Sharanjit Singh vs State of Punjab

Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.—Feeling aggrieved against the concurrent findings of fact, recorded by both the learned courts below, plaintiff has approached this Court by way of instant regular second appeal, in his suit for declaration claiming arrears of salary on account of alleged difference of pay and allowances w.e.f. 13.1.1969.

Briefly put, facts of the case are that appellant was appointed as Drawing Instructor in the Department of Technical Education and Industrial Training, Punjab w.e.f. 10.7.1965. The cause of action became available to the plaintiff-appellant, as submitted by learned senior counsel for the appellant, in the year 1971. Plaintiff retired from service on 30.4.2011 after attaining the age of superannuation. Present suit was filed on 23.7.2005. Suit was dismissed by the learned trial Court and the first appeal filed by the plaintiff was also dismissed by the learned District Judge. Hence, this appeal.

Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that since the plaintiff-appellant was having a recurring cause of action, no law of limitation would apply. He further submits that the defendants did not raise the issue of limitation. However, since the learned courts below have misdirected themselves while dismissing the suit of the plaintiff, the impugned judgments and decrees were not sustainable in law. He prays for setting aside the impugned judgments by allowing the present appeal.

On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that the suit of the plaintiff was hopelessly time barred. Issue of limitation was specifically raised. Thereafter, issue No. 3 framed by the learned trial Court to the effect that whether the suit was within limitation period and onus thereof was rightly put on the plaintiff. However, plaintiff-appellant failed to prove that his case was within limitation. She further submits that litigation between other allegedly similar employees and the State will not provide a fresh cause of action in favour of the plaintiff. Plaintiff came to the Court after an inordinate long period of about 34 years and there was hardly any explanation for this inordinate delay. She also submits that learned courts below have rightly appreciated the true facts of the case as well as settled principles of law applicable thereto and the appellant was rightly non-suited . She prays for dismissal of the appeal.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, after careful perusal of record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that in the given fact situation of the instant appeal, present one has been found to be not a fit case warranting interference at the hands of this Court, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction u/s 100 of the CPC (''CPC'' for short). To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter.

Undisputed fact on record is that the plaintiff-appellant is claiming the revision of pay scale w.e.f. 13.1.1969 instead of 1.2.1971. There is no dispute between the parties that the cause of action, if any, became available to the plaintiff-appellant in the month of February 1971 itself. Argument raised on behalf of the appellant that he had been moving repeated representations and also issued legal notices, would be of no consequence for the reason that mere filing of representations will not stop the time to run. Once the time started running in the year 1971, it will not stop and the cause of action would become time barred as and when requisite period of limitation is complete.

Any litigation initiated at the instance of some other employees will also be totally insignificant because the plaintiff kept on sleeping over his rights, for more than three decades. Argument raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that issue of limitation was not raised by the defendants, has also been found to be factually incorrect because the learned trial Court framed a specific issue i.e. issue No. 1 qua limitation. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that the suit of the plaintiff was hopelessly time barred and the same has been rightly dismissed by both the learned courts below and that too on merits.

During the course of hearing, learned senior counsel for the appellant failed to substantiate any of his arguments that the appellant was having a recurring cause of action. Even if for the sake of argument, it is accepted that it was a continuing cause of action, still the said continuing cause of action will not be available, in favour of a lethargic litigant like the appellant, even after 34 years. A heavy onus was on the plaintiff to give explanation for this inordinate long delay. However, in the present case, plaintiff-appellant has failed to do so. If the plaintiff was not feeling aggrieved and kept sitting conveniently at home for about 34 years, his claim has become time barred and the suit for declaration in such a situation, would not be maintainable.

The abovesaid view taken by this Court also finds support from the judgment rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, Relevant observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in paras 13 to 16 of T.T. Murali Babu''s case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, reads as under:

First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and Others, the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp ( 1874 (5) PC 221), which is as follows:

Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.

In State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar, while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a persons entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.

In State of M.P. and Others Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others, the Court observed that it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice.

Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time"- and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons-who compete with Kumbhakarna or for that matter Rip Van Winkle. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.

Reverting back to the present case and following the law laid down by Hon''ble Supreme Court referred to here-in-above, it is unhesitatingly held that the appellant had no case either on facts or in law. Learned courts below committed no error of law, in passing the impugned judgments and decrees and the same deserve to be upheld.

On merits also, the appellant has been rightly non-suited by both the courts below. Learned first appellate court, in para 22 to 24 of its impugned judgment, recorded cogent findings and the same read as under:

It is worth mentioning here that as many as 15 PSIs filed LPA No. 848 of 1992 in the Hon''ble Punjab and Haryana High Court against the judgment of learned Single Judge Hon''ble Mr. Justice J.L. Gupta, dated 26th February, 1992 in Civil Writ Petition No. 3367 of 1991. The said LPA was decided vide judgment dated 3.12.2001 and in the concluding para, it was held by the Hon''ble High Court as under:

In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge is modified and the respondents are directed to fix pay of the appellants in the pay scales of Rs. 200-450 with effect from 1.2.1968 and Rs. 225-500 with effect from 1.2.1971. However, the appellants shall not be entitled to arrears beyond a period of 38 months preceding the date of filing of the writ petition. The respondents are directed to notionally fix their pay in the pay scales mentioned above and give them monetary benefit in terms of this order within a period of 6 months from the date of submission of certified copy of this order.

Keeping in view the spirit of the judgment in the said LP A, the Government has fixed the pay of the petitioners as well as the other non-petitioners who have identical claims. Accordingly, the appellant-plaintiff was also given the pay scale of Rs. 225-450 with effect from 1.2.1968 and Rs. 225-500 with effect from 1.2.1971. However, the appellant was not happy with the said revised pay scale and has claimed that his pay be fixed at Rs. 225-500 with effect from the date of joining i.e. 13.01.1969. There is nothing on the record to indicate that the petitioners or the non-petitioners have filed any SLP against the above said LPA. Therefore, the judgment in LPA dated 3.12.2001 has attained finality.

Coming to the discrimination aspect of the appellant-plaintiff it is not disputed that prior to 16.01.1996 the cadre and seniority of Hindi, Punjabi and English Stenography Instructors were different and thus, only after merging into each other with effect from 16.01.1996 they have one cadre and since the present case is pertaining to the year, 1969, therefore, the case of the appellant-plaintiff is not at par with them. Moreover, once it has been decided by the Hon''ble High Court in the LPA, then the matter can not be re-agitated before this Court.

Further, during the course of hearing, learned senior counsel for the appellant failed to point out any patent illegality in either of the impugned judgments. No question of law much less substantial question of law has been found involved in the present case, which is sine quo non for interference at the hands of this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction u/s 100 CPC.

No other argument was raised.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the present appeal is misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance, thus, it must fail. No case for interference has been made out.

Resultantly, instant appeal stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.