State of Punjab vs Bhag Singh

G.C. Garg, J.—Land of the respondent and others measuring 303.42 acres was acquired by the State of Punjab for a public purpose i.e. for the development and utilisation of land as residential and commercial area in the Urban Estate Of Village Mataur by issuing notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Notification u/s 4 of the Act was published on 20.11.1980. Award in the matter was given by the Land Acquisition Collector on 12.7.1984. After the references were disposed of by learned District Judge, the State of Punjab filed Regular First Appeals in this Court not only in the case of the present-applicant but of other Landowners also. The applicant-respondent did not file appeal but preferred cross-objections seeking enhancement of compensation and restricted his claim in the cross-objections to the price of Rs. 1,20,000/- per acre. Some appeals and the cross-objections were taken up for disposal by this Court. Appeals filed by the State of Punjab were dismissed but the appeals of the landowners and the cross-objections filed by them were allowed. The claimants were held entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 90,000/- per acre. The appeals and cross objections were disposed of by this Court by order dated 24.7.1989.

Appeal filed by the State of Punjab in the case of the present applicant was also dismissed in the same terms as in the order dated 24.7.1989 and cross-objections filed by him were allowed and he was held entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 90,000/- per acre.

The landowners whose appeals had been dismissed by learned Single Judge by order dated 24.7.1989, preferred Letters Patent Appeals claiming still higher compensation. Some other appeals of the landowners were also taken up and were ordered to be heard along with the Letters Patent Appeals. The LPAs and the remaining Regular First Appeals were taken up for disposal by a Division Bench of this Court and the same were allowed by order dated 10.9.1990 and the claimants were held entitled to compensation @ Rs. 1,75,000/- per acre. The judgment of the LPA Bench is reported as Harchal Singh v. State of Punjab 1991 P.LJ. 20.

Still some appeals remained pending relating to the same acquisition and the same were disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court by order dated 21.1.1992 and the claimants therein were also held entitled to the same relief as was granted in Harchal Singh''s case (supra).

It is thereafter the respondent moved Civil Misc. 1249/CI of 1992, dated 31.1.1992, u/s 114 read with Section 151 of the CPC seeking review of the order passed by N.C. Jain, J. on 24.7.1989 in RFA No. 1339 of 1988 and the cross-objections therein by claiming that he may also be awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,75,000/ per acre along with other benefits under the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The applicant further prayed that he may be allowed to make up deficiency of court fee within a reasonable time.

This application remained pending for quite some time before N.C. Jain, J. but could not be disposed of. N.C. Nain, J. now stands transferred as a Judge of Gowhati High Court. It is how this application has come up for disposal before this Bench.

Learned counsel for the applicant-respondent submitted that the other land-owners have been held entitled to compensation @ Rs. 1,75,000/- per acre and the land of the applicant was also acquired by the same notification and for the same public purpose and even the award in the case of the applicant and many others is also the same and once this Court has allowed higher compensation, the applicant is also entitled to the same relief by seeking review of the order dated 24.7.1989 passed by N.C. Jain, J. He thus prayed that the application of the applicant deserves to be allowed and he may be permitted to make good deficiency in court fee. Learned counsel in support of his submission placed strong reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court in Ram Mehar v. Union of India AIR 1987 Del 130.

Before the Delhi High Court an application was moved claiming a similar relief as in the instant application. On a consideration of the matter, it was held that the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code are not applicable to the matter. Learned Judges of the Delhi High Court, however, granted enhanced compensation to the applicant therein in exercise of their inherent powers u/s 151 of the Code. The Delhi High Court observed thus :

"The right to receive compensation arises when the land of a person is acquired. The determination of the compensation for the acquired land is the duty of the Court under the Act. The Court is required to compute and quantify the true market value of the acquired land on the principles enacted in the Act. This Court has determined the market value differently in two cases. Section 28-A of the Act gives a mandate to give and pay equal compensation to all persons whose land has been compulsorily acquired by the Government under the same Award and same notification u/s 4 of the Act. The intention is to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for similar quality of land to different interested persons. The ends of necessity persuade us to invoke our inherent jurisdiction to reopen the assessment which we hereby do for redctermination of the market value of the acquired land."

On a consideration of the matter and having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and with utmost respect to the conclusion arrived at by the Delhi High Court, we find it difficult to accept the view taken therein. The applicant before us, in our view, is not entitled to the enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,75,000/- per acre by moving an application for review of the order earlier passed by this Court way back in July, 1989. The applicant is not entitled to enhanced compensation in such a situation under the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act as these provisions are not applicable to the case of the applicant, he having sought reference u/s 18 of the Act. Relief again cannot be granted in exercise of inherent jurisdiction u/s 151 of the Code because the applicant had not filed appeal and rather chose to file cross-objections in the appeal filed by the State of Punjab and he restricted his claim to an amount of Rs. 1,20,000/- per acre and paid court fee accordingly in the cross-objections. Once that is so, under no law the applicant can be permitted to seek compensation at a rate higher than the one claimed by him in the cross-objections wherein he had paid the court fee accordingly. It is not a case where the claimant-applicant claimed compensation at a higher rate and restricted his claim to Rs. 1,20,000/- per acre on the ground that he is unable to pay court fee and thus paid court fee at a lesser rate. Present is a case where the claimant only claimed that he is entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- per acre by filing cross-objections in a pending appeal at the instance of the State. Now after a lapse of eight years of the pronouncement of the order enhancing the compensation to Rs. 1,75,000/ per acre, the applicant cannot be permitted to make good the deficiency in the court fee and granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,75,000/- per acre by just ignoring the claim made and relief sought by him in the cross-objections, in exercise of our inherent jurisdiction u/s 151 of the Code. The apex Court on a number of occasions has observed that inherent jurisdiction of the Court cannot be invoked for the grant of a substantive relief in a situation where a specific provision in that behalf is available under other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 151 of the Code is not a substantive provision conferring any right to get any relief of any kind. It is a mere procedural provision which enables a party to have proceedings of a pending suit conducted in a manner consistent with justice and equity, but not a provision to grant substantive relief by ignoring another provision of the Code. The applicant herein had the remedy of appeal against the order dated 24.7.1989. He, in our view cannot be granted the relief in exercise of inherent power u/s 151 of the Code. In Arjun Singh Vs. Mohindra Kumar and Others, , it was held:

"It is sufficient if we proceed on the accepted and admitted limitations on the existence of such jurisdiction. It is common ground that the inherent power of the Court cannot override the express provisions of the law. In other words, if there are express provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code."

Again in Padam Sen and Another Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, , it was observed:-

"The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and, therefore, it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of these powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature."

The above view has again been re-iterated in Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kanhaya Lal Bhargava and Others, .

Even the Delhi High Court in Ram Mehar''s case (supra) concluded that the relief cannot be granted by way of review.

The claimant in such a situation cannot even seek relief by moving an application Under Sections 152 and 153 of the Code. Relief could be granted under these provisions if there was a clerical or arithmetical mistake within the meaning of these sections. We do not find any such mistake in the order. Applicant is only seeking enhanced compensation because of a subsequent judgment of-this Court. For seeking enhanced compensation, the only remedy available to the claimant was to file appeal against the order of the High Court and not to seek relief by moving application Under Sections 151, and 152 of the Code. The judgment of the apex court in Union of India Vs. Rangila Ram (dead) by Lrs., can be read with advantage in that behalf

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has specifically concluded that the claimant is not entitled to the relief under Order 47 Rule 1 i.e. by way of review of the original order. In the present case also we are of the view that the claimant is not entitled to the relief either u/s 114 or Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code. It is again the settled view that a later judgment of the High Court or of the Supreme Court is not a ground for seeking review of an order passed on an earlier occasion. This is what precisely the situation here. Cross-objections preferred by the applicant were disposed of by order dated 24.7.1989. It was open to the applicant to take the matter further in appeal and seek enhancement in compensation. He did not do so and stopped short there. He cannot now seek higher amount of compensation simply on the ground that on a later dated i.e. on 10.9.1990, a Division Bench of this Court awarded higher amount of compensation in respect of the same acquisition. If the relief as now claimed by way of review is granted, it will not only open a flood gate of litigation but will also unsettle the settled matters i.e. the judgments and the orders which have attained finality long ago as in that situation it will be open to a claimant to move a Civil Misc. application or review application to seek higher compensation after the matter is settled on a later date either by the High Court or by the apex Court, relating to the same acquisition. In other words the claimant would be entitled to the relief by moving an application after the compensation relating to the same acquisition is enhanced by the courts in appeal and in further appeal relating to other claimants from time to time, a relief which is not even contemplated by the Legislature u/s 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act.

There is still another aspect of the matter. In this case the applicant had claimed compensation by filing cross-objection at the rate of Rs. 1,20,000/- per acre. How can he now be granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,75,000/- per acre simply on an application moved by him? Moreover, the applicant can only pray and seek higher compensation than the one claimed in the appeal or the cross-objections if he makes a prayer at the hearing and seek time to make up the deficiency of court fee. The claimant cannot be permitted now to make good the deficiency of court fee after the conclusion of the proceedings in the appeal and that too, after a couple of years. The judgment of the Supreme Court in The Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda Vs. Union of India and others, can be read with advantage in that behalf. Thus, both in equity and in law the applicant is not entitled to the relief prayed for in the Civil Misc. application which is consequently dismissed.