State Of Uttarakhand And Others vs Khachedu Singh And Another

Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J.

The delay in preferring this appeal is of 174 days. Though the name of learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner is printed in the cause list, neither is he present nor is there any representation on his behalf. We have perused the affidavit and are satisfied that the delay, in preferring this appeal, is not so inordinate as to justify the appellants-respondents being non-suited merely on the ground of delay, without considering the merits of the order under appeal. The delay is, therefore, condoned. Delay Condonation Application is allowed.

This intra-court appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 2039 of 2016 dated 24.04.2018. The respondent-writ petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, filing the said writ petition, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 01.10.2016 issued by the fifth appellant herein, and for a mandamus to direct the respondent-authorities to reinstate the respondent-writ petitioner with all consequential benefits.

By the order impugned in the writ petition dated 01.10.2016, the respondent-writ petitioner was dismissed from service on the ground that he had obtained employment producing a forged B.T.C. (Basic Training Course) certificate at the time of his initial appointment. The said order of dismissal was passed without a departmental inquiry being held, and without permitting the respondent-writ petitioner to adduce evidence in his defense. In the affidavit, filed in support of the writ petition, the respondent-writ petitioner contended that the sixth respondent had directed the fifth respondent to verify the genuineness of Roll No. 4715 of the B.T.C. examination held in the year 1985, whereas the roll number allotted to the respondent-writ petitioner, in the B.T.C. examination held in the year 1985, was 645; before passing the order neither was a report of the inquiry dated 09.08.2016, caused behind the respondent-writ petitioner's back, furnished to him, nor was a departmental inquiry conducted pursuant to a charge-sheet being issued.

In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge, following his earlier order in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1152 of 2016 and batch dated 28.03.2017, quashed the termination order; and directed the appellants-respondents to reinstate the respondent-writ petitioner with all consequential benefits within a period of six weeks, however, reserving liberty to the appellants-respondents to proceed with the matter in accordance with law. The learned Single Judge, in his earlier order in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1152 of 2016 and batch dated 28.03.2017, had noted that the service of the petitioners therein were terminated without holding a regular inquiry; the petitioners were permanent employees; the services of the petitioners could only have been terminated in compliance with Article 311 of the Constitution of India; in D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. 1993 (3) SCC 259, the Supreme Court held that the order of termination of the service of an employee visits him with civil consequences, jeopardizing not only his livelihood, but also his career and livelihood of his dependents; and before taking any action, putting an end to the tenure of an employee, fair play required that a reasonable opportunity to put forth his case is given to him, and a domestic inquiry is conducted complying with principles of natural justice.

In the present case also, the respondent-writ petitioner is a permanent employee, and was appointed on 07.01.1992. The order, terminating him from service, was passed on 01.10.2016 more than 24 years after he joined service. Even if the appellants-respondents were of the view that the respondent-writ petitioner had secured employment producing a forged B.T.C. certificate, they were obligated in law to conduct a departmental inquiry, and to take action pursuant to the departmental inquiry caused against the said employee. In the present case no departmental inquiry was, admittedly, held. The learned Single Judge was, in our view, justified in setting aside the impugned order of termination, and in directing payment of all consequential benefits. The learned Single Judge has also granted liberty to the appellants-respondents to conduct a departmental inquiry and, thereafter, to take action in accordance with law.

While we see no reason to interfere with the order under appeal, suffice it to make it clear that this order shall not disable the appellants-respondents from taking action against the respondent-writ petitioner in accordance with law, after a charge-sheet is issued and a departmental inquiry is held.

Subject to the aforesaid observations the appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.