Smt. Narmada Devi vs State of Bihar and Others

Sachchidanand Jha, J.

1.The petitioner seeks quashing of the order of the Administrator, Gaya Municipal Corporation, dated 16-1-95 raising the annual valuation of the house bearing holding No. 49. within ward No. 2, situate at Law Road, in the town of Gaya, from Rs. 2200/- to Rs. 35,000/-. She also seeks quashing of the appellate order of the 2nd Additional District Judge, Gaya, dated 18-9-96 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 5/2 of I995/ 96 upholding the said order of the Administrator. Copies of the said orders have been marked Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition.

Mr. Sudarshan Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, has assailed the order of the Additional District Judge on the ground that in view of the provisions of Section 152 read with Section 502 of the Patna Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 (in short ''the Act''), which is applicable to the Gaya Municipal Corporation as well, it is the District Judge alone who is competent to decide the appeal. He placed reliance of Sri Sudhir Chandra Ghose v. Patna Municipal Corporation 1998 (1) BLJ 3.

No doubt, the judgment in the above-mentioned case, supports the contention of the counsel. However, with utmost respect to the learned Judge, it appears that the relevant provisions of the Bengal, Agra and AssamCivil Courts Act, 1887 (in short ''the Civil Courts Act''), under which the civil Courts have been established in the State of Bihar, and which contains provisions regarding classifications, constitution and delegation of powers in different Courts in the hierarchy of Civil Courts, nor the decisions on the point were brought to his notice.

Section 3 of the Civil Courts Act provides for the following classes of civil Courts :

(a) the Court of District Judge,

(b) the Coun of Additional Judge,

(c) the Court of Subordinate Judge, and

(d) the Court of munsif.

Section 8 provides for appointment of the Additional District Judges and their functions and powers. Being relevant to the point at issue the section may be quoted verbatim as hereunder :

"8 (i) When the business pending before any District Judge requires the aid of Additional District Judge for its speedy disposal, the State Government may, having consulted the High Court, appoint such Additional Judges as may think requisite.

(ii) Additional Judges so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of the District Judge which the District Judge may assign to them, and in exercise of those functions, they shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge."

The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the effect of identical provisions of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 in the case of Kuldip Singh Vs. The State of Punjab and Another, . Section 21 of the said Act contains similar provisions as Section 8 of the Civil Courts Act as hereunder:

" 1. When the business pending before any District Judge requires the aid of an Additional Judge or Judges for its speedy disposal, the State Government may appoint such Additional Judges as may be necessary.

An Additional Judge so appointed shall discharge any function of the District Judge which the District Judge may assign to him, and in discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge."

The Supreme Court held on construction of the different provisions of the Punjab Courts Act that although an Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal nor be can exercise original jurisdiction and in that sense he does not stand at par with a District Judge, he is competent to deal with appeal which has been entrusted to him by the District Judge and while doing so he exercises all the powers of the District Judge. The following observations at page 399 of the report may usefully be quoted :

"But these powers are limited to the cases with which he is entitled to deal. Thus, his functions are confined to the hearing of the appeals, he cannot exercise original jurisdiction and vice versa. But if he is vested with the functions of the appellate tribunal, then he can exercise all powers of the District Judge in dealing with the appeal which the District Judge is competent to entertain."

So far as this Court is concerned, way back in 1924 in the case of Most. Dako Kuer v. Most. Tural Dei AIR l924 Pat. 593, while considering the same question in the contest of the provisions of the Probate and Administration Act 1982, it was held, in view of the provisions of Section 8 of the Civil Courts Act, that when the Additional District Judge takes seisin of a case upon a transfer made to him, he becomes civil Court of original jurisdiction. He exercises the same power and in fact, occupies the position of a District Judge in the sense the term has been used in the Probate and Administration Act. Reference may also be made to the case of Balbhadra Singh alias Balbhadra Narain Singh Vs. Munaka Devi and Others ,

It is unnecessary to refer to the case law on the point of nature of jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge under different statutes in view of direct decision of this Court in the context of the Patna Municipal Corporation Act itself in the case of Sri Narayan Sharan Sharma v. Smt. Lalita Devi 1992 PLJR 102. The reported decision was rendered on difference of opinion between two Judges of the Division Bench by third Judge. While one of the Judges constituting the Division Bench held that the District Judge alone is vested with powers and jurisdiction to decide an application u/s 242(5) of the Act, the other judge took the view that the Additional District Judge is also competent to decide such application on transfer. The third Judge, on reference, referred to the provisions of Section 8 of the Civil Courts Act and certain other provisions, as mentioned in judgment, and held that the District Judge can transfer application u/s 242(5) of The Act to an Additional District Judge for disposal, and the Additional District Judge is competent to dispose of the same.

I was initially inclined to refer this case to a Division Bench for authoritative decision on the point. However, in view of the aforesaid decision in the case of Sri Narayan Sharan Sharma v. Smt. Lalita Devi (supra) and that of the Supreme Court, I do not think it is necessary to do so. The judgment in the case of Sri SudhirChandra Chose v. Patna Municipal Corporation (supra) having not taken into consideration the aforementioned provisions of the Civil Courts Act and being contrary to the decision of the larger Bench and, indeed, decision of the Supreme Court, I do nol think, it is necessary to refer the case to a Division Bench.

In the above premises, 1 have no difficulty in holding that an Additional District Judge is competent to decide appeals assigned to him by the District Judge for disposal, and while doing so. he exercises the same powers as those of the District Judge. It would thus follow, in the present case that the Additional District Judge, Gaya, was fully competent to decide the appeal and the appellate order docs not suffer from any error of jurisdiction.

Mr, Sudarshan Sharma next contended that enhancement of the annual valuation more than fifteen limes was arbitrary. From the impugned orders, however, it appears that the house in question is a four-storeyed house in which there arc shop rooms, living rooms, toilet etc. on each tloor, part of which is being used for commercial purposes. The house has, in fact, being held to be commercial-cum-residential building situate in commercial area. In my opinion, in writ jurisdiction it is not possible to take a different view as to the nature and size of the building. The writ petition so far as this point is concerned, is included by concurrent findings of fact of the two tribunals below.

Both the contentions raised on behalf of !hc petitioner having, thus, been rejected, the writ petition must fail. The same is, accordingly, dis missed.