Smt. Harbans Kaur and others vs Smt. Tej Kaur

Gokal Chand Mittal, J.—This revision arises out of order dated 12th of April, 1979, passed by the Executing Court dismissing the objections filed by the petitioner judgment-debtors against the execution of a consent ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller, on the following facts:�

Kartar Singh, Lal Singh and Dayal Singh, three brothers, mortgaged with possession their house along with vacant site vide mortgage deed dated 31st of August, 1964, in favour of Smt Tej Kaur respondent for a consideration of Rs. 25,000/�. The mortgagers took the mortgaged properly on rent from the mortgagee at Rs. 135/� Per mensem. Since the mortgagors-tenants failed to pay rent with effect from 1st of March, 1965, Smt Tej Kaur filed an application for their ejectment on 29th of February, 1979, u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. On the first date of hearing, the tenants failed to tender the arrears of rent and denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. On the contest of the parties, issue regarding the ground of ejectment and there being no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, were framed. By 18th of September, 1975 the landlord produced as many as eight witnesses to prove her case and closed her evidence. The case was fixed from time to time for the tenants evidence. The last date for their evidence was 2nd of December, 1976 when statements of both the parties were recorded as they had entered into a compromise and a consent ejectment order was passed on that date in favour of the landlord and against the tenant-mortgagors and under the agreement of the parties four months'' time was allowed to the tenants to pay Rs. 16,000/- to the landlord and on such payment the decree of ejectment was not to be executed and the arrears of rent and the mortgage amount payable to the landlord-mortgagee were to stand satisfied on such payment The further condition was that in case payment was not made within the aforesaid period, the landlord was entitled to execute the decree for ejectment.

The tenants judgment-debtors failed to make the payment of Rs. 16,000/� within the time allowed whereafter the decree-holder took out execution of the ejectment order in which the judgment-debtors raised the following two points:�

That the ejectment order was null and void as no statutory ground of ejectment was contained in the ejectment order; and

That some of the heirs of Kartar Singh tenant, who were (sic) to the case after his death, were minors and no compromise was sanctioned by the Court.

The Court below has decided both the points against the petitioners (sic) elaborate and well written order dated 12th of April, 1979.

When the case was first taken up for arguments the counsel for the respondent-decree holder made an offer to the petitioners that if payment of all the arrears of rent is made by them to the respondent with effect from 1st of March, 1965, at the rate of Rs. 135/� per mensem, within a reasonable time to be fixed by this Court, the respondent would agree to the acceptance of the objections of the petitioners and for remanding the case to the Rent Controller to proceed from the stage of the tenants evidence, when the matter was compromised, and that this payment will be subject to the final decision of the ejectment application by the Rent Controller The counsel for the petitioner on this offer took time to consult his clients and on the date of adjourned hearing stated that his clients were not agreeable to the suggestion of the respondent and accordingly the case was heard on merits.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find that there is no merit in this revision and only delaying factices are being adopted by the judgment debtors to delay the proceeding as much as possible. The discussion by the Excusing Court in para 5 of the order shows how even the ejectment proceedings were delayed from 1972 to 1976 on one pretext or the other. The compromise was certainly for the benefit of the judgment debtors as by paying only a sum of Rs. 16,000/�not only were they to discharge their liability of Rs. 25,000/� and the arrears of rent from 1st of March, 1965, till 2nd of December, 1976, that is, the respondent was to forego Rs. 9,000/� out of the mortgage amount and about Rs. 17,000/� on account of arrears of rent from 1st of March, to December, 1976. It seems that the judgment-debtors are taking benefit of the decree holder being a woman.

The first point raised before me is fully covered by two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and Others, and Roshan Lal and another v. Madan Lal 1976 R.C.J. 112 The Executing Court on the material on the file of the ejectment case bus found that the statutory ground of ejectment for non payment of rent was clearly borne out and on that account the tenants agreed to the passing of a consent ejectment order, As held in the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court, if this is so, the order of ejectment is not null and void. Finding that the statutory ground of ejectment for non payment of rent was made out in the ejectment proceedings, I hold that the ejectment order was executable and was not nuil and void.

There is no merit in the second contention either The Executing Court has given a clear finding in the middle of para 5 of the order to the following effect:�

Before the Rent Controller, application was moved by Gurcharan Singh steno guardian for the minors that this compromise is for the benefit of the minors. The Rent Controller certified that the compromise was for the benefit of the minors.

As all cady discussed above, the compromise was certainly for the benefit of the minors as well as the major tenants and if inspite of a favourable compromise they are not prepared to company with the terms of the ejectment order, they have to suffer But there is no merit in the argument that the compromise was not in favour of the minors. Since the compromise was certainly for the benefit of the minors, any technical defect in filing the application and in passing of an order there on is not to be noticed.

Under the amended provision of section 115 of the CPC unless manifest injustice is shown to have been caused to the petitioner, no revision is competent and the High Court is not bound to interfere. On this ground also I decline to interfere in the order of the Executing Court.

For the reasons recorded above, this revision is dismissed with cost.