United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs Umar Rep. by his father guardian and Another

S. Jagadeesan, J.—This petition is to condone the delay of 30 days in filing the appeal against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims

Tribunal (Principal Sub-Judge) Cuddalore in MACTOP No. 264 of 1990. In the affidavit, the petitioner has stated that the relevant papers relating

to the O.P. and the certified copies of the judgment and decree were forwarded to the Regional Office at Madras for scrutiny by the legal

department of the petitioner insurance company to decide on the question of advisability of filing appeal. The concerned Managers, who have to

take a decision, were not readily available inasmuch as they had been deputed to attend certain policy matters of importance. As such, the decision

could not be taken for filing an appeal within the period of limitation. Moreover, in a Government Undertaking like the petitioner, administrative

delay cannot be avoided for more reasons than one.

It is clear that the Tribunal has passed the award on 22-2-1995 and the certified copies of the judgment and decree were made ready on 8-3-

1995. Since the limitation expires during summer vacation i.e., on 6.6.1995 the appeal ought to have been filed on the reopening day. Thus, due to

the administrative reasons, a delay of 30 days had caused.

I had an occasion to deal with another connected matter in CMP. No. 2147 of 1996 in AAOSR. No. 44397 of 1995 wherein the same reason

was given. Relying upon the decision of this Court reported in United India Insurance Company Ltd, Division Office, Pondicherry v. Pravin Paul

(2) N. Periannan, 1993 (1) L.W.68, I had dismissed the said CMP.No.2147 of 1996 on the ground that mere ""administrative delay"" without

giving the details with regard to the dates cannot be accepted as sufficient cause. The counsel for the petitioner contended that though the

application was dismissed relying upon the judgment of this Court reported in United India Insurance Company Ltd., Division Office, Pondicherry

v. Pravin Paul (2) N. Periannan, 1993 (1) L.W. 68, he was not aware of the Supreme Court Judgment made in S.L.P.(Civil) No. 4060 of 1993

dated 13.9.1993. The judgment reported in United India Insurance Company Ltd., Division Office, Pondicherry v. Pravin Paul (2) N. Periannan,

1993 (1) L.W. 68 was set aside by the Supreme Court in S.L.P.(Civil) No. 4060 of 1993.

The Supreme Court, by its Order date 13-9-1993 made in the SLP referred to above, has passed the following Order:-

The SLP is disposed of.

The Supreme Court has also passed the following order on the same day in the SLP referred to above;-

The costs of Rs. 10,000 deposited in this Court may be sent by the Registry by way of a crossed demand draft drawn in the name of the first-

respondent directly to the first- respondent.

The order of the High Court dated 17th November, 1992 dismissing the appeal as barred by time is set aside. Delay in filing the appeal before the

High Court in condoned and the appeal will now be disposed of on merits. The petitioner shall pay an additional sum of Rs. 50,000 to the first-

respondent before the appeal is taken up for final hearing.

Only on the basis of the order dated 13-91993, the counsel for the petitioner represents that the Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in

United India Insurance Company Ltd., Division Office, Pondicherry v. Pravin Paul (2) N. Periannan, 1993 (1) L.W. 68 had been overruled.

I am unable to agree with the contention of the counsel for the petitioner. The order can be said to have been set aside, but it cannot be said that

the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court had been overruled since the Supreme Court had not discussed anything on merits. From a look

at the order of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the Supreme Court had imposed certain conditions on the Insurance Company and since those

conditions have been complied with, the Supreme Court condoned the delay, without considering the legality of the order of this Court reported in

United India Insurance Company Ltd., Division Office, Pondicherry v. Pravin Paul (2) N. Periannan, 1993 (1) L.W. 68 on merits.

The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in Collector, Land

Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, ; G. Ramegowda, Major and Ors Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer,

Bangalore, and State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others, there should be some liberal approach in considering the petitions for condonation

of the delay, especially when such petitions are filed either by the Government or by the State Undertaking Corporations. 1 have carefully

considered those decisions. In fact, liberal approach has to be made in considering the claim of the petitioners they have given some details with

regard to the administrative delay. In the absence of any reason, the liberal approach is not possible, because the Court has to consider whether

the reason given by the petitioner will amount to sufficient cause or not. In the case on hand, the petitioner has not furnished the date on which the

Regional Office, Madras received the papers and when the Managers were deputed to attend certain policy matters of importance and when they

returned from such discussion over the policy matters or when their work was over. These dates arc essential to consider whether the petitioner

had, acted bona fide without any unnecessary delay. In the absence of such relevant dates, it cannot be said that the petitioners has acted bona fide

on their part. When the bona fide is under doubtful, then, there cannot be a sufficient cause for condoning the delay irrespective of the number of

days delay in filing the appeal. In fact, the Supreme Court, in the latest Judgment reported in State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others, has

held that the expression ""sufficient cause"" should be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of

sufficient cause for explaining every day''s delay. If this statement of the Supreme Court is to be considered, the petitioner is bound to give the

relevant particular dates which are most essential to consider the sufficient cause in its pragmatic approach. When those relevant dates are not

available and the mere words ""administrative delay"" cannot be said to be sufficient cause. Even according to the Supreme Court wherein it has

been held as follows:-

The expression ""sufficient cause"" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism injustice-oriented approach rather than the technical

detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day''s delay. The factors which arc peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the

Government conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice oriented process. The Court should decide

the matters on merit unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State viz-a-vis private

litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the

cases whether any legal principles arc involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to

take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, the needed prompt action should be pursued

by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the

same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an

appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is in impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.

From the above extracted passage, it is clear that the Supreme Court has observed in the event of decision to file the appeal, the needed prompt

action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any.

In this case, in the absence of any relevant dates, it is not possible for the Court to fix the responsibility for lapse on any officer and at the same

time, it is also not possible for this Court to find out as to whether the officers have acted with promptness or whether there are lapses on their

part. Considering all these, I am of the view that there is no need to change my view expressed in the earlier order in C.M.P. No. 2147 of 1996,

Accordingly, this petition is dismissed and the memorandum of grounds of civil miscellaneous appeal shall stand rejected out of this Court.