming to Section 18(1) of the Act, we find that right is given under that section to ask for reference to the Court against the award

passed by the Land Acquisition Officer only to the persons interested in the land and the persons who are entitled to receive compensation.

Therefore, if a beneficiary is not treated as a party to the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, he cannot be deemed to be a person

interested in the payment of compensation as is already seen from the provisions of Sections 9 to 12 and 18(1) of the Act. Therefore, the entire

scheme of the abovesaid section deals with only the persons who are entitled to accept the award or refuse to accept the award passed by the

Collector as could be seen u/s 18(1) of the Act. Once it is found that the beneficiaries like the petitioner Corporation who are not expected to

accept the award being not a party to the same are not entitled to ask for reference u/s 18 of the Act, they would not come under the definition of

''person interested'' found in Section 3(b) of the Act. A clear indication can be seen from Section 19(1) of the act where under the Collector is

expected to send a statement to the court only with reference to the details of the land acquired, the names of the persons who are interested in

such land, the amount awarded as compensation and if the objection be to the amount of the compensation the grounds on which the amount of

compensation was determined. There is absolutely no scope for considering the claims of the beneficiaries like the petitioner Corporation as to the

quantum of compensation. This is followed by Section 20 of the Act which says that after the receipt of the said statement from the Collector, the

Court shall issue a notice to the person who had asked for reference and all persons in the said objection except such of them as have consented

without protest"" to receive payment of the compensation awarded. The expression ""all the persons interested in the objection in Section 20(b)

cannot be read in isolation, but on the other hand, it has to be understood in the light of the subsequent expression ""except such (if any) of them as

have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded."" Therefore, what is contemplated under this provision is those

persons who have already objected to the acquisition excepting those persons who have received compensation without protest are alone entitled

to receive notice. Section 20(c) makes the position clear by stating that if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the

compensation, notice must be given to the Collector, Section 20 has to be read together with Section l9of the Act. If it is understood in the said

manner, there is no scope for issuing any notice to anybody else like the petitioner/Corporation and other similarly situated persons. To put in other

words, notice is contemplated u/s 20 only to the persons who have raised objection and who are really interested in such objections but not to any

other person who was neither interested in the land nor in the compensation and who was not a party to the award. Only in cases where the

quantum of compensation is objected to, notice should go to the Collector who made the award, and not to any other person for whose benefit the

lands were acquired. Again we find that the scope of the enquiry u/s 20(1) of the Act conducted on a reference from the Collector is restricted

only to the persons who have raised objection and who are likely to be affected by any decision on such objection.

The Full Bench then noticed that the only right to which the petitioner Corporation and other beneficiaries were entitled to, was the one given u/s

50(2) of the Act which occurs after various provisions relating to acquisition for a public purpose under Part II of the Act and for Companies

under Part VII of the Act and thus said:

As already pointed out, the person interested has been clearly indicated in the said provisions and nowhere we find that any right has been

conferred on the company to take part in the award proceedings or to seek a reference to the Civil Court against the award. That position is

reiterated in this Sub-section, which clearly says that in any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or

company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of-compensation. The Proviso to this Sub-

section makes the position clear beyond any doubt. It says that no such local authority or company shall be entitled to demand a reference u/s 18.

When there is such a clear embargo on the rights of the Company, we fail to understand how the Company can be treated as a party who is

entitled to notice in the proceedings arising out of such reference. The principle underlying this provision is that the Government is acquiring the land

for the benefit of the company and they are expected to take care of the interest of the Company or the local authority, as the case may be, and

therefore there is identity of interests between them. As a matter of fact, that lands are acquired by the Government arid then only they are

transferred to the Company as per the agreement entered into between them.

The Court also said that it will not be possible to invoke O. l Rule 10 of the CPC to implead any person for whose benefit the land is acquired for

the reason of the provisions in Section 53 of the Act which reads as follows:

Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the CPC shall apply to all proceedings before the

Court under this Act.

and held:

Therefore, once it is found that the provision in Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. is inconsistent with the provisions under the Land Acquisition Act, there

is no scope for invoking the said provision. Therefore considering the scheme of the Act in its entirety, we find no difficulty in coming to the

conclusion that the beneficiaries are not entitled to be impleaded as parties and they have no right to challenge the correctness of the compensation

amount fixed by the Civil Court, by way of appeal or writ petition.

The above view of the Full Bench of this Court is in tune with the view of the Supreme Court in Santosh Kumar and Others Vs. Central

Warehousing Corporation and Another, . The principal question raised before the Supreme Court in that case was that the High Court was wholly

in error in entertaining the writ petitions to challenge the award made by the Collector on the ground that the same was excessive and that too not

at the instance of the Government, but at the instance of the corporation at whose request the acquisition was made. The Supreme Court held as

follows:

In our view there cannot be any possibility that the scheme of the Act is that, apart from fraud, corruption or collusion, the amount of compensation

awarded by the Collector u/s 11 of the Act may not be questioned in any proceeding either by the Government or by the Company or Local

authority at whose instance the acquisition is made. Section 50(2) and Section 25 lead to the inevitable conclusion. Surely what may not be done

under the provisions of the Act may not be permitted to be done by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. Article 226 is

not meant to avoid or circumvent the processes of the law and the provisions of the statute. When Section 50(2) expressly bars the Company or

local authority at whose instance the acquisition is made from demanding a Reference u/s 18 of the Act, notwithstanding that such company or

local authority may be allowed to adduce evidence before the Collector, and when Section 25 expressly prohibits the Court from reducing the

amount for compensation while dealing with the Reference u/s 18, it is clearly not possible for the Company or local authority to invoke the

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 to challenge the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector and to have it reduced.

It is indeed intrinsic in the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act that the Collector must notice the person interested in any land which has been

notified u/s 4, Sub-Section (1) to object to the award u/s 5-A if it is not an emergency proceeding u/s 17 of the Act and in all cases for

compensation u/s 9 of the Act of the Government''s intention to take possession of the land to afford an opportunity to the person interested to

claim compensation. Any person falling in its category and duly noticed thus will be before the Collector and thus a party to the reference u/s 18 of

the Act in case an award is not acceptable to them. Others who will be strangers until that stage however will still have a right to raise a dispute as

to apportionment of compensation u/s 30 of the Act. Section 30 of the Act states,

When the amount of compensation has been settled u/s 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to

the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the Court.

While there is a time limit for purposes of proceeding u/s 5-A of the Act or for all proceedings before the reference to Court u/s 18 of the Act,

there is no time limit for a dispute u/s 30 of the Act. The Supreme Court in Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar, , has clearly indicated that a person

shown in that part of the award, which relates to apportionment of the compensation, who is present either personally or through a representative,

or on whom a notice is served under Sub-Section (2) of Section 12, must, if he does not accept the award, apply to the Collector within the time

prescribed under Secl8(2) to refer the matter to the Court, but person who has not appeared in the acquisition proceeding before the Collector

may, if he is not served with notice of the filing, raise a dispute as to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable and apply to the

court for a reference u/s 30, for determination of his right to compensation which may have existed before the award, or which may have

developed upon him since the award. A person in whom a right to compensation has existed or accrued after the award may also as, observed by

the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar, , be relegated by the Collector to agitate the dispute in a suit, but it is obvious,

the suit would be for apportionment of the compensation or the right to receive compensation but not as to the acquisition.

The Supreme Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Others Vs. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda and Others, , considered the appeal of persons

who had purchased the land after the notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. They raised their objections and alleged that the substance of

the notification u/s 4 and its corrigendum was not published by the Collector in the locality, that the proposed land sought to be acquired was not

demarcated at site u/s 4(2) of the Act that the procedure laid down in Section 5-A was not followed, that the notification was vague and since the

land sought to be acquired was not fully described in the notification, the interested persons could not file their objections against the requisition;

that Khasra No. 2030 was a very large plot of land consisting of several building plots which were all part of the main Khasra No. 2030 and the

original owners of this field number had divided this field into several abadi plots and had sold them to different persons before the notification and

unless the portions of Khasra No. 2030 sought to be acquired were specified by reference to certain areas thereof the owners could not be

deemed to have intimation that their plots were to be acquired and that the notification issued by the Government u/s 6 and the plan accompanying

thereto did not tally with the alignment of the roads as originally intended to be laid or subsequently modified by the Municipal Committee. The

High Court, while dismissing the petition in limine, observed

The grievance of the petitioner''s complaint is that the area now sought to be taken possession of was not included in the acquisition notification of

1959. In the elaborate order of the Collector the condition is, ""I am satisfied that the true area of land demarcated corresponds to the area notified

and that it has been demarcated on the ground with as much accuracy as was reasonably possible."" This Court cannot determine disputed question

of fact and this petition is dismissed accordingly.

Saying that the High Court was not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution merely because in

considering the petitioner''s right to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined and that the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of

fact and law, and noticing that it was urged on behalf of the Municipal Committee before the Supreme Court that the three appellants were

purchasers of the lands claimed by them after the notification u/s 4 was issued and they had no right to challenge the issue of the notification. The

Supreme Court said,

If, however, the notification u/s 4 was vague, the three appellants who are purchasers of the land having title thereto may challenge the validity of

the notification. The appellants have spent in putting up substantial structures considerable sums of money and we are unable to hold that merely

because they had purchased the land after issue of the notification u/s 4 they are debarred from challenging the validity of the notification, or from

contending that it did not apply to their lands.

This is thus an authority that a purchaser after the notification u/s 4 can have locus standi. But then the challenge to the notification by such a person

can well be u/s 5-A of the Act if the purchase is before the publication of the notification as required u/s 4 of the Act. Since the ownership is not

transferred until possession is taken u/s 16 of the Act and there is not absolute vesting of the land in the Government free from all encumbrances

until the Collector after making the award u/s 11 takes possession of the land, it is not difficult to visualise that a purchaser after notification u/s 4 or

even declaration u/s 6 of the Act can be a ''person interested''. If, however, the owner had the notice of the notification u/s 4 of the Act or the

declaration u/s 6 of the Act and he sold the land concealing this information, would he create in the purchaser a right to seek a de novo hearing u/s

5-A of the Act. That obviously cannot be allowed. Such a purchaser, therefore, may be found to be a stranger, who would be raising a

controversy as to the objections which were to be raised by the owner u/s 5-A of the Act. He, however, shall still have the locus standi as a

person interested to object to the award until the proceeding reached the stage of reference u/s 18 of the Act. Beyond Section 18 reference also,

there can be a third party right, but that will be for the purpose of Section 30 only as to apportionment of the amount of compensation. In these

cases, the court shall not be wrong in asking the petitioner how he claimed any right in the property acquired and refusing to interfere with the

notification for the reason that the vendor could not create a right in the vendee that stood extinguished after the expiry of the statutory period of 30

days from the date of the publication of the notification u/s 4 of the Act. A notification, however, may be found to have been issued in violation of

such mandates of law, which unless complied with, would render the notification voidab initio. Determination of such a question will be done some

times on pure reading of the law and some times on facts alleged in the petition. Facts which go to the root and upon which the jurisdiction to

proceed under a special statute, depends, are called preliminary facts, collateral facts and or jurisdictional facts. If such facts are found non-

existing, all acts done under the Act would be without jurisdiction. The judgment in Smt. Gunwant Kaur and Others Vs. Municipal Committee,

Bhatinda and Others, , has to be under-stood in this light. The judgment gives a clear indication that a purchaser of a land under the notification u/s

4 of the Act will have locus standi to challenge the validity of the notification and if he is able to show that the notification is invalid, then he has

established his claim to the land free from acquisition.

Much stress has been laid before us on the ground of vagueness. Since we are not entering into the facts, we do not wish to state now

vagueness of the notification will affect its validity, but then it is always possible to find vagueness going to the root of the notification as has been

found by the Supreme Court in one of its latest judgments in the State of Tamil Nadu and another Vs. A. Mohammed Yousef and others, . That

was a case relating to the acquisition proceeding started for obtaining land for construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board

constituted u/s 3 of the Madras State Housing Board Act, 1961 Madras Act 17 of 1961. This fact was mentioned in the impugned notification.

The High Court held that the public purpose mentioned in the notification was too vague in absence of details relating to the scheme for which the

acquisition was sought to be made, and consequently, the land owners could not effectively avail of the benefits u/s 5-A of the Land Acquisition

Act by filing their objection. The Supreme Court formulated the question in these words:

The question for decision is whether the acquisition proceeding, can be initiated only after the framing of the proposed scheme and not earlier.

The State''s contention before the Supreme Court was that having regard to the provisions of the Act and the other relevant considerations, it must

be held that the procedure in regard to the preparation of the scheme had to await the conclusion of the land acquisition proceeding. It was only

after the possession of the land was delivered to the Board that its engineers and other experts could go over the land, make necessary inspection

and collect vital data on the basis of which the scheme could be drawn up. It was essential according to the State, to have a clear idea of the area

of the land, its boundaries and the nature of the soil for deciding about the details of the proposed scheme, and this was not possible so long as the

owner of the land continued in possession. Any attempt to draw up a scheme earlier according to the State, had been an exercise in futility. It was

alternatively argued that if it was possible to frame the scheme without waiting for the acquisition and possession of the land, it could not be further

assumed that the land acquisition proceeding had to await the finalisation of the scheme. The Supreme Court answered this contention saying:

The order, in which the different steps for the preparation of the scheme and the acquisition of the land, is suggested on behalf of the petitioners to

be taken, appears to be impractical and defeating the purpose of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. If the notification u/s 4 under the Land

Acquisition Act is published without waiting for the scheme, as has been done in the present case, it will not be possible for the land owners to

object to the proposed acquisition on the ground that the land is not suitable for the scheme at all, and therefore does not serve any public purpose,

or that another piece of land in the area concerned, is far more suitable, leading to the conclusion that the proposed acquisition is mala fide. We,

accordingly, hold that a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 70 of the Madras Housing Board Act, can be commenced

only after framing the scheme for which the land is required. The notification issued u/s 4 in the present case must, therefore, be held to be

premature, and it was rightly quashed by the High Court.

The Supreme Court, however, observed:

We do not think that as a result of this judgment the concluded land acquisition proceedings can be allowed to be re-opened. Although we have

held that the initiation of the proceeding for acquisition has to await framing of a scheme, it does not mean that the concluded acquisition

proceeding can be condemned as void so as to be ignored later. However, to avoid unnecessary controversy we are hereby clarifying the position

that a ground based on the present judgments shall be available to the land owners only for such land acquisition proceedings, which are under

challenge and still pending decision.

The Supreme Court thus on the one hand took notice of the infirmity in the land acquisition proceedings and the denial to the land owners of their

right to raise objections u/s 5-A of the Act and on the other hand, cautioned that concluded acquisition proceedings should not be allowed to be

condemned as void even though there had been such infirmity.

A Bench of the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question as to who the ''person interested'' is in General Government Servants

Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Agra and Others Vs. Sh. Wahab Uddin and Others, , and took notice of the following circumstances:

(1) A sale certificate had been issued to the first respondent, Wahab Uddin, after the purchase of the land in auction sale held in 1962;

(2) The Collector, Agra, knew that first respondent had purchased the land in auction for he had himself filed a suit for ejectment from the land in

question u/s 171 of the Tenancy Act against the first respondent, and that the suit was dismissed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Class, the appeal

preferred against the said order had also been dismissed by the Commissioner;

(3) The Collector issued notice u/s 9(3) of the Act calling upon the first respondent to prefer his claim, if any, for compensation of the land

acquired;

(4) and that in the counter-affidavit filed by the Collector, in reply to the affidavit filed by the first respondent before the High Court, the claim of

the petitioner to get compensation for the rights acquired by the Government was not denied by the appellant.

The Supreme Court on that basis said that, we agree with the High Court that the first respondent was a ''person interested'' within the meaning of

Clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act.

The case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay and Others Vs. Godrej and Boyce, , had been cited at the Bar, but, this however, is

not relevant on the question that we are considering here.

The position thus in cases of acquisition of land is that the interest therein can be transferred by the owner thereof to a purchaser and/or that

besides the owner, there could be another person interested in the property, which logically can also extend to any other right accruing during the

pendency of the acquisition proceeding to a third party by transfer or otherwise. This will be so even in cases of acquisition u/s 17 of the Act and/

or Section 17-A of the Act, because ownership is not disturbed until the Collector takes possession of the land. This has been the consistent view

of all the courts in India including the Patna High Court in State of Bihar Vs. Dr. G.H. Grant and Another, , the Calcutta High Court in Nrishinha

Charan Nandi Chaudhuri Vs. Nagendra Bala Debee and Another, , the Allahabad High Court in Union Sugar Mills Co. Vs. U.P. Government and

Others, , the Rajasthan High Court in Neelkanth Mali Vs. Jagannath Singh and State of Rajasthan, and Calcutta High Court in the case of Benarasi

Sha v. Lakshmi Rani Deve Sankar ILR (1964) Cal. 662.

We have already seen that the concept of person aggrieved is not in any way different from a person interested and that there can be a variety

of interests and different persons may have different interests. It is also possible that a person surrendered some interests but fought for the other

interests, such as the owner found no tenable objection to the acquisition but questioned the adequacy of the compensation. The locus standi to

question the acquisition thus will not be available to him. He can, however, question the quantum of compensation. Similarly a purchaser of a piece

of land under acquisition, who came in the picture only after the stage of objection u/s 5-A but before the dispute of compensation was decided,

may enter into the proceeding and question the compensation amount but may not demand inquiry u/s 5-A of the Act. If he purchased after the

notification u/s 9, he cannot be heard to say that he was entitled to a notice. A purchaser may have a right to raise objections to the award and/or

even acquisition such as the objection that the proceeding elapsed because the award was not made within the stipulated period and like but not

the objections which the owner availed or had opportunity to avail u/s 5A of the Act. If his purchase is after the award but before possession is

taken by the Collector, he may not be heard to question the acquisition because his vendor never questioned the acquisition. These, however, will

depend upon facts as well as law attracted to the fact situation of each case. Thus it will be a misconception to say that a purchaser shall have no

locus standi. But it will be equally misconceived if it is said that the purchaser shall have locus standi in all circumstances.

The circumstances of each case will thus show how far the Court can go to accommodate the purchaser/petitioner and what is the extent of his

right in jeopardy. If he is coming to meddle in the proceeding in which his vendor had notice and/or participated, he would only be seeking a re-

commencement of the proceeding. That will not be permissible. He shall be thus exhibiting as noticed in the case of Coleman v. Miller (1939) 307

U.S. 433, that he has got no standing to sue for judicial relief. Courts can intervene only where legal rights are invaded. Legal wrong requires a

judicially enforceable right and the touchstone to justiciability is injury to a legally protected right. In all cases, the Courts shall refuse to recognise

the right which has got an illegal effect and decline for that reason to recognise the standing of the petitioner. In short, if the purchaser/petitioner is in

a position to show that something has been done contrary to law in the name of the land acquisition proceeding under the Act, he can maintain a

writ petition and he shall have locus standi, otherwise not. As observed in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jasbhai Motibhai

Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, :

It is true that in the ultimate analysis, the jurisdiction under Article 226 in general and certiorari in particular is discretionary. But in a country like

India where writ petitions are instituted in the High Courts by the thousand, many of them frivolous, a strict ascertainment, at the outset, of the

standing of the petitioner to invoke this extraordinary jurisdiction, must be insisted upon.

It should be seen whether the petitioner has been deprived of a legal right and/or has sustained injury to any legally protected interest or, in other

words, whether he has been subjected to a legal wrong or Suffered any real grievance According to the Supreme Court, if he has not legal peg of

a justiciable claim to hang on, he is not a person aggrieved and has no locus standi to challenge.

Thus the Court must ask the questions from all such persons as indicated above and if questions asked show that he has challenged the

acquisition for (1) it is void for a valid reason, the Court shall protect his interest; (2) otherwise, the court shall take notice of the legal injury, if any,

and see whether it can remedy it and if there is no legal grievance, hold that he is not the person aggrieved and thus got no locus standi.

The reference is answered accordingly.