Sukhwinder Singh and Another vs State of Punjab and Others

Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.—As, identical questions of law and facts are involved, therefore, I propose to decide the above indicated petitions bearing CRM No. M-29424 of 2012(for brevity "the 1st case") and CRM No. M-29672 of 2012 (for short "the 2nd case"), arising out of the same very FIR/cross-case, by means of this common judgment, in order to avoid the repetition. Tersely, the facts and material, culminating in the commencement, relevant for disposal of the instant petitions and emanating from the record are that, initially in the wake of complaint of complainant-Balwinder Singh son of Sadhu Singh, respondent No. 2 (for brevity "the complainant in the 1st case"), a criminal case was registered against the petitioners-accused Sukhwinder Singh and another, for causing injuries to the complainant-Balwinder Singh, Gurdeep Singh (respondent No. 3) and Dalbir Kaur (respondent No. 4), by virtue of FIR No. 42 dated 24.06.2012, on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under Sections 326, 323, 324 and 34 IPC, by the police of Police Station Nurmahal, District Jalandhar.

Sequelly, during the course of same very incident, Tara Singh son of Samund Singh and Sukhwinder Singh (respondent No. 3) also sustained injuries. In pursuance of the statement (Annexure P-2) of the complainant-Tara Singh, respondent No. 2 (for short "the complainant in the 2nd case"), a cross criminal case was also registered against the petitioners-accused Balwinder Singh and others (in 2nd case), for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 148 and 149 IPC (offence punishable u/s 326 IPC was added later on), vide same FIR and by the police of same Police Station Nurmahal, District Jalandhar.

During the course of investigation of both the criminal cases, good sense prevailed and the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by means of compromise dated 17.08.2012(Annexure P-3 in the 2nd case and compromise/affidavits (Annexures P-2 and P-3 in the 1st case).

Having compromised the matter, now the petitioners-accused in both the cross-cases, have preferred the present petitions, to quash the impugned FIR and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr. P.C., inter alia, pleading that both the parties have received injuries and have subsequently amicably settled their disputes vide compromise dated 17.08.2012 with the intervention of friends, elders and respectables. They want to settle down their life afresh as they want to live peacefully in future. As per compromise (Annexure P-3 in the 2nd case), both the parties have redressed their grievances. They will not keep any kind of grudge and enmity against each other. They have entered into compromise, without any kind of pressure or coercion. On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioners-accused in both the cases, sought to quash the impugned FIR and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, in the manner depicted hereinabove.

During the course of preliminary hearing, the Magistrate was directed to record the statements of all the concerned parties with regard to the genuineness and validity or otherwise of the compromise and affidavits, in question, between them, by this Court, by way of order dated September 24, 2012.

In compliance thereof, having recorded the statements of all the concerned parties in both the criminal cases, the Magistrate has concluded that the compromise has been effected voluntarily between. them, without any kind of pressure or coercion and the same is genuine, vide report bearing No.3035 dated 19.10.2012.

Meaning thereby, it stands proved on record that the parties have amicably settled their disputes, with their free will and without any kind of pressure, through the medium of compromise (Annexure P-3) in the 2nd case and compromise/affidavits (Annexure P-2 and P-3) in the 1st case). The factum of compromise is also reiterated in the report of the Magistrate.

What cannot possibly be disputed here is that, the law with regard to the settlement of criminal disputes by virtue of amicable settlement between the parties is no more res integra and is now well-settled.

An identical question (recently) came to be decided by the Hon''ble Apex Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 8989 of 2010, titled as Gian Singh Versus State of Punjab and another., decided on September 24, 2012. Having interpreted the relevant provisions and considered a line of the judgments on the indicated points, it was ruled (para 57) as under:-

The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences u/s 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim''s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personnel in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

Above being the legal position and the material on record, now the short and significant question, though important, that arises for determination in these petitions is, as to whether the present criminal prosecution against the petitioners-accused deserves to be quashed in view of the compromise or not?

Having regard to the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, to my mind, it would be in the interest and justice would be sub-served, if the parties are allowed to compromise the matter. Moreover, learned counsel for the parties are ad idem that, in view of the settlement of disputes between the parties, the present petitions deserve to be accepted in this context.

As is evident from the record that, in both the cross-cases, both the parties have received injuries and have subsequently amicably settled their disputes vide compromise dated 17.08.2012 with the intervention of friends, elders and respectables. They want to settle down their life afresh as they want to live peacefully in future. As per compromise (Annexure P-3) in the 2nd case, both the parties have redressed their grievances. They will not keep any ill-will, grudge or enmity against each other. They have entered into compromise, without any kind of pressure or coercion. The complainants do not want to further pursue the matter. They have no objection if both the criminal cross-cases registered against each other are quashed. The factum and genuineness of the compromise between the parties is also reiterated by the Magistrate in his indicated report.

Thus, it would be seen that since, the compromise is in the welfare and interest of the parties, so, there is no impediment in translating their wishes into reality and to quash the criminal prosecution to set the matter at rest, to enable them to live in peace and to enjoy the life and liberty in a dignified manner. Therefore, to me, the ratio of the law laid down and the bench-mark set out by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh''s case (supra), "mutatis mutandis" is applicable to the facts of the present cases and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. Sequelly, the impugned FIR and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom in both the cross-cases, deserve to be quashed in the obtaining circumstances of the case. In the light of aforesaid reasons, the instant petitions are accepted. Consequently, both the cross-cases, arising out of the same impugned FIR and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed. The petitioners-accused are accordingly discharged from both the criminal cross-cases, in this relevant connection.