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Judgment
33 paragraphs · 638 wordsRamesh Ranganathan, CJ
Delay Condonation Application No. 14811 of 2017
Heard Mr. Anil Bisht, learned Standing Counsel for the appellants.
The delay in preferring the appeal is not opposed and the delay is therefore, condoned.
This appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in WPSS No. 2567 of 2015 dated 17.05.2017. The respondent-writ
petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 19.11.2015 passed by the District Education Officer,
Dehradun terminating the services of the petitioner from the post of Assistant Teacher, Government Primary School, District Dehradun on the ground
that the B.T.C. certificate was not valid, according to the N.C.T.E, for appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher in the State of Uttarakhand; and
a writ of mandamus directing that she be reinstated to the post of Assistant Teacher, Primary School with immediate effect.
Facts, to the limited extend necessary, are that the appellant-writ petitioner completed her Basic Teacher Course from the Bhartiya Shiksha
Parishad, U.P. through correspondence in the year 2000, which she claims is equivalent to the B.T.C. certificate issued by regular Government
Institutions. Pursuant to an advertisement, the petitioner participated in the process of selection, before the Selection Committee, on 10.08.2006 which,
after examining the certificates, called her for interview. On being found suitable, she was appointed to the post. By proceedings dated 02.08.2007,
she was posted at the Government Primary School Kairad, Block Chakrata of district Dehradun. Eight years after she joined service, the petitioner
was served a letter by the fourth-respondent directing that she produce her B.T.C. Certificate for verification. The impugned order dated 19.11.2015
was issued terminating her services, which the petitioner claims was without issuing any show cause notice to her, and without affording her an
opportunity of being heard.
In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stated that letter dated 27.08.2015 was issued directing that she place her version before the
Enquiry Committee on 07.09.2015; she did not give any satisfactory reply thereto; she was again given a chance to put across her case on 02.11.2015
which she failed to avail; and, as the training course undergone by her, was not recognized by the NCTE, her services were terminated.
Even if what the respondent-writ petitioner has stated, in the counter-affidavit, is true, the fact remains that the appellant-writ petitioner was a
permanent employee; and her services could not have been terminated except after conducting a regular departmental enquiry; more so when she had
neither admitted to the charge nor had she waived her right for a departmental enquiry to be held to enquire into the charges leveled against her. All
that the learned Single Judge has held, in the order under appeal, is that termination of the services of the petitioner was in violation of principles of
natural justice. The learned Single Judge, while setting aside the order of termination, had also observed that the petitioner be reinstated forthwith; and
the respondent should proceed in accordance with law.
We find no error, much less any patent illegality, in the order under appeal. Suffice it, while dismissing the writ petition, to observe that neither the
order passed by the learned Single Judge nor the order now passed by us shall disable the appellant-respondent from initiating disciplinary proceedings,
against the respondent-writ petitioner in accordance with law; and, thereafter, to take action including imposition of appropriate punishment on the
respondent-writ petitioner. Needless to state that the respondent-writ petitioner’s entitlement for back wages shall be subject to the outcome of
the enquiry, which the appellant-respondent shall initiate and complete within a period of six months from the date of production of a copy of this
order.
Subject to aforesaid observations, the special appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
