Ved Pal alias Vedu vs Smt. Raj Rani

V.M. Jain, J.—This regular second appeal has been filed by the defendant, challenging the judgments and decrees of the courts below

whereby suit filed by the plaintiffs was decreed by the trial Court and the appeal filed by the defendant was dismissed by the learned Additional

District Judge.

Plaintiffs had filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief of possession on the ground that the plaintiff was owner in possession of the

house in question by virtue of civil court decree dated 27.4.1992, whereby his father had suffered the said decree in his favour, It was alleged that

the defendants had forcibly entered into house in dispute and plaintiff has been dispossessed illegally. Suit was contested by the defendant. It was

alleged that the plaintiff was not son of the father of the defendant and the alleged decree dated 27.4.1992 was obtained by the plaintiff by

impersonating the father of the defendant and as a result of fraud. It was alleged that the plaintiff was neither owner, nor in possession of the house

in question and was not dispossessed. It was alleged that the plaintiff had no concern with the suit property or with the family of the defendant or

his father. After hearing both sides, learned trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiff, holding that Darshan Lal, plaintiff was owner of the house in

question and was entitled to seek its possession from the defendant. The appeal filed by the defendant was dismissed by the learned Addl. Distt.

Judge. Now the defendant has filed the present regular second appeal in this Court.

It has been submitted before me by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the civil court decree in favour of Darshan Lal plaintiff

could not be made the basis for decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. It was submitted that the said decree was not registered and as such the plaintiff

was not entitled to seek possession of the house in question from the defendant. Reliance was placed on the authorities, Kale and Others Vs.

Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, and Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major and others, .

However, I find no force in this submission of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant. In Kale and Others Vs. Deputy Director of

Consolidation and Others, , it was held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration

is necessary. But registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also a distinction should

be made between a document containing terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared

after the family settlement had already been made, either for the purpose of record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation.

In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and is, therefore, not compulsorily

registerable, In my opinion, the law laid down in this authority would be of no help of the defendant appellant. It is not disputed before me that in

the present case, in the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff, it was alleged that in the family arrangement, suit property has been given to the plaintiff

about one year prior to the filing of the earlier suit. The plea of the plaintiff was admitted by his father by filing admission written statement. Civil

Court decree was passed on the basis of allegations made in plaint and admission written statement. In my opinion, under such circumstances, it

could not be said that the civil court decree dated 27.4.1992 required registration. So far as authority Bhoop Singh Vs. Ram Singh Major and

others, is concerned, in my opinion, law laid down in the said authority would have application to the facts of the present case. In the reported

case, civil court had passed the decree in presenti by declaring the plaintiff to be owner from the date when the said decree was passed. It was

under those circumstances that it was held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that he said decree required registration. However, in the present case,

position is entirely different. Here the pre-existing right of the plaintiff was acknowledged by the defendant and on the basis thereof decree was

passed by the civil court.

Furthermore, in S. Noordeen Vs. S. Thiru Venkita Reddiar and others, , it was held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the decree did not

require registration. The law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, in Bhoop Singh''s case (supra), was also considered and it was

distinguished, holding that in that case there was no pre-existing right to the properties between the parties, but a right was said to be created for

the first time under the compromise. After considering the entire matter, it was held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the compromise decree

did not require registration. Similarly, in Bachan Singh v. Kartar Singh (2002) 131 P.L.R. 512 (S.C.), it was held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court

that a consent decree did not require registration.

In view of the above discussion, in my opinion, it would be clear that Darshan Lal, plaintiff had become owner of the suit property and was

declared as such by virtue of Civil Court decree dated 27.4.1992, and as such he was entitled to seek possession over the suit property from the

defendant. I find no illegality in the judgments of the courts below which may require interference by this Court in this second appeal. Even

otherwise, no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. Dismissed.