Special Land Acquisition Officer vs Nathaji Kacharaji (Decd.) through heir Dhulaji Nathaji

Y.B. Bhatt, J.—These are appeals filed on behalf of the State of Gujarat u/s 54 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 96, C.P.C.,

challenging the common judgment and awards passed by the Reference Court u/s 18 of the said Act. We do not propose to discuss in detail the

various factual contentions which may arise in these appeals, but restrict ourselves to questions of law, which are pertinent in the context of the

present order.

The principal contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is as regards the period of limitation applicable to applications for

making a Reference u/s 18 of the said Act, and the different circumstances under which such period of limitation is to be considered and

computed. During the course of hearing and discussion we have had the opportunity of referring to a number of decisions of this Court as also of

the Supreme Court. During the course of hearing our attention has also been drawn to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court case of Kalidas

N. Mehta and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (hereinafter referred to as the said decision). It is in the context of this particular decision

that we are required to pass the present order.

The said decision lays down that in order to apply the period of limitation, as provided for u/s 18, Sub-sections (2) of the said Act, the phrase

date of the Collector''s award"" must be interpreted so as to mean such date when the award is either communicated to or is known by the party,

whether actually or constructively. The said decision lays down that the date of the Collector''s award does not necessarily mean mere knowledge

of the making or publication of the award, but also means actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award. In paragraph 5 of the

said decision, the learned Division Bench has referred to and relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court, in the case of Raja Harish Chandra

Raj Singh Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Another, , and in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and Another,

. Relying upon the said two decisions, the learned Division Bench concluded and laid down the law in para 5 of the said decision to the effect that,

in the context of Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award, which must be made

known to the land holder, either actually or constructively.

In para 6 of the said decision the Bench referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Rasulkhanji Sardar Mahomad Khanji Vs. H.P.

Rathod, 3rd Spl. Land Acquisition Officer and Another, , wherein it is held that there can be no valid notice under Sub-sections (2) of Section 12

until the essential contents of the award were brought home to the parties affected by actually communicating the award. In the very said

paragraph, the learned Division Bench took support to the view expressed, from a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tola Ram v. State

of U.P., (1997) 6 SCC 280 .

In the context of the aforesaid law laid down by the learned Division Bench in the said decision, we are of the opinion that (1) subsequent

decisions of the Supreme Court have apparently escaped the attention of the learned Division Bench and (2) that the decision of the Supreme

Court in the case of Tota Ram (supra) is in the specific context of the computation of limitation prescribed for applications u/s 28-A of the said

Act, which confers specific and distinct rights and specifically provides for a distinct and separate period of limitation. This limitation is to be

computed in a manner very different from the computation of the period of limitation prescribed u/s 18(2) of the said Act. In fact the limitation

prescribed by the proviso to Section 28-A, specifically provides that in computing the prescribed period of limitation, the time required for

obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. Obviously, there is no such specific provision, nor any decision even indirectly implying exclusion

of such period, while computing limitation for the purpose of Section 18(2) of the said Act.

It would, therefore, appear from the said decision of the learned Division Bench, that even where Reference Courts are dealing with or deciding

the question of limitation, even if arising u/s 18(2) of the said Act, actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award must be imputed

to the applicant, and that the time taken for obtaining certified copies of the award should be excluded while computing the period of limitation.

In our opinion, the ratio laid down in the said decision of the learned Division Bench is doubtful and requires reconsideration in view of the

following decisions of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has held in the case of Poshetty and Others Vs. State of A.P., to the effect that a copy of the award need not be supplied

to the person affected together with the notice u/s 12(2) of the said Act. It necessarily follows, in our opinion, that imputation of the knowledge of

the making of the award or publication of the award is sufficient, and the knowledge, whether actual or constructive, as to the contents of the

award, is irrelevant and immaterial for computation of the period of limitation u/s 18(2). In our opinion, a similar view has also been expressed by

the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and Another Vs. Satinder Bir Singh, , wherein it has been held that the notice u/s 12(2) need not

contain the details of the award, and by necessary implication, the said decision lays down that the said notice need not be accompanied by a copy

of the award. We, therefore, read into this decision the necessary consequence that what must be imputed to the applicant is only the knowledge

of the making or publication of the award and not the knowledge, whether actual or constructive, of the contents of the award.

We have also considered other decisions which may possibly have a bearing on the peripheral aspects which may arise from the consideration

of this specific issue. This includes the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Memon Ibrahim Haji Latif Sukhediwala Vs. Officer on

Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and Another, , as also a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Hasnuddin Vs. State of

Maharashtra, .

In the light of the various Supreme Court decisions considered by us (and all of them are not referred to in the present order), we are also of

the opinion that the decision of this Court in the case of (1) Damor Fataji v. State of Gujarat reported at 1987 (2) GLH 5 and (2) Rajat Hirabhai

Motibhai and Others Vs. Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation, Panam Project, Godhra and Others, , are no longer good law.

We may also note here that another specific legal issue arises in the present group of matters. The question is as to whether the Reference

Court, after reaching a conclusion that the Reference is time-barred, has a power to condone the delay on an application made for the purpose, or

whether the Reference Court, in the absence of such a power, is bound to reject the Reference.

In this context, we are of the opinion that it is possible, on an examination of the correct interpretation of the decisions of the Supreme Court in

the case of Mohammed Hasnuddin Vs. State of Maharashtra, and the Full Bench decision in the case of Memon Ibrahim Haji Latif Sukhediwala

Vs. Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and Another, , to conclude that the Reference Court has no power of condonation of delay.

Another reason on our part for expressing the above view can best be expressed as under:

13.1 It is well settled law that the Reference Court is not merely a principal Court of original jurisdiction and/or is not functioning as a civil Court

constituted under the Bombay Civil Courts Act, but functions as a Special Forum or the Special Tribunal inasmuch as it is assigned this function

and jurisdiction under the Land Acquisition Act, particularly in view of Section 3, which defines the word ""Court"". Thus, a Special Forum specially

constituted to perform special functions under a special statute, obviously functions within the parameters of such special statute and is subject to

the limitations imposed by the relevant special statute. On an examination of the various provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and in particular,

Sections 18(2) and 28-A of the said Act, we find that each of these provisions provides not merely a separate period of limitation, but also provide

for a different scheme for computation of such period. Each of these two provisions (and we are referring to only two of such provisions by way of

illustration), provides for a different mode of computation of the period of limitation, and the criteria for determination of the period of limitation are

also specifically different. To be more specific, Section 28-A contains an intrinsic and specific provision that the period of time for obtaining

certified copy of the award (the award in question) shall be excluded from the computation of the period of limitation. Section 18, Sub-sections (2)

does not contain any such or similar exclusion. This dissimilarity between the two provisions appears to us to indicate the Legislative intent in this

regard. We are, therefore, inclined to express an opinion that the Legislature did not intend, in relation to references u/s 18, to confer any incidental

benefit to the land holders-applicants, by excluding such period for obtaining certified copies and/or extending the period of limitation in any other

manner. Another reason for holding such a view is that, if the Legislature considered it necessary, the power to condone delay exercisable by the

special forum constituted under the Land Acquisition Act, would have been specifically conferred upon such special forum by the statute itself. In

the absence of such a special conferment of specific power, in relation to Section 18(2), such a power cannot be impliedly read into the statute.

Inasmuch as this is a question of general public importance, and as we are informed that there is no specific decision, either of the Supreme Court

or of any other High Court on this question, we are of the opinion that this question also requires to be decided by a Larger Bench.

In the premises aforesaid, we are of the opinion that the said decision of the Division Bench requires reconsideration and for this purpose we

direct the Registry to obtain appropriate directions of the Hon''ble Chief Justice for placing these matters before an appropriate Larger Bench.