Shrimati Mohinder Kaur vs Desa Singh

Harbans Singh, C.J.—This revision has arisen out of an application filed by the landlady for getting the tenant ejected from a plot of land over which a Kotha seems to have been constructed by the tenant and he is keeping his horse there and has also fixed a Toka. It is a common case between the parties that in view of this the premises would fall within the purview of ''rented land''. The ground for ejectment was the personal necessity.

Paragraph 3(c) of the ejectment application runs as under:-

That the applicant has to do her business of a carpenter (tarkhana) on the premise with her son Daya Singh and for this reason the applicant needs the premises for her personal requirement and that the same are not to do be given on rent to anybody.

Her husband, Hazara Singh A.W. 2, appeared as a witness for the applicant. The last lines in his examination-in-chief are as under:-

The applicant and her son are separate. They have to do the timber work (lakar aa kam) there. We are carpenter by caste.

A.W. 3 is one Hazura Singh who is a Sarpanch. He also mentions that the applicant''s son originally did timber work at this plot A.W. 4 Mohinder Kaur is the applicant herself and she stated as follows:-

We used to do timber work. My son Daya Singh, has to start a shop here. For this reason the disputed land is required.

The respondent-tenant came into the witness-box and there is no clear averment that the son of the applicant would not like to start the business here. In fact the last line of cross examination is "Daya Singh is the son of the applicant and he used to do work of a carpenter."

The sole ground on which the ejectment application has been rejected is that even if it be taken as correct that the applicant''s son Daya Singh, wants to start the timber work business there, that cannot be said to be the personal requirement of the landlady within the meaning of section 13(3)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. This, I feel, is a misreading of the evidence. Taking into consideration the allegations made in the application for ejectment, the statement of the Sarpanch and the statement made by the applicant, it is obvious that the requirement is of the applicant who alongwith her son wants to utilise the premises for running their timber business. The fact that this requirement is bona fide is further borne out from the admission by the respondent.

As stated above, in the application for ejectment it has been clearly stated that the applicant along with her son wants to start the business of timber The word ''own use'' in clause (ii) of section 13(3), mentioned above does not exclude the use of the premises jointly with the landlord''s son or even jointly with another person in partnership. In either case the use of the premises would be the use by the landlord, though he may carry on tie business with his children or with somebody else.

It is not disputed that if the applicant requires the premises for running the business herself, that would be a ground for ejectment. The real contention in the case is that the requirement for son''s use is not the same thing as requirement for her own use. Taking the evidence as a whole, it is a clear case where it is not the requirement of the son alone, but also of the applicant.

I, therefore accept this revision, set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and direct the ejectment of the tenant. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, has made a statement that he is willing to give the tenant six months to put the applicant in possession of the premises in dispute. In view of this, I direct that the tenant will put the landlady in possession of the premises within six months from today. No order as to costs.