High CourtsDivision Bench

State of MP vs Satya Dev Sharma

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 8 July 2014 · Citation: (2014) 07 MP CK 0074

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.K. Palo, J · S.K. Gangele, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
WA 166/2014
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

18 paragraphs · 694 words
1.

Heard on IA 3661/2014 an application for condonation of delay in filing this writ appeal.

2.

As per office report, there is a delay of 825 days in filing this appeal. It is mentioned in the application that order in the writ petition was passed on 14/12/2011. Thereafter, legal opinion was forwarded to the Government vide letter dated 5/1/2012 for filing appeal. Then the Department granted permission to file appeal on 24/3/2014 and thereafter the appeal was filed on 17/6/2014. There is no mention in the application as to what had happened after furnishing legal opinion on 5/1/2012 till 24/3/2014, i.e. for a period more than two years. In accordance with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, if there was sufficient reason on the part of the person not to approach the Court within time, then the Court can condone the delay. However, in the present case, sufficient reason has not been explained by the appellants.

3.

Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others, has held as under in regard to exercise of powers by the Courts in the matter of condonation of delay:

(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

(ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

4.

Considering the facts of the case and in view of the aforesaid judgment of Hon''ble the Supreme Court, in our opinion, the appellants have failed to show sufficient cause to condone the delay.

5.

In this view of the matter, the application IA 3661/2014 for condonation of delay is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the writ appeal is also dismissed as barred by limitation.