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Judgment
8 paragraphs · 640 wordsA.P. Chowdhri, J.
This appeal is directed against the judgment dated March, 19, 1984 of the Additional. Sessions Judge, Karnal, acquitting Pokhar Dass under section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as, `the Act''). The said accused had been convicted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karnal, for the aforesaid offence and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000/.
According to the prosecution, the accused was found in possession of 60 bottles of carbonated water for sale in the form of several crates. The Food Inspector purchased for analysis 9 bottles, mixed the contents thereof so as to make the same uniform, and took sample in three equal parts according to the procedure laid down under the Act and the Rules. The Public Analyst by his report Exhibit PD found that the sample contained 3.63 per cent of sugar as against the minimum prescribed standard of 5 per cent. The Local Health Authority informed the accused about the result of the analysis and the accused was tried, as already stated. The Chief Judicial Magistrate convicted and sentenced the accused. He referred an appeal, which was allowed. Aggrieved by the judgment of the lower appellate Court, the State has preferred this appeal.
The scope of controversy in this appeal is very limited and is confined to a single point. According to the prosecution, the case in question is impliedly covered under the item sweetened carbonated water. According to the accused, on the other hand, the article in question was carbonated water and there was no requirement of any percentage of sugar. In order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to reproduce in extenso the relevant entry in appendix `B'' to the Act :
"A.01,01Carbonated Water means potable water impregnated with carbon dioxide under pressure and may contain any of the following singly or in combination.
Sugar, liquid glucose, dextrose, monohydrate, invert sugar, fructose, honey, saccharin not exceeding 10 p.m., fruits and vegetables extractives and permitted flavouring, colouring matter, preservatives, emulsifying and stabilizing agents, citric acid, fumaric acid and sorbitol, tartaric acid, phosphoric acid, lactic acid, ascorbic acid, malic acid, edible gums such as guar, karaya, arabic, carobean, furcellaran, tragacanth, gum ghatti, edible gelatin, albumin, licorice and its derivatives, salts of sodium, calcium and magnesium, vitamins, caffeine not exceeding 200 parts per million, and quinine salts not exceeding 100 parts per million (expressed as quinine sulphate) Provided that the case of sweetened carbonated waters other than tonic water and dry gingerale the percentage of total sugars expressed as sucrose shall not be less than five".
It will be seen that the above provision specifically deals with two, distinct items; one is carbonated water mentioned in the body of the provision and the other is sweetened carbonated water referred to in the proviso. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that `carbonated water'' is distinct from `sweetened carbonated water''. It cannot also be disputed that while `carbonated water'' may or may not contain sugar, `sweetened carbonated water'' is required to contain not less than 5 per cent of sucrose. The article of which sample was taken was described as carbonated water. It was not described as sweetened carbonated water. There was thus no requirement of any percentage of sugar in the sample. This is precisely what the lower appellate Court has held. This view finds further support from Bhim Sain v. State of Punjab, 1976(1) SCC 141, in which it was laid down that the requirement of sucrose content being not less than 5 per cent does not apply where what is sold is not sweetened carbonated water but merely `carbonated water which may or may not contain sugar.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed.
