Suhel Singh vs Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur

R.N. Mittal, J.

Briefly, the facts of the case are that the petitioner was elected as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Talwandi Jhunglan, Tehsil Batala, District Gurdaspur (hereinafter referred to as the Panchayat). Some complaint was made against the petitioner that he had misappropriated certain amounts. An enquiry was held against him and it was held by the Block Development Officer vide order dated May 27, 1967, that he was liable to deposit Rs. 1080/ in the Panchayat funds. He was consequently ordered to deposit the aforesaid amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The petitioner went up in appeal against the aforesaid order of the Block Development Officer to the Assistant Director of Panchayats. The Assistant Director, vide order dated June 19, 1967 passed an ad interim order that till the final decision of the application recovery proceedings may be stayed. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner served a notice dated July 1, 1967, on the petitioner to show cause as to why he should not be suspended.

After receipt of the reply of the petitioner, the Deputy Commissioner, vide other order dated September 1, 1967, (Annexure F) suspended the petitioner under section 102(1) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1942 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner has challenged the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated September 1, 1967 (Annexure F). The writ petition has been opposed by the respondents.

The first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the stay order had been granted by the Assistant Director of Panchayats and therefore, the Deputy Commissioner had no right to suspend the petitioner on the charges of misappropriation. I have considered the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner but do not find any substance in it. In the letter dated June 19, 1967, the Assistant Director has stated that the recovery proceedings may be stayed. The stay was to a limited extent, i.e. for staying the recovery proceedings. It was not ordered by the Assistant Director that no other proceedings could be taken by an authority. In the aforesaid circumstances, I reject this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the enquiry was not ordered by the Government and, therefore, the Deputy Commissioner had no right to suspend him. It is urged by the learned counsel that the order of suspension has cast stigma on the petitioner. It is further stated by him that the order of suspension is without jurisdiction. I have also given a considerable thought to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner but do not find any substance in it. It has not been pleaded by the petitioner in the writ petition that the enquiry had not been ordered by the Government. In case the petitioner wanted to take the aforesaid plea, it was necessary for him to have pleaded in the writ petition in section 102(1) of the Act that the Deputy Commissioner can during the course of an enquiry suspend a Panch for any of the reasons for which he can be removed and debar from taking part in any act or proceedings of the said body during that period. In view of the aforesaid facts, in my view, the order of suspension is legal and cannot be quashed in this writ petition. In case the order of suspension is legal, the question of stigma does not arise.

The learned counsel for the petitioner lastly submits that a parallel enquiry could not be instituted against the petitioner. He argues that the second enquiry was therefore, illegal and that the order of suspension was liable to be quashed. This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has also no substance. Section 102 of the Act relates to suspension and removal of Panches. Section 102(2)(e) says that Government may, after such enquiry as it may deem fit, remove any Panch whose continuance in office is, in the opinion of Government or of the officer to whom Government has delegated its powers of removal, undesirable in the interests of the public. A reading of the showcause notice shows that the notice was given to the petitioner under the aforesaid section. Section 105 is regarding the liability of members of the Panchayat. Subsection (1) says that "every member of Gram Panchayat shall be liable for the loss, waste or mis application of any money or property belonging to that body if such loss, waste or misapplication is a consequence of his neglect or misconduct while a member". Subsection (2) provides the procedure in which the liability of the member can be fixed. Subsection (3) deals with the right of the member to file an appeal against an adverse order and powers of the appellate authority. A reading of the aforesaid sections shows that the two sections are independent; one dealing with the removal and the other with recovery of amounts suffered by the Panchayat on account of neglect or misconduct of a Panch/Sarpanch. In the case of misappropriation of funds of the Panchayat by a Panch/Sarpanch, action can be taken against him under both the sections simultaneously. If the interpretation of the counsel for the petitioner is accepted, then a Panch/Sarpanch who misappropriated any amount can either be held liable to pay the amount or be removed. This cannot be spelt out from the phraseology of the two sections. I am of the firm view that action can be taken simultaneously under both the sections. In case action can be taken under the aforesaid sections together, independent enquiries can also be held by the authorities concerned under the said sections. It may be mentioned that different authorities have been provided under the aforesaid sections to take action. In view of these aforesaid circumstances, I reject this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also.

For the reasons recorded above I dismiss the writ petition with costs. Counsel''s fee is Rs. 100/.