State Of Jharkhand And Ors vs Swati Enterprises

D.N. Patel, J

This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original respondents of Civil Review No.95 of 2012. The Civil Review application was

preferred by the respondent which was allowed by the learned Single Judge and the earlier order passed in writ petition bearing W.P.(C) No.4566 of

2011 dated 8th August, 2012 was dismissed and now in Civil Review application the writ petition was allowed on the detailed arguments canvassed by

the counsel for the original petitioner.

It appears from the facts of the case that the land in question was acquired by the State of Jharkhand for construction of Ring Road for the capital

city Ranchi of the State of Jharkhand. Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on 2nd June, 2011. Several plots

were acquired including the plot in question i.e. plot no. 335.

It further appears from the facts of the case that the total land acquired was 14.43 acres.

It further appears from the facts of the case that Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was also invoked which is a special power vested in

the State in case of urgency. This notification was published on 4th June, 2011.

It further appears from the facts of the case that the respondent is original petitioner who is holding 4.28 acres of land in plot no.335 situated at

village Garke. Out of the aforesaid holding of the respondent (original petitioner) the land acquired for the Ring Road purpose by the State

Government is 1.28 acres only.

It further appears from the facts of the case that earlier the respondent had preferred one more writ petition being W.P.(C) No.4566 of 2011 which

was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 08.08.2012 against which L.P.A. No. 388 of 2012 was preferred which was dismissed as

withdrawn by the respondent (original petitioner) vide order dated 29th November, 2012 however, liberty was reserved with the respondent to file

review application in the writ petition because the issue raised under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, was not decided by the learned Single

Judge.

Hence, the respondent (original petitioner) preferred Civil Review No.95 of 2012 which was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and

order dated 18th June, 2015 whereby, the learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside invocation of the urgency clause under Section 17 of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and later on vide further order dated 26th June, 2015 in the same Civil Review No.95 of 2012 even the liberty reserved

with the State to proceed with the land acquisition proceedings under Section 4 was also withdrawn. Thus, if two orders are read jointly one is dated

18th June, 2015 and second is dated 26th June, 2015 in Civil Review No.95 of 2012, the power of the State to invoke Section 17-urgency is now

quashed and set aside as well as power of the State to proceed further under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Section 4 onwards is also taken away.

It further appears from the facts of the case that under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, several plots have been acquired for construction of

Ring Road for the city of Ranchi, State of Jharkhand. If Section 4 notification as well as invocation of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is

quashed and set aside perhaps, the whole construction of Ring Road will be illegal. All other owners of their properties have accepted the notification

under Section 4 as well as under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Reasons:

Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the construction of the Ring Road

itself is an urgency. Reasons of urgency have already been given by the Government which has been discussed by the learned Single Judge in the

internal page no.4 of the order. The said reasons as enumerated in supplementary counter affidavit filed by the appellants in Civil Review application

reads as under:

“(i) After creation of new State of Jharkhand in the capital city of Ranchi there has been enormous increase and addition of various

types of vehicles which has resulted into traffic congestion.

(ii) The increase of numbers of vehicles in the capital city was a reason of constant and frequent traffic jam and congestion.

(iii) After the creation of new State of Jharkhand, Ranchi being the capital city a number of VIP’s and VVIP’s authorities of the

State and Central Government regularly visit the capital city and to avoid unnecessary delay and also for their safety and security a smooth

running traffic is necessary.

(iv) Therefore in order to provide smooth and fast mobility of vehicles an idea was mooted for construction of Ranchi Ring Road.

(v) It was decided that for the aforesaid construction of Ranchi Ring Road a detail project report shall be prepared.

(vi) It was decided that the length of the Ring Road will be 85.089 kilometres which will consist of six lanes and for the said purpose a

recommendation was made and placed before the cabinet.

(vii) That the matter was approved by the cabinet and under the signature of Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Road Construction Division,

Ranchi, a Memo bearing no.4747 dated 22.11.2004 was issued.â€​

It appears that the learned Single Judge has gone into the sufficiency of the reasons. It further appears from the order of the learned Single Judge

that subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Government was opened by the Court, while exercising powers under the judicial review. Neither of the

things is permissible in the eye of law. It ought to be kept in mind that this Court is not sitting in an appeal against a subjective satisfaction arrived at by

the State Government based upon objective facts or based on reasons, enumerated hereinabove. The reasons given by Government for invoking

Section 17 urgency clause, reflect application of mind by the Government. There is no malafide exercise of powers by the Government. The need of

government for invoking Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, reflects priority of Government. The Court should not be in search of sufficiency of

reasons, when policy decision is taken by Government to invoke Section 17 of the Act, 1894.

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nand Kishore Gupta and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & others reported

in (2010) 10 SCC 282 especially in paragraph nos. 93 to 98 as under:

“93. We have deliberately quoted the above part of the High Court judgment only to show the meticulous care taken by the High Court

in examining as to whether there was material before the State Government to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. We

are completely convinced that there was necessity in this Project considering the various reasons like enormousness of the Project,

likelihood of the encroachments, number of appellants who would have required to be heard and the time taken for that purpose, and the

fact that the Project had lingered already from 2001 till 2008. We do not see any reason why we should take a different view than what is

taken by the High Court.

The law on this subject was thoroughly discussed in Tika Ram v. State of U.P. to which one of us (V.S. Sirpurkar) was a party. In that

decision also, we had reiterated that the satisfaction required on the part of the executive in dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A

is a matter subject to satisfaction and can be assailed only on the ground that there was no sufficient material to dispense with the enquiry

or that the order suffered from malice.

It was also found on facts in Tika Ram v. State of U.P. that there was no charge of mala fides levelled against the exercise of power and

there was material available in support of the satisfaction on the part of the executive justifying the invocation of the provisions of Section

The position is no different in the present case. The High Court in the present matter went a step ahead and examined the bulky original

record itself to find that there was full material available.

We are not impressed by the argument that the encroachment issue was not a relevant factor. This argument was based on the reported

decision in Om Prakash v. State of U.P. It must be said that the actual scenario in that case was different. In that case, the Court was

considering the acquisition of area of about 500 acres comprising of 437 plots, whereas, in the present case, the area to be acquired for

the Expressway alone was more than 1600 ha. This is apart from the 25 million sq m of land which was liable to be acquired for the

purposes of development of five land parcels. There was interlinking between the acquisition of land for the highway and the acquisition of

land for establishing the five townships.

In Om Prakash v. State of U.P. there was unexplained delay after issuance of Section 4 notification, which is not the case here.

Therefore, we do not think that what has been said in Om Prakash v. State of U.P. would be apposite here. Every case has to be decided on

its own facts. This is apart from the fact that it is not specifically laid down in Om Prakash v. State of U.P. that the encroachment was never

a relevant factor for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Again we hasten to add that this was not the only factor considered by

the State Government and even the High Court has not held the same to be the only factor for dispensing with the enquiry.

In view of the law laid down in the last judgment on this issue i.e. Tika Ram v. State of U.P. we are of the clear opinion that the

challenge by the appellants on the ground that there was no urgency and, therefore, the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act should not

have been dispensed with, cannot be accepted. We hold accordingly.â€​

(Emphasis supplied).

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of First Land Acquisition Collector & others Vs. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli &

Another, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 160 especially in paragraph no. 5 as under:

“5. The question of urgency of an acquisition under Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the

Government and ordinarily it is not open to the court to make a scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of

facts. In this view of the matter when the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant considerations into account and is satisfied that

there exists emergency for invoking powers under Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act, and issues notification accordingly, the same should

not be interfered with by the court unless the court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority had not applied its mind to the

relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the appropriate authority mala fide. Whether in a given situation there existed

urgency or not is left to the discretion and decision of the authorities concerned. If an order invoking power under Section 17(4) is

assailed, the courts may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant materials before it or whether the order has been

passed by non-application of mind. Any post-notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with an

enquiry under Section 5-A by invoking powers under Section 17(1) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself specially when no mala

fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Opinion of the State Government can be challenged in a court of law if it

could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that action of the State Government is mala fide. Though

the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a court of law, except for the grounds already

indicated, but the said satisfaction must be of the appropriate government and that the satisfaction must be, as to the existence of an

urgency. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency, even though cannot be conclusive, but is entitled to great weight, as has

been held by this Court in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana. Even a mere allegation that power was exercised mala fide would not be enough

and in support of such allegation specific materials should be placed before the court. The burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy

on the person who alleges it. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, if the circumstances of the case in hand are examined it would

appear that the premises in question were required for the students of National Medical College, Calcutta and the notification issued in

December 1982 had been quashed by the Court and the subsequent notification issued on 25-2-1994 also had been quashed by the Court.

It is only thereafter the notification was issued under Sections 4(1) and 17(4) of the Act on 29-11-1994, which came up for consideration

before the High Court. Apart from the fact that there had already been considerable delay in acquiring the premises in question on account

of the intervention by courts, the premises were badly needed for the occupation by the students of National Medical College, Calcutta.

Thus, existence of urgency was writ large on the facts of the case and therefore, the said exercise of power in the case in hand, cannot be

interfered with by a court of law on a conclusion that there did not exist any emergency. The conclusion of the Division Bench of the

Calcutta High Court, therefore, is unsustainable.â€​

(Emphasis supplied).

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepak Pahwa & others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & others, reported in

(1984) 4 SCC 308 especially in paragraph no. 8 as under:

“8. The other ground of attack is that if regard is had to the considerable length of time spent on inter-departmental discussion before

the notification under Section 4(1) was published, it would be apparent that there was no justification for invoking the urgency clause

under Section 17(4) and dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A. We are afraid, we cannot agree with this contention. Very often

persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired make various representations to the concerned authorities against the proposed

acquisition. This is bound to result in a multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussions leading invariably to delay in the

execution of even urgent projects. Very often the delay makes the problem more and more acute and increases the urgency of the necessity

for acquisition. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the submission that mere pre-notification delay would render the invocation of the

urgency provisions void. We however wish to say nothing about post-notification delay. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana this Court pointed

out the fact that the State Government or the party concerned was lethargic at an earlier stage is not very relevant for deciding the question

whether on the date on which the notification was issued, there was urgency or not. In Kasireddy Papaiah v. Government of Andhra

Pradesh it was held, “… delay on the part of tardy officials to take the further action in the matter of acquisition is not sufficient to

nullify the urgency which existed at the time of the issue of the notification and to hold that there was never any urgencyâ€. In the result

both the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are rejected and the special leave petitions are dismissed.â€​

(Emphasis supplied).

It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chameli Singh & others Vs. State of U.P. & Another reported in (1996) 2 SCC

549 especially in paragraph nos. 4 and 17 as under:

“4. It is settled law that the opinion of urgency formed by the appropriate Government to take immediate possession, is a subjective conclusion

based on the material before it and it is entitled to great weight unless it is vitiated by mala fides or colourable exercise of power. Article 25(1) of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of

himself and his family including food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social servicesâ€. Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 laid down that State parties to the Covenant recognise “the right to everyone to an adequate standard

of living for himself and for his family including food, clothing, housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditionsâ€. The State parties will

take appropriate steps to ensure realisation of this right. In P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat, a Bench of three Judges of this Court considering the

mandate of human right to shelter read it into Article 19(1)(e) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India to guarantee right to residence and

settlement. Protection of life guaranteed by Article 21 encompasses within its ambit the right to shelter to enjoy the meaningful right to life. The

Preamble to the Indian Constitution assures to every citizen social and economic justice and equity of status and of opportunity and dignity of person

so as to fasten fraternity among all sections of society in an integrated Bharat. Article 39(b) enjoins the State that ownership and control of the

material resources of the community are so distributed as to promote welfare of the people by securing social and economic justice to the weaker

sections of the society to minimise inequality in income and endeavour to eliminate inequality in status. Article 46 enjoins the State to promote with

special care social, economic and educational interests of the weaker sections of the society, in particular, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

Right to social and economic justice conjointly commingles with right to shelter as an inseparable component for meaningful right to life. It was

therefore, held that right to residence and settlement is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(e) and it is a facet of inseparable meaningful right to

life under Article 21. Food, shelter and clothing are minimal human rights. The State has undertaken as its economic policy planned development of

massive housing schemes. The right to allotment of houses constructed by the Housing Board to the weaker sections, lower income group people

under Lower Income Group Scheme was held to be a constitutional strategy, an economic programme undertaken by the State and that the weaker

sections are entitled to allotment as per the scheme.

It is true that there was pre-notification and post-notification delay on the part of the officers to finalise and publish the notification. But those facts

were present before the Government when it invoked urgency clause and dispensed with inquiry under Section 5-A. As held by this Court, the delay

by itself accelerates the urgency: Larger the delay, greater be the urgency. So long as the unhygienic conditions and deplorable housing needs of

Dalits, Tribes and the poor are not solved or fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist. When the Government on the basis of the material,

constitutional and international obligation, formed its opinion of urgency, the court, not being an appellate forum, would not disturb the finding unless the

court conclusively finds the exercise of the power mala fide. Providing house sites to the Dalits, Tribes and the poor itself is a national problem and a

constitutional obligation. So long as the problem is not solved and the need is not fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist. The State is expending

money to relieve the deplorable housing condition in which they live by providing decent housing accommodation with better sanitary conditions. The

lethargy on the part of the officers for pre and post-notification delay would not render the exercise of the power to invoke urgency clause invalid on

that account.â€​

(Emphasis supplied).

In view of the aforesaid decisions, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Government for invoking urgency clause for the construction of

Ring Road around the city of Ranchi in the State of Jharkhand cannot be made a subject for judicial review. This Court has no expertise knowledge of

the construction of the road and the priority of the Government in urgency. Every Government has its own priority and urgency. Court is not

evaluating the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Government. What can be viewed in judicial review is whether the Government had followed

the procedure for invoking Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and nothing beyond that. Thus, only procedure to be followed by the

Government for invoking Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 can be looked into, but, not the sufficiency of the reasons given by the

Government. There is no malafide exercise of powers by Government.

Looking to the procedure followed by the Government of Jharkhand, it appears that after recording the reasons as stated hereinabove, a conscious

decision has been taken by the Government which is based upon objective facts. It is not that in hot hurry the decision was taken by the Government.

Well defined reasons have been given by the Government for invoking Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The justification of those reasons

cannot be reviewed by this Court. We are not sitting in an appeal against subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Government of Jharkhand. What is

to be verified by this Court is the procedural aspect. Looking to the facts of the case, it appears that all the necessary ingredients of Section 17 of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are present. For ready reference Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as under:

“17. Special powers in cases of urgency.- (1) In cases of urgency.- (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Govt. so directs,

the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in

sec. 9, sub-section (1) take possession of any land needed for a public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the

Government free from all encumbrances.

………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………..â€​

In view of the aforesaid provisions, the reasons have been assigned by the Government, as stated hereinabove and also stated in the impugned

judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge. Moreover, it appears that necessary notification under Section 17 was also published which

is dated 4th June, 2011. Moreover, looking to section 4 notification, there are several plots which are acquired because of the land acquisition process

for construction of Ring Road around the city of Ranchi. Nobody has objected. Everyone has accepted Section 4 notification to be read with

notification under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The respondent (original petitioner) is claiming to be an owner and possessor of plot

no. 335 at measuring totally 4.28 acres, out of which only 1.28 acres has been acquired. Moreover, it appears from the facts of the case that much

apprehension was shown by this respondent (original petitioner) in the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 4566 of 2011 that today the Government has

acquired land belonging to the respondent factory and tomorrow they may acquire the factory itself. This apprehension is unwarranted and uncalled

for. Out of 4.28 acres of land belonging to the respondent the notification under Section 4 has been published is for 1.28 acres of land only. There is no

further notification under Section 4 for rest of the land belonging to the respondent (original petitioner) for plot no. 335 at village Garke. Even the

counsel appearing for the appellant-State submitted that under Section 4 notification, which is published as on 2nd June, 2011 only 1.28 acres of land

out of 4.28 acres of land of plot no. 335 belonging to the respondent is acquired and nothing beyond that.

It ought to be kept in mind that private interest ought to be given go-bye against the public interest. Even if the whole factory had been acquired in

the Ring Road, we would not have granted any stay nor, we would have interfered with. Looking to the facts of the present case only the open

compound of the factory premises of the respondent has been acquired leaving aside the actual factory premises, where manufacture is going on.

It has also been mentioned in the writ petition that if the land is acquired the original petitioner will lose the factory and therefore, Government

should change the alignment of the Ring Road. This is nothing, but, a perversity in the mind of the original petitioner. Ring Road cannot be altered for

one petitioner when only part of the premises of the respondent is put under the acquisition which is approximately 30% of the total land holding of the

original petitioner. 2/3rd of the land is with the respondent without any acquisition. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by

the learned Single Judge while allowing Civil Review No.95 of 2012 vide judgement and order dated 18th June, 2015 as well as vide order dated 26th

June, 2015 (further modification). After the review petition was disposed of, without any civil miscellaneous petition the order has been further

modified. It ought to be kept in mind that once, the civil review application is finally disposed of, upon oral mentioning by the original applicant no

further order could have been passed by the learned Single Judge. In the court of law there are bound to be methods to be followed especially when,

modification of order is required. In the facts of the present case, no civil miscellaneous petition was ever preferred and after Civil Review No.95 of

2012 was finally allowed vide order dated 18th June 2015, upon oral mentioning reasoned order was passed in favour of the original petitioner.

Much has been argued out by the counsel for the respondent (original petitioner) under Section 24 of the Right to fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and submitted that now neither Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 can be invoked nor urgency clause-Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 can be invoked and the compensation shall be paid according to

the new Act. This condition is not accepted by this Court mainly for the following reasons:

(a) In the facts of the present case, it appears that originally a writ petition preferred by the respondent being W.P.(C) No. 4566 of 2011 was already

dismissed vide order dated 08.08.2012 challenging the notification under Section 4 to be read with notification under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition

Act, 1894.

(b) Thereafter, Letters Patent Appeal was preferred by this respondent being L.P.A. No.388 of 2012 which was also dismissed as withdrawn vide

order dated 29th November, 2012. Nonetheless, liberty was reserved with the respondent (original petitioner) to prefer a civil review application in the

writ petition.

(c) Thus, after the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed as withdrawn Civil Review No.95 of 2012 was preferred. Thus, the whole writ petition was

re-argued on the merit of the case. Normally this is not permissible in the eye of law. The civil review jurisdiction is absolutely a limited jurisdiction as

has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions viz.

(i) (1979) 4 SCC 389 - para 3.

(ii) (1995) 1 SCC 170 - para 8, 9 & 15

(iii) (1997) 8 SCC 715 - para 7 to 9

(iv) (2006) 4 SCC 78 - para 13 to 18

(v) (2012) 7 SCC 200 - para 26 to 30 and 32 to 35

(vi) (2018) 4 SCC 587 - para 18

(d) In view of the aforesaid decisions, unless there is an error apparent on the face of record, civil review is not tenable at law. In view the aforesaid

decisions, if an error can be found out after the lengthy arguments, it cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.

(e) Civil review application is more or less governed by the principles enshrined in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Looking

to the order passed by the learned Single Judge allowing Civil Review No.95 of 2012 vide order dated 18th June 2015, it travels beyond the scope of

the civil review as pointed out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of the aforesaid decisions and beyond the principles as enumerated under

Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(f) Respondent (original petitioner) is claiming to be an owner and possessor of plot no. 335, village Garke at measuring totally 4.28 acres. For the Ring

road construction around the city of the Ranchi several plots have been acquired by invoking urgency clause and out of plot no.335 the land acquired is

1.28 acres only leaving aside the factory premises of the respondent where the manufacture process is going on. Thus, only campus of the respondent

(original petitioner) has been acquired which is approximately 30% of the total holding.

(g) Initially, a writ petition was preferred bearing W.P.(C) No. 4566 of 2011 by the respondent under an apprehension that today the compound has

been acquired by the Government and tomorrow the factory premises will be acquired, but, such apprehension is uncalled for and unwarranted

because Government has no intention at all to acquire any further land from plot no.335 except 1.28 acres as per notification under Section 4 already

issued on 2nd June, 2011 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

(h) Most of the Ring Roads around the city of Ranchi has already been constructed. Public at large is also using the same. In several cases, the

award has already been passed and the owners of the property or the possessor of the property have already obtained the compensation.

(i) The order under Civil Review No.95 of 2012 dated 18th June 2015 and another order dated 26th June 2015 passed in the same matter, without any

civil miscellaneous petition, just upon oral request, in a disposed of matter, an order was passed. As per impugned judgment, perhaps, the whole land is

to be re-acquired. Again, a new notification under Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement

Act, 2013 has to be issued. It is not required in the facts of the present case because a subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Government for

invocation of the urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be reviewed by this Court. We are not sitting in an appeal

against the reasons given by the Government for invoking urgency clause. The Court has to verify whether the Government has followed the

procedure or not. As stated hereinabove, there is no procedural lacuna on the part of the Government in invoking Section 17 of the Land Acquisition

Act, 1894. Applicability of the urgency clause depends upon the urgency felt by the Government. Every Government has their own priority. In a

construction of Ring Road, if the Government invokes the urgency clause, the Court should be extremely slow in interfering with the decision of the

Government unless the said decision is having any procedural lacuna or there is malafide exercise of power by the Government. We are not sitting in

an appeal against the reasons given by the Government for invoking Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 otherwise, there will be no end of

interference by the Court. If such type of interference by the Court is permitted, perhaps, the project of the construction of Ring Road can’t be

completed within time bound schedule. Huge cost of crores of rupees is involved. Stay granted by the Court, even for a week, is harmful and the price

escalation is also in crores of rupees. If such, such type of interference by the Court is permitted perhaps, the budgetary provisions of the State will be

at stake. Urgency clause has several aspects of the matter. Original petitioner might be losing the possession immediately, but, from the view point of

public purpose the cost is also one of the factors, immediate conveyance of public at large is involved, the urgent need of the Ring Road is also

involved. Priority of the Government is the highest. Diversion of the traffic cannot be ignored.

(j) Applicability of urgency clause is a complex phenomena. There cannot be a straight jacket formula. It is a policy decision itself and therefore, what

has to be checked by the Court is only the procedural aspect. If the Government has followed the procedure while invoking Section 17 of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894, then rarely the Court shall interfere with the subjective decision of the State Government.

The aforesaid aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing Civil Review No.95 of 2012

vide order dated 18th June, 2015 and 26th June, 2015. We therefore, quash and set aside the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge

in Civil Review No.95 of 2012 dated 18th June, 2015 and 26th June, 2015. Thus, this appellant is not required to follow the new procedure for the land

acquisition under Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 nor the respondent is

entitled to get any compensation under new Act, namely Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and disposed of.

In view of the final order passed in main petition, all the interlocutory applications are also stand disposed of.