The Secretary, K.S.E. Board vs Puthuparambil Jameela

Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.—This appeal by the Kerala State Electricity Board comes up with an application seeking condonation of delay of 128 days. Notwithstanding the fact that we are not satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown in the affidavit to condone delay, we have heard the learned counsel for the parties on the merits of the appeal, as well.

The fact that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs died of electrocution on 19.07.1999 is not in dispute.

The defence set up by the KSEB was that the electric overhead line was appropriately maintained by it, however that, on the day previous to the incident, it was raining heavily with wind blowing , and resultantly, the conductor had broken down and that the break down of the conductor was beyond the control of the defendants and was an act of God. There was no negligence or carelessness on the part of the KSEB. On the aforesaid facts situation, the doctrine of strict liability as enunciated by the Apex Court and this Court in 2002 ACJ 337 (SC) , Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumari and Others, and Varghese and Thressiamma Vs. Kerala State Electricity Board, , also following Quebec Rly., Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry[ 1920 AC 662], clearly rules out the defence set up by the KSEB. KSEB is the statutory licensee dealing with the dangerous substance, namely, electricity. Hence, the appeal on the ground of negligence is only to be rejected. We do so.

It is the admitted position that Rs. 25,000/- was granted by the KSEB as ex gratia.

Onto the question of compensation, the court below applied the appropriate multiplier in the light of the age of the deceased at the time of his death and his per day earnings. The relevant material for that was derived on the basis of certificates which evidenced his earnings to the satisfaction of the court below, including Annexure-A5 certificate issued by the Fisheries Officer, Ponnani and the family membership certificate etc. We do not find any infirmity on that issue either.

For the aforesaid reasons, we see that no useful purpose will be served even if the appeal is entertained condoning delay. We are also of the firm view that there is no ground to condone the delay.

In the result, the C.M. Application is dismissed. As a consequence of the dismissal of the C.M. Application, the appeal is rejected. Refund the court fee paid on the appeal at the time of its institution to the appellants.