TATA MOTORS Limited vs The State of Jharkhand, & Ors.

The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the

notification contained in Letter No. 10/DLA Ranchi (Path)-60/2009-

50/Ra, Ranchi dated 12.01.2010, issued under Section 4 of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended vide Bihar Act 11 of 1961

(hereinafter referred to as ''the Act, 1894''), under the signature of the

Additional Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department,

Government of Jharkhand (respondent No.3) whereby, he has

purported to authorize the Additional Collector-cum-Land Acquisition

Officer, Ranchi and his sub-ordinate officers to survey and enter upon

the chunks/plots of the land, as mentioned in the said notification,

which belongs to the petitioners. Further prayer has been made for

quashing the declaration contained in Letter No. 10/DLA Ranchi (Path)-

60/2009-51 /Ra.Ranchi dated 12.01.2010, issued under Section 6 of

the Act, 1894 by the Additional Secretary (respondent No.3) declaring

therein that the land mentioned in the said declaration, which belongs

to the petitioners, has been acquired by the respondents. It has also

been prayed for quashing of four notices all dated 27.08.2010 and one

notice dated 26.08.2010, issued under Section 12(2) of the Act, 1894

by the respondent No.4 calling upon the petitioners to receive

compensation, as mentioned therein, for acquisition of the petitioners''

land on 04.09.2010, within a period of only three days from the date

of receipt of the said notices.

The brief factual background of the case, as stated in the writ

petition is that the petitioner No.1 is an educational institution/school

imparting education since 1952. The Government of Jharkhand

conceived a plan for construction of Ring Road on the circular outskirts

of Ranchi town and for the aforesaid purpose, the respondent No.3

issued notification contained in Letter No. 10/DLA Ranchi (Path)-

60/2009-50/Ra, Ranchi dated 12.01.2010 under Section 4 of the Act,

1894 by invoking the urgency provision under Section 17(4) of the Act,

1894 mentioning, inter alia, that the land covered under the said

notification has been acquired by the respondents and he purported to

authorize the Additional Collector, Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi and

his Sub-ordinate officers/employees to survey and enter upon the land

belonging to the petitioners. Thereafter, the respondent No.3 issued a

declaration contained in Letter No. 10/DLA Ranchi (Path)-60/2009-

51/Ra, Ranchi dated 12.01.2010 under Section 6 of the Act, 1984. The

petitioners were served four notices, all dated 27.08.2010 and one

notice dated 26.08.2010, only on 01.09.2010 calling upon the

petitioners to collect the amount of the alleged compensation on

04.09.2010.

Mr. Indrajeet Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioners, submits that Section 17 of the Act, 1894 (as amended vide

Bihar Act 11 of 1961) confers extraordinary powers to the Government

authorities by dispensing with the normal procedure laid down under

Section 5-A of the Act, 1894, which can only be exercised in

exceptional case of urgency and such power cannot be lightly resorted

to, except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take

immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public

purpose. It is further submitted that the respondents have violated the

provisions of the Act, 1894 by surpassing the remedies available to

the petitioners under Section 5-A of the Act, 1894 by invoking the

urgency provisions of the Act, 1894. It is also submitted that the

urgency provision has been incorporated in the Act, 1894 to meet

extremely urgent situation and in the instant circumstance, no such

urgency existed, as the respondents had conceptualized the

construction of the proposed Ring Road as far back as in the year

2004-05 itself. There was more than sufficient time available to the

respondents to resort to the normal procedure for acquisition of the

land in question. The proposed acquisition of the land will bisect the

existing premises of the school and, thus, the school will be deprived

of many facilities meant for co-curricular activities of the students. It is

further submitted that when any acquisition of land is to be made, the

Government is under moral and legal duty to ensure that the

acquisition would cause least inconvenience and dislocation of the

people getting affected by such acquisition. There is ample land

available around all sides of the school and by taking slightly different

route, the purpose of commencement and completion of the proposed

Ring Road can be fully achieved. Due to the proposed acquisition, 32

acres (approx) of land will be cut off from the school resulting into a

situation that the students and staffs will have to cross the proposed

Ring Road, which is not safe. It is further submitted that it is not a fact

that only 4.47 acres of land is within the boundary wall, rather, 9.83

acres of land within the boundary wall of the school is proposed to be

acquired. It is also not a fact that most of the land proposed to be

acquired belongs to other raiyats and if the respondents have paid

compensation to the other raiyats without following the due procedure

provided under the Act, 1894, the land acquisition is at the risk of the

respondents. Although the construction of Ring Road is a public

requirement, but it is not so emergent that a valuable right of the land

holder under section 5A of the Act, 1894 could be taken away. It is

further submitted that by virtue of the amendment carried out by the

erstwhile State of Bihar in section 17 of the Act 1894, the provisions of

Section 17(1) can only be invoked in respect of a land which is "waste

or arable". Though as per the records of right, the land in question is

waste land, yet the said records of right would not be the sole criteria

for determining whether the land is waste or arable, rather the

Government should have considered the present nature and condition

of the land. Since in the instant case, the land in question falls within

the boundary wall of the school and is being used by it, the same

cannot be treated as waste or arable land. It is further submitted that

the Hon''ble Supreme Court has consistently held that the right to

object under Section 5A of the Act, 1894 is a valuation right and

Section 17 is an exception to the general rule, hence the same can be

invoked only when the proposed acquisition relates to a public

purpose which cannot brook any delay on account of the objections.

Administrative laxity or lethargy cannot be a ground for invoking the

urgency clause. It is further submitted that the power under Section

17 of the Act, 1894 can be exercised only when the State Government

is satisfied on the basis of materials before it that an occasion has

arisen for invoking the urgency provision coupled with further

satisfaction that the right to file objections should also be made

inapplicable and such satisfaction cannot be perverse, arbitrary and

unreasonable.

In support of the above contentions, the learned counsel for the

petitioners puts reliance upon the following judgments:

i. Union of India & Ors. Vs. Krishna Lal Arneja & Others

reported in (2004) 8 SCC 453

ii. Mahender Pal & Others Vs. State of Haryana & Others reported in (2009) 14 SCC 281

iii. Union of India & Others Vs. Mukesh Hans reported in (2004) 8 SCC 14

iv. Narayan Govind Gavate etc. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others reported in (1977) 1 SCC 133

v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah Vs. The State of U.P & Others reported in AIR 1967 SC 1081

vi. Laxmi Devi Vs. State of Bihar & Others reported in (2015) 10 SCC 241

vii. Darshan Lal Nagpal (dead) by LRS. Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & Others reported in (2012) 2 SCC 327

viii. Bharat Sewak Samaj Vs. Lieutenant Governor & Others reported in (2012) 12 SCC 675

ix. Radhy Shyam (Dead) through LRs. & Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others reported in (2011) 5 SCC 553

Per contra, Mr. Atanu Banerjee, learned Government Advocate

appearing on behalf of the State-respondents, submits that due to

immense increase in traffic inflow, the Government of Jharkhand

decided to construct Ring Road on circular outskirts of Ranchi city.

Accordingly, on the basis of the technical survey and DPR, the centre

line was fixed for the construction of the Ring Road by the technical

experts. It is further submitted that the proposed road does not

disturb the major part of the school including its buildings as the

proposed road is only crossing the side of the boundary wall or

overlapping at some places. Moreover, out of the total 4.47 acres of

the acquired land falling inside the boundary wall of the school, it has

been found that most of the land belong to the other raiyats and only

0.16 acre of land of the petitioner-school actually lies on the alignment

of the Ring Road. It is also submitted that the land of the petitioner-

school has been acquired under Section 17 of the Act, 1894 by

invoking the urgency provisions for which a declaration was also made

on 12.01.2010 under Section 6 of the Act, 1894. The part of acquired

land which is within the boundary wall of the school, does not affect

any institutional structure. It is also submitted that in the opinion of

the Government, the present acquisition is of emergent nature for

public purpose and, thus, the provision of Section 17(4) of the Act,

1894 has rightly been invoked in the present case.

Learned G.A, in support of the above contentions, puts reliance

on the following judgments:

i. Mahender Pal & Others Vs. State of Haryana & Others reported in (2009) 14 SCC 281

ii. M/s. Meena Devi Jindal Medical Institute and Research Centre Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Others reported in 2017 SAR 593 (Supreme Court)

iii. Collector (LA) Vs. Andaman Timber Industries, reported in (2014) 16 SCC 780

iv. Arnold Rodricks & Another Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others reported in AIR 1966 SC 1788

v. Navneet Ram Batra Vs. State of U.P. & Others reported in (1975) 2 SCC 727

vi. Chameli Singh & Others Vs. State of U.P. & Another reported in (1996) 2 SCC 549

vii. Union of India & Others Vs. Ghanshyam Dass Kedia & Others reported in (1996) 2 SCC 285

viii. Anand Singh & Another Vs. State of U.P & Others reported in (2010) 11 SCC 242

ix. Rajasthan Housing Board & Others Vs. Shri Kishan & Others reported in (1993) 2 SCC 84

x. Satendra Prasad Jain & Others Vs. State of U.P. & Others reported in (1993) 4 SCC 369

xi. Nand Kishore Gupta & Others Vs. The State of UP & Others reported in (2010) 10 SCC 282

xii. Deepak Pahua & Others Vs. Lt. Governer Delhi & Others reported in (1984) 4 SCC 308

Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the

materials available on record. The part of the land falling inside the

boundary wall of the petitioner-school has been acquired by the

respondents for construction of the Ring Road on the circular outskirts

of Ranchi town by invoking the urgency provision under Section 17(4)

of the Act, 1894. The petitioners have challenged the acquisition

mainly on the ground that the nature of acquisition was not so

emergent for which the provision under Section 17(4) could be

invoked. The other ground urged by the petitioners is that the

acquisition will divide the school into two parts, which will be

detrimental to the cause of the school and, therefore, the same could

have been avoided by acquiring the other vacant land around the

school.

The main issue raised by the petitioners in the writ petition is

that in the present factual context, whether the State of Jharkhand

and its authorities are justified in invoking the urgency provision of

Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894 (as amended

vide Bihar Act 11 of 1961). Thus, before appreciating the rival

submissions made on behalf of the parties, it would be appropriate to

discuss the respective judgments relied upon by the parties.

I have perused the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for

the petitioners. In the case of Bharat Sewak Samaj Vs. Lieutenant

Governor & Ors. (Supra), the Hon''ble Apex Court appreciated the

fact that the notice issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition

Act, 1894 was earlier issued on 06.01.1969 and the Land Acquisition

Collector had passed an award in the year 1975. The said acquisition

proceeding was challenged in a suit filed in the year 1975, which was

decreed by the learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in the year

1993 holding, inter alia, that the notification issued under Sections 4 &

6 of the Act, 1894 were illegal and without jurisdiction. Under the said

background, invoking of urgency provision in the year 2004 by the

Government of NCT of Delhi was held to be arbitrary and unjust.

Moreover, in the said case, the Government of NCT of Delhi intended

to develop Mehrauli Heritage Zone under the ''Planned Development of

Delhi'' which was not found by the Hon''ble Supreme Court so urgent

for dispensing with the provisions of Section 5-A . In the case of Union

of India & Ors. Vs. Mukesh Hans (Supra) also, the land was sought

to be acquired by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi by invoking the

urgency provision and ignoring the fact that there had been earlier

attempt to acquire the said land. Moreover, the purpose for which the

said land was sought to be acquired was for convening the annual

festival i.e. "Phool Walon Ki Sair". Under the said factual background,

the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that invoking of urgency provisions

for acquisition of the said land is illegal. In the case of Union of India

& Ors. Vs. Krishan Lal Arneja & Ors. (Supra), after lapse of the

Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, the

land continued to remain in possession of the Government and

thereafter notification under Section 4(1) was issued for acquisition

thereof by invoking the urgency provisions under Section 17 of the

Act, 1894. It was thus held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that

invocation of the urgency clause is not justified mainly due to the

reason that the Government otherwise had adequate time for taking

recourse of normal acquisition. Further, in the case of Darshan Lal

Nagpal (Supra), there had been delay of more than five years from

the date of proposal till issuance of notice under Section 4 read with

Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894 and, thus, the Hon''ble Apex Court held

that in such a situation, the Government had no such urgency so as to

invoke the provisions of Section 17 of the Act, 1894. In the case of

Laxmi Devi (Supra), the factual context was that the land acquisition

proceeding was initiated thrice and the same lapsed and the land was

in possession of the State. The Hon''ble Supreme Court set aside the

acquisition proceeding and directed the State Government to initiate

fresh proceeding, but the possession of the Government over the land

was not disturbed. In the case of Raja Anand Brahman Shah

(Supra), the land was acquired by invoking the urgency provision "for

limestone quarry" treating the land as "waste or arable land", but it

was found that there were one lac trees upon the said land and as

such the Hon''ble Supreme Court quashed the acquisition notification.

Further, in the case of Narayan Govind Govate. (Supra), the fact

was that the land was sought to be acquired invoking the urgency

provision for industrial and residential purpose. The Hon''ble Supreme

Court held that the purpose for which the land was sought to be

acquired, the said purpose itself on the face of it, does not call for any

such action, barring exceptional circumstances so as to take

immediate possession, without even holding a summary enquiry

under Section 5A of the Act, 1894. Moreover, in the case of Radhy

Shyam (Supra), the land was sought to be acquired for industrial

purpose and the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the objective of

development of an industrial area cannot be achieved by pressing

some buttons on the computer screen, which actually needs lot of

time and as such the time required for ensuring compliance of the

provisions contained in Section 5-A of the Act, 1894, cannot be

portrayed as delay, which would frustrate the purpose of acquisition.

The ratio laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in all these

judgments are that the power conferred to the State under Section 17

of the Act, 1894 for acquisition of any land in case of urgency without

resorting to the provisions of Section 5-A is an extraordinary power

and the same cannot be exercised in routine course and before

exercising such power, the State Government should come to its

subjective satisfaction so as to ensure that real urgency to take

immediate possession of the land exists. Before exercising such

power, the Government should bear in mind that such exercise under

Section 17 of the Act, 1894 will deprive a land owner of his right in

relation to immovable property to file objections for the proposed

acquisition by dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act,

1894. However, in the present case, all the steps have been taken by

different departments of the Government within a year. Moreover, in

all the aforesaid cases, the fact was not that the land was sought to be

acquired for road purpose. In the present case, the land is acquired for

rind road and, thus, the factual context of the aforesaid cases cannot

be applied in the case in hand.

I have also perused the judgments cited by the Learned

Government Advocate. In the case of Arnold Rodricks (Supra), the

Hon''ble Supreme Court has held the notification of acquisition as valid

by observing that the notification was undoubtedly issued under

Section 4 and the declaration was made under Section 6 invoking the

urgency provision under Section 17 of the Act, 1894 for public purpose

and the petitioners were not able to show that there was any

colourable exercise of power by the authorities in acquiring the land in

question. In the case of Navneet Ram Batra (Supra), the Hon''ble

Supreme Court has held that since none of the raiyats raised any

objection with regard to invoking of the urgency provision, particularly,

Section 17 of the Act, 1894 and there has been no construction raised

over the land sought to be acquired by the Government, the challenge

put by the petitioners with regard to invoking of the urgency provision,

cannot be said to be genuine.

Further, in the case of Chameli Singh (Supra), the Hon''ble

Supreme Court has held that the opinion of urgency formed by the

appropriate Government to take immediate possession is a subjective

conclusion based on the material before it which is entitled to great

weight unless it is vitiated by malafide or colourable exercise of power.

It has also been held that very often the officials, due to apathy in

implementation of the policy and programmes of the Government,

themselves adopt dilatory tactics to create cause for the owners of the

land to challenge the validity or legality of the exercise of the power to

defeat the urgency existing on the date of taking decision under

Section 17(4) to dispense with Section 5-A enquiry. It has further been

held that the delay by itself accelerates the urgency. "Larger the

delay, greater be the urgency." So long as the unhygienic conditions

and deplorable housing needs of dalits, tribals and the poor are not

solved or fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist. So long as the

exercise of the power is for public purpose, the individual right of an

owner must yield place to the larger public purpose. In paragraph 15

of the said judgment, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"15. The question, therefore, is whether invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4) dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A is arbitrary or is unwarranted for providing housing construction for the poor. In Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (SCC at p. 290), a Constitution Bench of this Court had upheld the exercise of the power by the State under Section 17(4) dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A for the planned development of Delhi. In Pista Devi case this Court while considering the legality of the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) exercised by the State Government dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A for acquiring housing accommodation for planned development of Meerut, had held that providing housing accommodation is national urgency of which court should take judicial notice. The pre-notification and post-notification delay caused by the officer concerned does not create a cause to hold that there is no urgency. Housing conditions of Dalits all over the country continue to be miserable even till date and is a fact of which courts are bound to take judicial notice. The ratio of Deepak Pahwa case was followed. In that case a three-Judge Bench of this Court had upheld the notification issued under Section 17(4), even though lapse of time of 8 years had occurred due to inter-departmental discussions before receiving the notification. That itself was considered to be a ground to invoke urgency clause. It was further held that delay on the part of the lethargic officials to take further action in the matter of acquisition was not sufficient to nullify the urgency which existed at the time of the issuance of the notification and to hold that there was never any urgency. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana this Court upheld the exercise of the power of urgency under Section 17(4) and had held that

the lethargy on the part of the officers at an early stage was not relevant to decide whether on the day of the notification there was urgency or not. Conclusion of the Government that there was urgency, though not conclusive, is entitled to create weight. In Deepak Pahwa case this Court had held that very often persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired may make representations to the authorities concerned against the proposed writ petition that is bound to result in multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussions leading invariably to delay in the execution of even urgent projects. Very often delay makes the problem more and more acute and increases urgency of the necessity for acquisition. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kisha (SCC at p. 91), this Court had held that it must be remembered that the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is a subjective one and that so long as there is material upon which Government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, the Court would not interfere nor would it examine the material as an appellate authority. In State of U.P. v. Keshav Prasad Singh (SCC at p. 590), this Court had held that the Government was entitled to exercise the power under Section 17(4) invoking urgency clause and to dispense with inquiry under Section 5-A when the urgency was noticed on the facts available on record. In Narayan Govind Gavate case a three-Judge Bench of this Court had held that Section 17(4) cannot be read in isolation from Section 4(1) and Section 5-A of the Act. Although 30 days from the notification under Section 4(1) are given for filing objections under Section 5-A, inquiry thereunder unduly gets prolonged. It is difficult to see why the summary inquiry could not be completed quite expeditiously. Nonetheless, this Court held the existence of prima facie public purpose such as the one present in those cases before the Court could not be successfully challenged at all by the objectors. It further held that it was open to the authority to take summary inquiry under Section 5-A and to complete inquiry very expeditiously. It was emphasised that: (SCC p. 148, para 38)

"... The mind of the officer or authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under Section 5-A of the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under Section 5-A which has to be considered."

In the case of Ghanshyam Dass Kedia (Supra), the Hon''ble

Apex Court has held that the exercise of power under Section 17(4)

dispensing with the enquiry for acquisition of land for planned

development of Delhi cannot be said to be illegal on the ground that it

would take long time for development. If the record discloses

consideration by the Government on the matter of urgency, the High

Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal over the subjective satisfaction

of the Government. In the case of Anand Singh (Supra), the Hon''ble

Apex Court even after finding that the State Government failed to

justify dispensation of an enquiry under Section 5-A by invoking

Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894, refrained from declaring the acquisition

proceeding to be invalid and illegal, particularly, considering the fact

that out of 400 land owners, more than 370 had already received

compensation and the GDA had spent huge amount for development

of the acquired land. In the case of Rajasthan Housing Board

(Supra), the Hon''ble Apex Court has held that the land sought to be

acquired is waste or arable land, has to be adjudged having regard to

the general nature and condition of the land. It has been further held

that the satisfaction under Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894 is a

subjective one and so long as there is material upon which the

Government could have formed the said satisfaction fairly, the Court

would neither interfere nor examine the material as an appellate

authority. In the case of Satendra Prasad Jain (Supra), the Hon''ble

Supreme Court has held that when Section 17(1) is applied by reasons

of urgency, the Government takes possession of the land prior to the

making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner loses

the title of land to the Government. Section 17(1) states so in

unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to

the cases of acquisitions under Section 17 of the Act, 1894 because

the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no

provision in the Act, 1894 by which the land statutorily vested in the

Government can revert to the owner.

In the case of Collector (LA) Vs. Andaman Timber

Industries (Supra), the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"7. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the acquired land only after an award in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award must be made within two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. Therefore, if an award is not made within two years, the land cannot be treated to have vested in the Government and its title continues with the owner. However, in cases where urgency clause enshrined in Section 17 is invoked and the competent authority takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11, the owner is divested of his title to the land and the same vests in the Government. In the instant case, 80% of the estimated compensation for the land was not paid to the respondent Company although Section 17(3-A) stipulates that it should have been paid before possession of the said land was taken. However, this by itself is not sufficient for holding that the acquired land did not vest with the appellants."

In the aforesaid judgment, it has been reiterated by the Hon''ble

Supreme Court that in the cases where the urgency clause enshrined

in Section 17 of the Act, 1894 is invoked and the competent authority

takes possession of the land under Section 11 prior to making of the

award, the owner is divested of his title to the land and the same

vests in the Government. In the said case, 80% of the estimated

compensation for the land was not paid to the respondent-Company,

although Section 17(3A) stipulates that it should have been paid

before possession of the said land was taken. However, it has been

held that the said fact by itself is not sufficient for holding that the

acquired land did not vest with the State.

In the case of Deepak Pahua (Supra), the Hon''ble Supreme

Court has held that mere pre-notification delay would not render the

invocation of the urgency provision void as very often, the delay

increases the urgency of the necessity for acquisition. The case of

Mahender Pal (Supra), has been cited by both the parties where the

issue was that the land was acquired under the urgency provision for

the purpose of construction of road, which can be said to be similar to

the purpose of acquisition in the present case.

In the case of Mahender Pal (Supra), the Hon''ble Supreme

Court has held as under:

"3. On 14.11.2006, the government issued a notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(4) of the Act and on 15.11.2006 as also a declaration under Section 6 of the Act, for acquiring the land for public purpose, viz., for the development and utilization of land for outer ring road, green belt on both side, Pataudi Road to Jhajjar Road in the area of village Gokalgarh, District Rewari.

The purported public purpose for which the land is to be acquired is for laying down a road. We are not unmindful of the fact that the road connection is one of the purposes mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act in respect whereof Sub- section (4) thereof would apply. But the same would not mean that for the purpose of road connection irrespective of the nature of cases and/ or irrespective of the nature of the road to be constructed; Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act could be invoked.

As an extraordinary power has been conferred upon the Appropriate Government in terms whereof the normal procedure laid down under Section 5A of the Act could be dispensed with, the High Court, in our opinion, should have entered into the merit of the matter. [ See Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others (2008) 12 SCC 418]"

In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held

that a land can be acquired for construction of road under section 17

of the Act, 1894. However, the power conferred under section 17 of

the Act, 1894 is an extraordinary power given to the appropriate

government and thus the High Court should have entered into the

merit of the matter.

In the case of Nand Kishore Gupta (Supra), the Hon''ble

Supreme Court has held as under:

"34. The High Court has refuted all these contentions by giving good reasons. We will not go into these individual cases once the High Court has decided not to entertain these plea and, in our opinion, correctly. After all, this was an acquisition

for building up a highway and the abovementioned Writ Petitions pertained to the land required for interchange. It is obvious that the alignment of the highway cannot be changed, as its design has been prepared after consideration of so many factors by the experts in building the road. Its direction or alignment, therefore, cannot be changed, with the result, the area which is required for interchange, also cannot be changed. This is a typical example of the individual having to sacrifice his land for the public good. There can be no dispute that this road would add to the betterment of the citizens of the East Yamuna area in particular and Uttar Pradesh in general. This is apart from the fact that the majority of the persons whose lands have been acquired, have either not objected to it or have accepted the compensation without any demur. It will, therefore, not be possible for us to go into these individual grievances, which have been rightly rejected by the High Court.

In fact, in Balbir Singh''s case, it was pointed out that out of the 12,315 affected farmers in 133 villages over the total area of 1,638 hectares of the Expressway, 11387 have already received compensation and only 142 farmers have raised the issues. The High Court has rightly held that the private interest is always affected to some extent in such large schemes requiring the acquisition of land. The High Court has rightly held that a holistic view had to be taken to look for an all round development without forgetting about our heritage, culture and traditions. We also, therefore, would not entertain the objections, feebly raised before us, individually."

In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon''ble Supreme Court did not

interfere with the acquisition of land sought to be done under the

emergent provision where the purpose for acquisition was

construction of "Yamuna Expressway". The Hon''ble Supreme Court

has held that the alignment of the highway cannot be changed, as its

design has been prepared after consideration of several factors by the

experts in building the road. It has further been held that the road will

add to the betterment of the citizens of the East Yamuna area in

particular and Uttar Pradesh in general. In that case, the Hon''ble

Supreme Court considered the situation that most of the persons had

received compensation and only few of them raised the objection.

Thus, it was observed that the High Court rightly held that the private

interest is always affected to some extent in such large schemes

requiring the acquisition of land.

In the case of Meena Devi Jindal Medical Institute (Supra),

the land was acquired for planned development of Delhi without

specifying any purpose. The Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the

there is no need to further specify any specific purpose. A purpose

complementary to public purpose is also a public purpose.

Now, coming to the facts of the present case, it is an admitted

fact that after re-organization of the State of Bihar w.e.f. 15 th

November, 2000, Ranchi was declared as the capital of the newly

crated State of Jharkhand. Ranchi, after becoming the capital city of

Jharkhand, faced sudden increase in commercial activities as well as

immigration from different places making the existing traffic condition

of the city miserable, which in the opinion of the State Government,

required immediate attention and, therefore, it was conceived and

planned that a Ring Road in the outskirts of the city of Ranchi should

be constructed without any delay to ease out the choked traffic

condition in the city. In my considered view, the ratio laid down by the

Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Chameli Singh (Supra) will

apply to the fact situation of the present case where the purpose for

acquisition is construction of Ring Road and in case of delay in

construction of the same, the situation would become worse and more

emergent. In fact, the delay by itself accelerates the urgency. On

perusal of the supplementary counter affidavit dated 22.11.2017 filed

by the State-respondents, it transpires that in the year 2009, the

Department of Road Construction, Government of Jharkhand made the

requisition for acquiring the land in question on urgent basis and,

thereafter, a notification under Section 4 of the Act, 1894 was issued

on 12.01.2010 and the same was published in the Gazette dated

25.01.2010. Thereafter, the Department of Revenue and Land

Reforms, Government of Jharkhand vide letter No. 537 dated

21.07.2010 communicated the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi for

taking possession of the said land and empowered him to make

payment of 80% of the compensation to the land holders within 15

days and, accordingly, payment of compensation has been made to

almost all the land holders, except the petitioner-school, as it refused

to receive the compensation.

In the case of Satya Narayan @ Satya Narayan Prasad Vs.

State of Bihar, through the Chief Secretary, Bihar, Patna

reported in 2011(4) BBCJ 494, wherein the challenge was made to

the acquisition for construction of approach road under the emergent

provision, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held as under:

"6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. The Chiraiyatand over-bridge was expanded to ease the traffic bottlenecks in the town of Patna. It was equally essential to acquire land in adjacent locality including mohalla Jamal Road for construction of an approach road to connect flow of traffic to the newly constructed over bridge. In order to tide over the traffic bottleneck, a Division Bench of this Court way back on 25.08.2004, in C.W.J.C. No. 2401 of 2003, gave the following direction:

"Admittedly, the construction of the Chiraitand over-bridge is in full swing. It is also admitted position that the land has been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act . In that view of the matter, no direction can be issued not to acquire the land or take possession. On the other hand, the authorities are hereby directed to take possession of all the lands already acquired or acquire the land immediately even taking recourse to the emergency provision in case any land has been acquired for the construction of the aforesaid over bridge."

It is the case of the respondent State that in view of Public interest and in view of direction of this Court, the Government decided to acquire adjoining land including appellants'' land to provide approach road to Chiraiyatand over-bridge under emergent provisions of section 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act. We find that necessary notifications under section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act have been duly issued. In terms of Section 17(1) of the Act, notice under Section 9 of the Act was issued on 03.12.2007, calling upon the appellants to accept

80% of the compensation amount. The learned Single Judge has clearly stated in his order that all attempts to serve notice to the petitioners were frustrated, as they refused to receive the same. The learned Single Judge noticed that process server on the reverse of the notice wrote that the petitioners have refused to accept the same. Learned Single Judge has also observed that the petitioners also negated the attempts of the authorities to serve compensation amount in the court. We find no reasons not to accept the findings of the learned Single Judge that steps were taken under Section 9(1), in terms of Section 17(1) of the Act, to pay 80% compensation to the appellants. In course of hearing, we too made offer to the appellants to receive the compensation amount in court itself, which too was declined. We indeed record our extreme sense of displeasure that in spite of repeated reminders to the appellants that the issue involved in this case were exactly similar to the issues concluded by the Division Bench in case of own relatives of the appellants in parallel Land Acquisition proceeding no.15 of 2007-08 in case of Bishnu Deo Narayan Vs. The State of Bihar and Others (supra), learned counsel for the appellants proceeded with the argument, which were advanced in the earlier case and rejected. It is on account of such unscrupulous litigations that the court is sagging under the weight of arrears. Indeed just the same counsel for the parties had appeared in the previous proceeding. The over-bridge is now complete and has become functional quite a few years ago. We would not hesitate to state that all these years the traffic congestion underneath the bridge which necessitated expansion and widening of the same has been obstructed by the luxury of litigations.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussions, we do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that requirement of notice and tender of compensation amount in terms of Section 17(1) of the Act was not followed."

In the aforesaid case, the Division Bench of the Patna High Court

did not intervene in the matter in the factual context that the land was

acquired invoking emergent provision for the purpose of construction

of approach road to "Chiraiyatand over bridge" after taking note of the

fact that the necessary notifications under Section 4 and declaration

under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 were duly issued as also the notice

under Section 9 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 03.12.2007, calling

upon the appellants to accept 80% of the compensation amount.

In the present case also, the notification under Section 4 and

declaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 were also issued and

thereafter the petitioners were served notices to receive

compensation in lieu of acquisition and, thus, no procedural illegality

has been committed by the respondents. Moreover, the land in

question pertains to the part of the Ring Road under Phase-7, which is

the last phase. The construction of the Ring Road in the four phases

have almost been completed and two phases are to be constructed by

the National Highways Authority of India, which is under progress. The

total area of land acquired for the purpose of construction of the Ring

Road is 1067.51 acres whereas, the impugned notification is for

acquiring 9.83 acres of land. In course of argument, the learned

Government Advocate has put much emphasis on the fact that on

verification of the land revenue documents of 4.47 acres of land falling

within the boundary wall of the school, the petitioner-school has been

found entitled to get compensation only for 0.16 acre of land and rest

belongs to other raiyats. The learned counsel for the petitioners has

opposed the said submission by contending that the respondents have

no business to raise the said issue in the present case and it is the

jurisdiction of the appropriate Civil Court to deal with the said issue.

Be that as it may. The status of the land has been annexed as

Annexure-A to the counter affidavit. The total area of the school is

172.47 acres. The constructed area of the school is 57.50 acres. The

notification dated 12.01.2010 (gazetted on 25.01.2010) was issued

under Section 4 with respect to Mouza-Neori for acquisition of 9.83

acres of land whereby, the urgency provision of Section 17(4) was also

invoked. All the other raiyats, except the petitioners, have received

the compensation amount finally. The Khatian of the concerned village

has been annexed as Annexure-C to the supplementary counter

affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 4 & 5. On perusal of

the same, it would appear that in the revenue record, the nature of

the land has been shown as "Parti Kadim" and "Don", which are

different types of waste land. Although, the petitioners have

submitted that in the revisional survey records of right, the land has

been recorded as waste land, however, in the present context, the

said land cannot be said to be "waste or arable", as the same is being

used by the petitioners for educational purposes. The said submission

made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not acceptable, as

the petitioners have failed to bring on record any material to suggest

that any institutional structure is existing on the said acquired land.

Thus, the petitioners cannot be said to have been seriously prejudiced

by the acquisition of the land in question by invoking the urgency

provision, as no important installation/building of the petitioners is

existing on the land acquired by the Government. The functioning of

the school would also not get hampered in any manner by acquisition

of the land in question. This Court is also not unmindful of the fact that

the Government has already spent huge amount in construction of the

rest parts/phases of the Ring Road and has paid considerable

compensation to several raiyats/land owners. Moreover, some parts of

the Ring Road have already been made operational. Thus, it would not

be appropriate to interfere with the acquisition proceeding at the

instance of the petitioners. The submission made by the learned

counsel for the petitioners that other vacant land are available around

the premises of the school may be acquired to cause less

inconvenience to the school, also cannot be accepted. The

respondents have taken specific stand that before acquisition, the

technical survey was made and, thereafter, the centre line was fixed

for construction of the Ring Road and any deviation in the same is not

possible at this stage. Moreover, the same has been prepared by the

technical experts having special qualification in dealing with the

matter. It is not feasible for the Government to satisfy each and every

person during an acquisition proceeding as the acquisition certainly

causes some inconvenience to the individuals whose land are to be

acquired, but at the same time, the individual inconvenience has to

give way for the public cause in absence of which, no bonafide

development work can take place. The facts of the present case are

similar to the case of Nand Kishore Gupta (Supra), as the purpose

for acquisition in this case is also road construction and almost all the

raiyats have already received compensation, except the petitioner-

school whose prime purpose of imparting education to its students is

not going to be hampered by the present acquisition. The Hon''ble

Supreme Court in the case of Arnold Rodricks (Supra) and Chameli

Singh (Supra) has held that the opinion of urgency formed by the

appropriate Government to take immediate possession is a subjective

conclusion based on the material before it and it is entitled to great

weight unless it is vitiated by mala fide or colourable exercise of

power. In view of the aforesaid facts, it cannot be said that the

decision of the Government of Jharkhand in making acquisition of land

for construction of Ring Road by invoking urgency provision under

Section 17 of the Act, 1894 suffers from any malafide or colourable

exercise of power.

In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I see no reason

to interfere with the impugned notifications/letters.

The present writ petition being devoid of merit is, accordingly,

dismissed.