Smt. Pathakka @ Pathamma vs S. Mallaiah and The Divisional Manager Divisional Office The United India Insurance Co. Ltd.

Aravind Kumar, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and award passed by M.A.C.T., Hiriyur, dated 31st May 2011 in M.V.C. No. 53/2010, whereunder the claim petition has been allowed in part and a total compensation of Rs. 38,132/- with interest at 6% per annum from the date of petition till realization has been awarded. Since, there is a delay of 529 days in filing the appeal, an application I.A. No. 1/2013 has been filed seeking condonation of delay. The reason given in paragraph-2 of the affidavit supporting the application reads as under:

I state that, I have sustained injuries in the accident, due to injuries, I have spent huge amount towards medical expenses. My Advocate after closing of evidence informed me that he will inform the final judgment of the case. My advocate inform me about passing of the award only in the second week of October 2011, I contacted my advocate in the first week of January 2012 and due ill health and viral fever collected the certified copy of the judgment and award in the second week of September 2012, due to financial problem, I came over to Bangalore in the first week of December 2012 and contacted and discussed with the advocate to file Appeal, after verification of the judgment and award advocate informed me to bring other case papers pertaining to my case and hence, I came back to Hiriyur and obtained required case papers, in the last week of January 2013, and in the first week of February 2013, came over to Bangalore and filed this appeal immediately without further delay. The delay is due to above said bone-fide reasons and not intention one.

It is no doubt true that it is not the length of delay which requires to be considered by this Court but the cause shown i.e., existence of sufficient cause which requires to be considered and as to whether delay is to be condoned by accepting the cause shown. No litigant would stand to benefit in approaching the Court belatedly. However, if the cause shown is not sufficient or in other words, cause shown is insufficient, then, this Court would be slow in condoning such delay. When the delay is inordinate and unexplained and reasons given in the application or the affidavit supporting such application as the case may be is fraught with vagueness, in such circumstances, this Court would not condone the delay. Hon''ble Apex Court in catena of decisions have repeatedly held that technicalities had to yield to substantial justice. On the ground of delay, the larger relief to which the litigant may be entitled to cannot be deprived of. At the same time, this Court cannot loose sight of the fact that delay disentitles to any relief since delay defeats equity. Hon''ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, has held that courts should adopt liberal approach-in condoning delay. It has been held as under:

The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ''merits''. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-

Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

"Every day''s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made Why not every hour''s delay, every second''s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the ''State'' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the ''State'' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.

Hon''ble Apex Court in the. case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) BY LRS vs. State OF A.P. & Others (C.A. Nos. 2909-2913/2005 disposed of on 24.02.2011) has held that concept of "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. It has been held that especially in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay, such appeals should not be entertained. It has been held by Hon''ble Court in Amalendu Kumar Bera & Amp; & Others vs. State of West Bengal (Civil Appeal No. 2677/2013 disposed of on 22.03.2013 to the following effect:

We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent-State. There is no dispute that the expression ''sufficient cause'' for the explaining every days'' delay. However, it is equally well settled that the Courts albeit liberally considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in some cases the Court may refuse to condone the delay in as much as the Government is not accepted to keep watch whether the contesting respondent further put the matter in motion. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. in a recent decision in the case of Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Nripen Sarma, the matter came up against the order passed by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant-Union of India. The High Court refused to condone the delay on the ground that the appellant-Union of India took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. The high Court also expressed its anguish and distress, the way the State conduct the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same became operational and barred by limitation.

Keeping the principles enunciated by Their Lordships in the above judgments, when the facts on hand are examined, it would clearly indicate that award in question came to be passed on 31.5.2011. However, claimant did not apply for certified copy immediately. Thereafter it was applied after a period of nearly one year i.e., on 20.4.2012. The reason assigned in the affidavit supporting the application is the negligence of the Advocate viz., it is contended by the claimant that it was the duty of the Advocate to inform her about the progress of the case and since she was not informed as to the status of the case, she could not meet her Advocate to apply for grant of certified copy. This contention of the appellant requires to be examined for purposes of outright rejection inasmuch as it is duty of the client to approach the Advocate to find out as to the status of the case and not vice versa. Even otherwise, appellant herself admit that her Advocate had informed her about the passing of the award in question during second week of October 2011. Even after being informed, she did not contact her Advocate for the reason best known. Again she admits in her affidavit that she met her Advocate during first week of January 2012. As to why she had not contacted her Advocate for a period of two and a half months, no reasons are forthcoming from the affidavit. Claimant has stated that she obtained certified copy during September 2012, which is also falsehood since the certified copy has been furnished to the claimant during June 2012, as could be seen from the certified copy of judgment and award accompanying the appeal. Hence, the reason given by the claimant for condonation of delay is loaded with false statements and as such, cause for delay cannot be accepted.

As discussed hereinabove, in the instant case, cause shown is not only insufficient, but also vague, bereft of material particulars, bereft of facts not supported by cogent material and cause shown is not even in the proximity of truth. Even otherwise, perusal of the award would indicate that claimant had sustained fracture of distal end of radius and it is opined by the Doctor that fracture is united. Taking into consideration the injuries sustained by the claimant, Tribunal has awarded in all a total compensation of Rs. 38,132/-, which is just and reasonable and it does not call for any enhancement.

Hence, I do not find any good ground to condone the delay.

Accordingly, I.A. No. 1/2013 is hereby dismissed and consequently, appeal is also dismissed.