State Of H.P. vs Dhan Prakash And Another

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.09.2012, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmour at Nahan (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the charged offences. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Section 323 and 325, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Rajender Singh (PW-1) had gone to the vegetable market to buy vegetables on 01.11.2008 at about 7:30 A.M. Accused Dhan Prakash was running a shop in the market. The informant went to his shop. Accused Dhan Prakash and his son Prince (acc sed No. 2) were present in the shop. They demanded ₹272/- from the informant towards the previous balance. The informed replied that he was liable to pay only ₹ 14/-. Dhan Prakash and Prince became infuriated and started beating the informant. Vijay, Pawan, Ramesh (PW-2) and other persons rescued the informant from the accused. The informant went to the hospital. An intimation was given to the Police, and entry (Ex. PW4/A) was recorded in the Police Station. The informant was medically examined by Dr Deepak Arora (PW-3), who found that there was perforation of the left eardrum, and the nature of the injury was grievous. Dr Jagdeep Thakur (PW-6) carried out a hearing assessment. He found that the informant had normal hearing on the right side and mild conductive hearing loss on the left side. There was a perforation in the left ear, while the right ear was normal. He issued the reports (Ex. PW6/A and Ex. PW6/B). The nature of the injury was stated to be grievous by Dr Deepak Arora (PW-3), who issued MLC (Ex. PW3/A). An entry (Ex. PW4/B) was recorded in the Police Station, and FIR (Ex. PW7/A) was registered. HC Kamlender Singh (PW-7) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the si e plan (Ex. PW7/C). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completi n f the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

The learned Trial Court charged the accused with t e commission of the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

The prosecution examined 7 witnesses to prove its case. Rajender Singh (PW-1) is the informant/victim. Ramesh Chand (PW-2) is an eyewitness. Dr Deepak Arora (PW-3) medically examined the informant/victim. Constable Jagjeet Singh (PW-4) proved the entry in the daily diary. ASI Ram Nath (PW-5) applied for medical examination of the informant/victim. Dr. Jagdeep Thakur (PW-6) examined the informant in IGMC, Shimla. HC Kamlender (PW-7) investigated the matter.

The accused Dhan Prakash, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that Rajender Singh, a fruit seller, had gone to the vegetable market on 01.11.2008 at about 7:30 A.M. He admitted that he (Dhan Prakash) was running a shop in the vegetable market. He stated that a false case was made and the witnesses falsely testified against him. Accused Nitin Kumar also admitted that Rajender Singh is a fruit seller, and co-accused Dhan Prakash runs a shop in the vegetable market. He claimed that he was innocent. The statement of Akash Saini (DW-1) was recorded in defence.

Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution’s evidence was full of contradictions. As per the initial version projected by the informant, he was beaten in front of the shop of accused Dhan Prakash, whereas the cross-examination of the complainant showed that he was beaten in the shop of Ramesh Chand, which is quite far away from the shop of accused Dhan Prakash. The prosecution had not cited the independent witnesses, and an adverse inference had to be drawn against the prosecution. The statement of the defence witness was highly probable. Nitin Kumar had lost his right arm much before the incident, and he could not have inflicted a blow on the left ear of the informant with his left hand because a blow given by the left hand would have landed on the right ear and not the le t ear, as asserted by the informant. The medical evidence showed that the perforation could be caused by using any sharp object to clean the ear. The p osecu ion’s case was not proved beyond a reasonable do bt, hence the accused were acquitted.

Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a slipshod and perfunctory manner. Unrealistic standards were used to evaluate the prosecution’s evidence. The statements of the witnesses were discarded without any cogent reasons. Ramesh Chand fully supported the prosecution’s case. The minor contradictions were bound to come with time, and they were blown out of proportion; therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Ms Shashi Kiran Negi, learned counsel for the respondents/accused.

Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting he accused. Learned Trial Court relied upon minor contradictions, which were bound to come with time and co ld not have been used to discard the prosecution’s case. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

Ms Shashi Kiran Negi, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while evaluating the evidence, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal; hence, she prayed that the appeal be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reas nable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440:

“23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudrago dar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)

“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words:

(Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42)

‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence up n which the order of acquittal is f unded.

(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limi ation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.

(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial c urt.”

Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)

… 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence.

8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence.

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record.

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity.

41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission o consider material evidence on record; and

41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on rec rd.”

It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The informant stated that he was present in the shop of Dhan Prakash when Dhan Prakash and his son Prince demanded ₹ 272/-. He stated that he was liable to pay only ₹14/-. The accused gave him beatings. Vijay, Pawan, Ramesh, etc., rescued him. He stated in his cross-examination that he was standing in the shop of Ramesh, where 20-25 people were also standing. He used to purchase the fruits from Ramesh for 4-5 years.

Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that he had shifted the place of the incident rom the shop of accused Dhan Prakash to the sh p f Ramesh in his cross-examination. Site plan (Ex. PW7/C) shows that the accused was beaten outside shop No. 8. Ramesh Chand (PW-2) stated that he is running shop No. 8, whereas the accused is running shop No. 4, which is located at a distance of 30-40 feet from shop No. 8. This shows that the informant/victim has changed the place of the incident.

Ramesh Chand (PW-2) stated in his cross-examination that the incident occurred near the shop No. 7 belonging to Garg. Thus, this witness has also shifted the place of the incident.

The statement of the informant that the incident occurred outside the shop of Ramesh and the statement of Ramesh that the incident occurred outside the shop of Garg would make the prosecution’s case highly suspect because if the informant was present in the shop of Ramesh or outside the shop of Garg, his version that he went to the shop of the accused where the accused had asked him to pay ₹ 272/- and he had replied that he only owned ₹ 14/-towards the accused is falsified. The incident would not have occurred if the informant had not visited the shop of the accused. Therefore, the discrepancy regarding the place of the incident is not a minor discrepancy, but it affects the genesis of the incident.

The informant stated that he had been purchasing fruits from Ramesh for 4-5 years. He has not explained why he went to the shop of the accused Dhan Prakash to buy the fruits when he was buying the fruits from Ramesh. This also casts a doubt regarding the prosecution’s case.

Ramesh (PW-2) stated in his cross-examination that many people had gathered outside the shop of the accused to sell their fruits and no person had visited his shop to sell the fruits and vegetables. Only 5-6 people were standing outside the shop. It was specifically mentioned in the FIR that Vijay, Pawan and other persons rescued the informant from the accused; however, the prosecution did not examine any of them and only examined Ramesh.

Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution for non-examination of independent witnesses.

Dr Deepak Arora admitted in his cross-examination that the injury could be caused by a fall on a hard surface, like a floor, or it could have been caused if a person cleans his ear with a sharp stick. This shows that the injury could have been self-inflic ed.

The informant claimed that the accused had given him beatings repeatedly; however, he had only sustained one injury n the left ear. Dr Deepak Arora (PW-3) did not find any other injury on the person of the informant/victim. Thus, the prosecution’s case that the accused ad given repeated beatings to the informant is not corroborated by the medical evidence.

Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with one surety each of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be e ective for six months with a stipulation that in the event f a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondents on eceipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble S preme Court.

Record of learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith along with a copy of the judgment.