Surinder Singh and Others vs State of Punjab and Ors

Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.—As, identical questions of law and facts are involved, therefore, I propose to decide the above indicated petitions bearing CRM No. M-36584 of 2014, titled as Surinder Singh and another Versus State of Punjab and others (for brevity "the 1st petition") and CRM No. M-36585 of 2014, titled as Sucha Singh and another Versus State of Punjab and others (for short "the 2nd petition"), arising out of the same very FIR/incident/cross-case, by means of this common judgment, to avoid the repetition.

The contour of the facts and material, which needs a necessary mention for deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petitions and emanating from the record is that, initially in the wake of complaint of complainant-Sucha Singh son of Hari Singh (respondent No. 2)(for brevity "the complainant"), a criminal case was registered against the petitioners-accused-Surinder Singh son of Mohinder Singh and his wife Baljit Kaur, vide FIR No. 114 dated 24.11.2013 (Annexure P-1), on accusation of having committed the offences punishable under Sections 452, 323, 324, 506 and 34 IPC, by the police of Police Station Nurpur Bedi, District Rupnagar.

Sequelly, the prosecution claimed that during the course of same incident, the opposite party also sustained injuries. Therefore, in pursuance of the statement of complainant-Surinder Singh son of Mohinder Singh, respondent No. 2 (for short "the complainant in the 2nd petition"), another criminal cross-case was also registered against the petitioners-accused-Sucha Singh son of Hari Singh and another (in 2nd petition), vide DDR No. 13 dated 25.11.2013 (Annexure P-2), for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452, 323, 324, 506 and 34 IPC, by the police of same Police Station Nurpur Bedi, District Rupnagar.

During the course of investigation of the criminal cases, good sense prevailed and the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by virtue of compromise-deeds dated 05.12.2013 (Annexure P-3 in both the petitions).

Having compromised the matter, the petitioners-accused (in both the cross-cases), have preferred the present petitions, to quash the impugned FIR/DDR (Annexures P-1 and P-2) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C., inter alia, pleading that, they belong to same village. Now, with the intervention of friends and respectables of the society, all the effected parties/injured (in both the cross-cases) have amicably settled the matter, vide pointed compromise-deeds (Annexure P-3). The settlement is stated to be in the welfare, benefit and larger interest of the parties. They have redressed their grievances and decided to put an end to litigation pending between them. Now they have no grudge against each other. They want to live in peace and harmony in future in the society. The respective complainants/injured PWs have no objection, if the indicated criminal cross-cases are quashed, on the basis of compromise. On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioners-accused (in both the cases), sought to quash the impugned FIR/DDR (Annexures P-1 and P-2) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, in the manner described herein-above.

During the course of preliminary hearing, the Magistrate, having the jurisdiction, was directed to record the statements of all the concerned parties with regard to the genuineness and validity or otherwise of the compromise-deeds (Annexure P-3), by means of orders dated October 29, 2014 by this Court.

In compliance thereof, having recorded the statements of all the concerned parties, the concerned Magistrate has concluded vide his report dated 03.01.2015 that they have amicably settled their disputes with their free will and without any kind of pressure or coercion. The compromise has been effected voluntarily and the same is genuine. Likewise, similar report of the Magistrate was received in the 2nd petition as well.

Meaning thereby, it stands proved on record that the parties have amicably settled their disputes, by way of compromise-deeds (Annexure P-3). The factum of compromise is also reiterated in the reports of the Magistrate.

What cannot possibly be disputed here is that, the law with regard to the settlement of criminal disputes by virtue of amicable settlement between the parties is no more res integra and is now well-settled.

An identical question came to be decided by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in case Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 9 JT 457 : (2012) 9 JT 426 : (2012) 9 SCALE 257 : (2012) 10 SCC 303 . Having interpreted the relevant provisions and considered a line of the judgments on the indicated points, it was ruled (para 57) as under:-

"57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim''s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personnel in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

Sequelly, the same view was again (recently) reiterated by Hon''ble the Apex Court in case Narinder Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014) AIRSCW 2065 : (2014) CriLJ 2436 : (2014) 4 JT 573 : (2014) 4 SCALE 195 : (2014) 6 SCC 466 .

Such, thus, being the legal position and the material on record, now the short and significant question, though important, that arises for determination in these petitions is, as to whether the present criminal prosecution against the petitioners deserves to be quashed in view of the compromise or not?

Having regard to the contentions of the learned counsel, to my mind, it would be in the interest and justice would be sub-served, if the parties are allowed to compromise the matter. Moreover, the learned counsel are ad idem that, in view of the settlement of disputes between the parties, the present petitions deserve to be accepted in this context.

As is evident from the record that, in the instant cases, both the parties belong to same village. Now with the intervention of friends and respectables of the society, they have amicably settled their disputes, by means of compromise-deeds (Annexure P-3), with their free will and without any kind of pressure or coercion. The settlement is stated to be in the welfare, benefit and larger interest of the parties. They have redressed their grievances. Now, they want to live with peace and harmony in future in the society. The respective complainants/injured PWs have no objection, if the indicated criminal cross-cases are quashed, on the basis of compromise-deeds. The factum and genuineness of the compromise between the parties is also reiterated by the Magistrate in his indicated reports.

Thus, it would be seen that since, the compromise is in the welfare and interest of the parties, so, there is no impediment in translating their wishes into reality and to quash the criminal prosecution to set the matter at rest, to enable them to live in peace and to enjoy the life and liberty in a dignified manner. Therefore, to me, the ratio of the law laid down and the bench-mark set out by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh and Narinder Singh and others'' cases (supra), "mutatis mutandis" is applicable to the facts of the present cases and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. Sequelly, the impugned FIR/DDR (Annexures P-1 and P-2) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, deserve to be quashed in the obtaining circumstances of the case.

In the light of aforesaid reasons, the instant petitions are accepted. Consequently, the impugned FIR No. 114 dated 24.11.2013 (Annexure P-1), DDR No. 13 dated 25.11.2013 (Annexure P-2) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed. The petitioners-accused are accordingly discharged from the indicated criminal cross-cases, on the basis of compromise, subject to all just exceptions.