High CourtsSingle Bench

Sohan Singh and Another vs State of Punjab

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 10 July 2013 · Citation: (2013) 07 P&H CK 0283

HON’BLE JUDGES
Mehinder Singh Sullar, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 225, 226, 227, 227, 228 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 148, 149, 307, 323, 324
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Revision No. 882 of 2011 (O and M)
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

17 paragraphs · 1,632 words

Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.—The epitome of the facts and material, which needs a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the instant revision petition and emanating from the record, inter-alia, is that, there was some dispute between the parties with regard to construction of metaled road. On 15.12.2006, petitioners along with their other co-accused formed an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons and came to the spot, where construction work of the road was going on. It was claimed that accused Gurdeep Singh raised a lalkara, whereas the present petitioner Prem Singh gave a dang blow, which hit on the head of Raj Singh. He repeated the injuries and inflicted other lathi blows on his head as well. It has been specifically mentioned that petitioner-accused Sohan Singh, who was armed with a double barrel gun, fired a shot towards Budh Parkash son of complainant Gurmej Singh with an intention to kill him. The shot hit on his right hand. He felled on the ground after receipt of gun shot injury. Other co-accused have also caused injuries to complainant party in the manner depicted in the FIR. In the background of these allegations and in the wake of complaint of complainant Gurmej Singh, a criminal case was registered against the petitioners and their other co-accused, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 148, 307, 323 and 324 read with section 149 IPC, by the police of Police Station Guruharsahai, District Ferozepur. During the course of inquiry, the police deleted the offence punishable u/s. 307 IPC and submitted the final police report (challan) against the accused, on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under sections 148, 324 and 325 read with section 149 IPC.

2.

Taking into consideration the material/evidence on record, the trial Court of Additional Sessions Judge charge-sheeted the accused for the commission of offences punishable under sections 148, 307 and 323 read with section 149 IPC, by virtue of impugned order dated 24.1.2011 (Annexure P1) and separate charge sheet dated 5.2.2011 (Annexure P2) and the case was slated for evidence of the prosecution.

3.

Instead of submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial Court, the petitioners-accused straightway jumped to prefer the present revision petition, to challenge the impugned indicated order and charge-sheet, invoking the provisions of Section 401 Cr.P.C. That is how I am seized of the matter.

4.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the material/evidence on record & the legal proposition with their valuable assistance and after considering the entire matter deeply, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant revision petition in this context.

5.

Ex facie, the arguments of the learned counsel that in subsequent enquiry, the police has deleted the offence punishable u/s. 307 IPC and since in the wake of complaint, petitioners were summoned as accused u/s. 326 IPC, so, the trial Court committed a legal mistake to frame the charges against them u/s. 307 IPC read with section 149 IPC, is not only devoid of merit but misplaced as well.

6.

As is evident from the record that very serious allegations are assigned to the accused that they formed an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons and reached the spot. The prosecution has specifically, inter-alia, claimed that petitioner Sohan Singh fired a shot from his double barrel gun towards Budh Parkash son of the complainant with the intention to kill him. The shot actually hit on his right hand and he felled on the ground after receipt of gun shot injury, whereas there are direct allegations that petitioner Prem Singh repeatedly gave lathi blows on the head of Raj Singh injured and their other co-accused also caused injuries to the injured PWs.

7.

Meaning thereby, there are direct allegations and sufficient material to support the prosecution version and the trial Court has rightly framed the charges against the petitioners and their other co-accused u/s. 148, 307 and 323 read with section 149 IPC as well. The mere facts that the accused were summoned to face the trial u/s. 326 IPC and that the police has deleted the offence punishable u/s. 307 IPC, ipso facto, are not the grounds, much less cogent, to exonerate them at this stage for the purpose of framing charges, particularly when very serious and specific allegations of having caused injuries with deadly weapons are assigned to the petitioners in the manner depicted here-in-above. To me, the trial Court has rightly placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in cases The State of Punjab and Others Vs. Jagtar Singh and Others, and Harnek Singh @ Meka & Ors. v. State of Punjab 1992 (3) RCR (Criminal) 422 and correctly framed the pointed charges against the accused.

8.

What cannot possibly be disputed here is that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to prima facie consider, whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused or not and the Court is not required to appreciate the evidence sufficient for conviction, at this stage.

9.

A similar question was considered by the Hon''ble Apex Court in case State of M.P. Vs. S.B. Johari and Others, . Having interpreted the provisions of Sections 227/ 228 of the Cr.P.C., it was ruled that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for conviction of the accused. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further, then a charge has to be framed.

10.

Sequelly, the next contention of learned counsel that the impugned order (Annexure P1) is non-speaking, lacks merit. The perusal of the record would reveal that the impugned order is well reasoned order. Moreover, it is now well-settled legal proposition of law that, if the trial Court decides to frame the charge, there is no requirement to include all the facts contained in the final police report (challan), as urged on behalf of petitioners-accused or that it should pass an order specifying the reasons as to why it had to do so. The framing of charge itself is a prima facie order, indicative of the fact that the trial Judge has formed the opinion upon considering the police report, other documents and after hearing both the parties that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, as contemplated under Sections 225 to 228 Cr.P.C. This matter is no more res integra and is now well-settled.

11.

An identical question came to be decided by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in cas U.P. Pollution Control Board Vs. M/s. Mohan Meaking Ltd. and Others, , wherein it was ruled as under (para 6):-

6.

In a recent decision of the Supreme Court it has been pointed out that the legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons vide Kanti Bhadra Shah and Another Vs. The State of West Bengal, The following passage will be apposite in this context:

If there is no legal requirement that the trial Court should write on order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work? The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the Court procedures and to chalk out measures to overt all (sic) causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial Courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages of the trial.

(Emphasis supplied)

12.

Therefore, if the totality of entire material/evidence brought on record and the legal proposition are put together, then, to my mind, the conclusion is inescapable that there is sufficient material on record and the trial Judge has rightly framed the indicated charges against the petitioners and their other co-accused as well, through the medium of impugned order (Annexure P1) and charge-sheet (Annexure P2). Hence, the contrary arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners "stricto sensu" deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances. Not only that, such order/charge-sheet cannot legally be set aside, while exercising the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court, unless the same are totally illegal, perverse and without jurisdiction. Since, no such patent illegality or legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for petitioners, so, the impugned order/charge-sheet deserve to be and are hereby maintained in the obtaining circumstances of the case.

13.

No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the parties.

14.

In the light of aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant revision petition is hereby dismissed as such. Needless to mention that, nothing recorded here-in-above, would reflect on the merits of the main case, in any manner, during the course of trial, as the same has been so observed for a limited purpose of deciding the present revision petition in this relevant direction.