State of M.P. vs Ramhet Sharma

Heard on IA 4258/2014 an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing this writ appeal.

As per office report, the appeal is barred by 825 days.

It is mentioned in the application for condonation of delay that after passing of the impugned order, legal opinion was sought on 3/1/2012 from the office of Additional Advocate General. It was handed over on 7/1/2012. The Department vide letter dated 9/1/2012 had written to the Principal Secretary, PHE, Bhopal to obtain sanction from the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Bhopal for filing a writ appeal. Thereafter, reminders were sent on 18/7/2012, 18/8/2012, 17/9/2012 and 7/6/2014. Finally, sanction was granted in the month of June, 2014 and thereafter the appeal was filed. Nothing has been mentioned in the application as to what had happened at the level of Law & Legislative Affairs Department from 18/7/2012 to June, 2014 in regard to grant of sanction. It is two years'' period. As per section 5 of the Limitation Act it is obligatory on the part of the appellant to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring appeal within the prescribed period.

Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, has held as under in regard to sufficient cause and the facts which have to be pleaded by the parties :

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

(ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude."

In the present case, no explanation has been offered in the application as to what had happened for a period of two years in regard to grant of sanction. It is also a fact that in the year 2013 respondent had been regularised. He is a Class IV employee.

In this view of the matter, in our opinion, no sufficient cause has been show to condone the delay in filing this appeal. Hence, the application IA 4258/2014 for condonation of delay is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the writ appeal is also hereby dismissed as barred by limitation.