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Judgment
The petitioner being common in both the writ petitions, they are taken up together and the following common order is passed.
The petitioner herein has sought for quashing the proceedings on the file of respondent No.1, dated 10.8.1987 and 17.11.1988, and on the file
of respondent No.2, dated 22.8.1989, and also for a consequential direction to the respondents, forbearing them from levying, assessing and
demanding or compounding Agricultural Income Tax in respect of total extent of 31 -90 acres of land, in both the writ petitions.
The petitioner was served with a notice (printed in Tamil in the Post Card and filled up with particulars) dated 25.9.1987, informing that he was
in arrears of tax to the tune of Rs. 257.50 for the year 1987-88 and that if the same is not paid on or before 30.9.1987, proceedings will be
initiated to recover the same as arrears of land revenue under the Revenue Recovery Act. The petitioner by his letter dated 8.10.1987 addressed
to respondent No.1 herein, sought for furnishing him with the details of the same and till such time, not to treat him as a defaulter. The particulars
were served on the petitioner thereafter, and a reply was given by the petitioner on 27.10.1987 contesting that the demand raised without any
opportunity or prior intimation, is without the authority of law. The petitioner was served with another compounding order, dated 17.11.1988 for
the year 1988-1989, fixing the tax liability at Rs.159.20. He filed a revision petition on 7.4.11989 before the respondent No.2, explaining all the
details, contending that determination was the one without jurisdiction, and the revision petition was rejected by an order dated 22.8.1989
despatched on 14.9.1989. The respondent No.2 confirmed the order of respondent No.1, in his proceedings R.P.Nos.33 and 34 of 1989 dated
22.8.1989. The total extent of 31.90 acres of land are situated in three villages, viz., 12.83 acres at Panappakkam Village; 6.25 acres at
Poigainallur Village and 12.82 acres at Aathur Village, Arakonam Taluk, North Arcot District.
It was stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner in both the writ petitions, died in the year 1994. No steps have been
taken so far to bring the legal representatives on record.
An otherwise a simple case to be dismissed as abated, but for stance of the learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia contending that the High
Court which exercises its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot be said to be the Court of Civil
Jurisdiction and technical rules of the CPC are not applicable in view of the amendment to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has called
for this detailed order. The learned counsel invited my attention to a decision in Hemraj Vs. Income Tax Recovery Officer, Jodhpur, , and also
another decision in The Press Trust of India and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, .
The Amendment Act, 1976, with an explanation to Section 141 of the CPC contemplates that the expression ""Proceedings"" includes
proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. But, this explanation does not run counter
to the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. As far as possible, the object being that this special jurisdiction of
a High Court aims at securing a very speedy and efficacious remedy and if all the elaborate and technical rules of the CPC were to be imported
into the writ proceedings, the very purpose is likely to be defeated by proceedings being delayed. But where the writ proceeding Rules which lays
down that in matters not specifically dealt with by the Rules and to the extent they are necessary, the provisions of the CPC will be applicable. For
the purpose of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not depend upon the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The Procedure prescribed by the CPC is followed in the writ proceedings not because of any legal compulsion to do so, but
because that procedure complies with the rules of natural justice. I need not refer to the explanation attached to Section 141, C.P.C because as
held in Bharat Board Mills Ltd. Vs. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Others, and Hans Raj Sood v. State of Himachal Pradesh
and others, AIR 1978 H.P 63, the jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under Article 226 of the Constitution is a special and limited
jurisdiction. It is not a revisional jurisdiction nor is it an appellate jurisdiction. The High Court also does not exercise any jurisdiction or
superintendence under Article 226 as it does under Article 227 of the Constitution. In such a situation, Section 141 of the CPC does not apply
literally to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. When it has no application, the explanation u/s 141 of the CPC need not be
countenanced from this angle.
A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is essentially different from a suit and it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the
procedure of a suit into the proceedings of a petition under Article 226.(see Babubhai Muljibhai Patel Vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and Others, .
Even in Management of Rain Bow Dyeing Factory Salem and Others Vs. Industrial Tribunal, High Court Buildings, Madras and Another, , the
same view was taken and it was stated that the provisions of the CPC cannot be applied to writ proceedings on the strength of the rule laid down
by Section 141 of that Code inasmuch as a writ proceeding cannot be held to be in the nature of a civil suit.
The Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Teja Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Others, , held that in the matters which
have not been specifically dealt with by the writ jurisdiction (Punjab and Haryana) Rules 1976, the provisions of the CPC so far as they can be
made applicable, would apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Explanation added to Section 141 of the CPC by the
1976 C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, does not in any way nullify the effect of Rule 32 of the Writ Rules.
With these decisions, the conclusion that emerges is that wherever the Writ Rules framed by the High Court are silent on procedure, the
procedure, contemplated in the CPC in order to meet natural justice can be availed of under inherent jurisdiction while dealing with a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
Even if it is held that Order 22 of the Code is not applicable to writ proceedings, it does not mean that the petitioner in such writ petition can
ignore the death of the party if the right to pursue the remedy even after the death survives. It is incumbent on the legal representatives of the party
to substitute themselves within a reasonable time. What is reasonable time depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court
may take note of the period prescribed under Article 120 of the Limitation Act for substituting the heirs of the deceased. But, incase, an application
is filed either within the reasonable time or beyond certain time, while condoning the delay in filing the application for substitution of the legal
representatives, the Court has to exercise the discretion on well-settled principles. That does not mean that it should rely on the technical rules of
limitation or the procedure contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure. Such applications may be dealt with under the inherent jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution. But just because, an unlimited power is there under Article 226 of the Constitution, that does not mean that it
is an unguided power, Such discretion also to be exercised judiciously to meet the ends of justice.
In the instant case, though the petitioner died in the year 1995 as per the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, no application till
date has been filed. The question of going into the technicalities of considering the substitution of the legal representatives does not arise. In such an
event, the application of the explanation attached to Section 141, C.P.C. or the technical rules of the CPC also does not arise. It is not right on the
part of the Court to allow a petition to lie for an indefinite period in the absence of heirs or legal representatives being substituted. The word
abate"" means ''to throw down, to beat down, to suspend, cessation or to do away with''. In that sense, when no steps have been taken, the Court
is justified in dismissing the petition as abated, which does not mean invoking the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, but under the inherent
jurisdiction.
In Puran Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and others, , a similar question was considered and it was held that it is incumbent on the part of
the party to substitute the legal heirs by filing an application, and on the ground of non-filing an application, for a considerable time, the petition
does not abate automatically. This statement implies pendency of an application. That does not mean that when no application has been filed, the
petition should survive on the file just for statistic purpose, that too, when no claim can be adjudicated.
The Press Trust of India and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , was a case where one shareholder since expired, the other
shareholder being brought on record can continue. In such a situation, the Apex Court held that the petition will not abate. But that case has no
application to the fact situation of this case. The other case cited by the learned counsel, viz., Hemraj Vs. Income Tax Recovery Officer, Jodhpur,
has also no application to the instant case, since I have taken the view that the explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, need not
be considered.
For reasons aforestated, both the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed for the lapse in not impleading the legal representatives though the
petitioner died in the year 1994 and the Court has no option except to dismiss these writ petitions as abated, and accordingly, the same are
dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.