Tarun Kumar & Ors. vs Union of India & Ors.

Exemptions are allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

The Applications stand disposed of.

Having heard the learned Counsel for the Parties and perused the averments made in the Applications, the same are allowed. The delay of 110 days in filing as well as 07 days in re-filing the present Appeal, respectively, are hereby condoned.

Accordingly, the Applications stand disposed of.

Having heard the learned Counsel for the Parties and perused the averments made in the Application, the same is allowed. The delay of 139 days in the filing the present Appeal is hereby condoned.

Accordingly, the Application stands disposed of.

The present two intra-court Appeals assail the common order dated 12.02.2026 (“Impugned Order”) passed in W.P.(C) 5719/2020 and W.P.(C) 1035/2023 (“Writ Petitions”). By the Impugned Order, the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petitions preferred by the Appellants seeking entitlement to the increment-based incentive scheme, namely “Incentive Scheme on acquiring Professional/Additional Qualifications” (“Incentive Scheme”) of Respondent No. 2, Airports Authority of India (“AAI”).

Since both Appeals arise out of a common factual matrix, raise identical questions of law, and impugn the same order, they are being decided by way of this common order.

The brief factual background germane to the adjudication of the present Appeals is set out hereinafter:

Learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the Impugned Order has wrongly considered the date of declaration of result as the sole qualifying event for entitlement under the Incentive Scheme. It was further submitted on behalf of the Appellants that the process of acquiring higher professional qualifications commences upon the seeking and grant of departmental permission and once formal permission had been accorded by Respondent No. 2 prior to 25.03.2010, the Appellants undertook their respective courses in reliance upon the then prevailing policy framework, and their entitlement ought to be governed by the scheme in force at the time such permission was granted, rather than by a subsequent policy revision.

Learned Counsel for the Appellants further submitted that the learned Single Judge misconstrued the stipulation “as per AAI policy” contained in the administrative permission letters. It was contended on behalf of the Appellants that the said phrase ought to be construed contextually as referring to the incentive regime applicable to such permissions at the time approval was granted.

In this context, learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the Incentive Scheme, when read with the departmental permission letters, gave rise to a legitimate expectation that, upon successful completion of the course, the employees would be extended the benefits of the Incentive Scheme. It was further urged by learned Counsel for the Appellants that, having induced the Appellants to expend personal time, effort, and financial resources based on an official approval, Respondent No. 2 could not thereafter alter the applicable terms to their prejudice under the guise of a policy revision.

We have heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants and have carefully considered the material placed on record.

The main grievance of the Appellants is that the grant of departmental permission prior to 25.03.2010 crystallised a vested right to be governed by the Incentive Scheme, irrespective of the date of acquiring the actual qualification.

We are of the view that the departmental permission to pursue higher studies is an administrative clearance granted by an employer principally to ensure that an employee’s academic pursuits do not conflict with official duties, regular attendance, or exigencies of service. Such permission is merely enabling in nature and does not, by itself, confer an accrued or vested financial right to the Incentive Scheme.

A financial benefit under the Incentive Scheme was to be granted upon the actual acquisition of a professional qualification, and not merely for seeking or obtaining permission to pursue studies. The qualifying event which triggers entitlement is, therefore, the successful acquisition of the degree or qualification, objectively evidenced by the declaration of result. Until such result was declared, the Appellants’ claim to the benefit of Incentive Scheme remained inchoate. Consequently, the decisive date for determining eligibility was the date on which the qualification was acquired by the Appellants, and not the date on which departmental permission was accorded to them.

Further, the administrative permission letters issued to the Appellants expressly stipulated that the qualification acquired “will be considered for incentive as well as promotion as per AAI policy and R&P Rules and further subject to recognition of the institution/course by Govt. regulatory bodies from time to time”. The expression “as per AAI policy... from time to time” cannot be construed in isolation or treated as freezing the applicability of the Incentive Scheme as on the date on which permission was granted. On its plain and natural construction, the claim for incentive was required to be assessed with reference to the Incentive Scheme in force at the time the qualification was actually acquired and submitted for consideration.

We also do not find merit in the submissions by the Appellants of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is intended to ensure fairness in administrative action. However, it does not operate to fetter the employer’s executive authority to amend, modify, or alter service policies in response to changing organisational requirements or binding governmental directives.

The Incentive Scheme itself contained an express reservation clause empowering the management to amend or withdraw the same. When read conjointly with the conditional language of the permission letters, there was no unequivocal or unqualified assurance given on the part of Respondent No. 2 that the Incentive Scheme would continue unchanged until the Appellants acquire the qualifications for consideration under the Incentive Scheme. The transition from an increment-based model to a lump-sum model was a bona fide policy realignment, and the doctrines of estoppel or legitimate expectation cannot be invoked to compel continuation of a superseded financial benefit.

In view of the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge rightly held in the Impugned Order that departmental permission to pursue higher studies was merely an enabling administrative clearance and did not confer any vested right or immutable financial entitlement under the Incentive Scheme. We are in complete agreement with the finding recorded in the Impugned Order that entitlement to an incentive accrues only upon actual acquisition of the qualification, to be determined with reference to the date of declaration of result and is governed by the Incentive Scheme in force at the relevant time, as expressly reflected in the permission letters by the stipulation “as per AAI policy... from time to time”.

In view of the above analysis, we do not find any infirmity in the Impugned Order dated 12.02.2026 warranting interference in the present intra-court Appeals. The Appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.