High CourtsSingle Bench

Surjit Kaur vs Gurdev Singh and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 19 August 1999 · Citation: (2000) 1 CivCC 253 : (2000) 124 PLR 253 : (1999) 4 RCR(Civil) 656

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.S. Sudhalkar, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Regular Second Appeal No. 2944 of 1999 and Civil Miscellaneous No. 5015-C of 1999 (O and M)
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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 1,036 words

S.S. Sudhalkar, J.—Having failed in both the courts below, the plaintiff has filed this regular second appeal. The case of the plaintiff-appellant is that her father Gurdial Singh, respondent No. 3, was the owner of the house in dispute. About 16-17 years ago, he gave the said house to the appellant and since then she is owner in possession thereof. Her father respondent No. 3 had suffered a decree in the year 1993 in a suit for declaration filed by the appellant and the decree was passed by learned Senior Sub Judge, Bhatinda on 16.4.83.

2.

It is alleged that as respondent No. 3 was a liquor addict, respondents No. 1 and 2 manipulated some writing from him when he was not in his senses and they also started living with him, on 18.5.83, respondents No. 1 and 2 filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining respondent No. 3 from alienating the disputed property to any other person on the basis of the said writing/agreement to sell. The suit was dismissed. They filed another suit on the basis of said agreement to sell. Again by administering liquor to respondent No. 3 and with the connivance of the local police, the sale deed was got executed and possession of the house was taken forcibly. It is further the contention of the appellant that respondents No. 1 and 2 further transferred the said property without any right to respondent No. 4 during the pendency of the suit. On these allegation, it was prayed that a decree for possession of the house and permanent injunction restraining respondents No. 1, 2, and 4 from alienating the same be passed.

3.

The suit was contested by respondents No. 2 and 4. The suit, ultimately, was dismissed and the appeal filed against the same was also dismissed.

4.

Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the appellant has a right over the property in dispute because of the family arrangement as well as since a decree in her favour was passed in the suit against her father respondent No. 3. He has cited various authorities on this point. He has referred to the case of Maturi Pullaiah and Another Vs. Maturi Narasimham and Others, . It has been held therein that family arrangements will not generally be disturbed by the court and the document not creating any interest in immovable property does not require registration. It has further been held therein that the family arrangement will need the registration only if it creates any interest in immovable property in praesenti in favour of the parties mentioned therein and in case, however, no such interest is created, the document will be valid despite its non-registration.

5.

Actually in the present case, the appellant''s contention would mean that she got the right because of the family arrangement and the subsequent decree which her father suffered. On questioning, learned counsel for the appellant was not in a position to say how the appellant had an antecedent title to the property before the alleged family arrangement. It is also not the case of the appellant that the property is an ancestral one. Even otherwise it is not shown as to how the appellant had any interest in the property which could be given to her in family arrangement or by an unregistered document. This case therefore does not help the appellant.

6.

Learned counsel for the appellant has also cited before me the case of Uda Chand and Ors. v. Ms. Rajo (1966)68 P.L.R. 382. In the said case, it has been held by a Division Bench of this court that where the terms of the compromise relating to immovable properties as set out in pleadings are admitted by the defendant, it is not necessary to go into the question of admissibility in evidence for want of registration as required under the provisions of section 17 and 49 of the Act.

7.

Learned counsel for the appellant has also cited before me the case of Kale and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, . It is also held therein that the members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. This citation, therefore, differs from the present case in the manner mentioned above viz. no antecedent title has been shown. Respondent No. 3 during his life time had all rights in the property and if any transfer is taken place without registration then it cannot be held to be valid transaction.

8.

Learned counsel for the appellant has also cited before me the case of Surjit Singh Vs. Uttam Singh and Others, . It has been held by this court in it that a compromise or consent decree does not require registration even if it creates title in respect of immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- or more.

9.

However, in view of the principle laid down in the case of Maturi Pullaiah and another v. Maturi Narasimham and others (Supra) and Kala and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Ors. (Supra) the facts and circumstances of the case in hand stand distinguished to the extent mentioned above. Moreover, the Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major and others, has held that when a suit is decreed in view of the written statement filed by the defendant admitting claim of the plaintiff to be correct, though not a compromise decree, it requires registration because such a decree creates right for the first time. It has also been held that a compromise decree also requires compulsorily registration if it creates new rights. Because of the above views taken by the Supreme Court, contrary authorities cited by learned counsel for the appellant stand overruled. In the present case, the appellant had no title over the property during the life time of her father and hence cannot challenge the sale made by her father and the title of the person who acquires interest in the property because of the sale.

10.

In view of the above, this appeal is without merit and is dismissed.