High CourtsDivision Bench

The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Dibbu @ Deva

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 6 September 2013 · Citation: (2013) 09 MP CK 0192

HON’BLE JUDGES
B.D. Rathi, J · Ajit Singh, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378(3) · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 148, 149, 201, 302
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
M.Cr.C. No. 12311 of 2012
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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 514 words

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This application for grant of leave to appeal has been preferred u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 19/07/2012 passed by the Special Sessions Judge, (under the Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Corruption) Act, 1989) at Damoh, in Sessions Trial No. 216/2008, whereby respondents have been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 302/ 149, 148 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short).

2.

Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 10/07/2007 at 8 pm, the respondents constituted unlawful assembly and in furtherance of its common object committed the murder of Khilan Yadav and caused disappearance of the corresponding evidence. Morgue intimation (Ex.P/1) was recorded at the instance of Vijay Yadav (PW1) and after investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

3.

Learned Deputy Advocate General argued that the impugned judgment was passed without proper appreciation of evidence on record and prays for leave to file appeal.

4.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Deputy Advocate General and record of the trial Court was perused.

5.

Case of the prosecution hinged upon the evidence of Ramprasad (PW4), Bahadur (PW7) and Tattu (PW9). Ramprasad has deposed that after the incident, due to fear, he had not informed about the incident to anyone and after few days had informed to Tunde Athya, Naresh Athya and Munna. Tunde Athya has not been examined by the prosecution. Munna was given up by the prosecution and Naresh at one place has deposed that Ramprasad had informed him 6-7 months after the incident, whereas, after a while, he stated that Ramprasad had informed him after a year of the incident. This contradiction was considered material by the trial Court in view of the fact that though Ramprasad has claimed to be an eye-witness, yet he had informed the same to other witnesses after several months. He further deposed that his police statements were recorded 6-7 months after the incident. Moreover, Ramprasad was not considered to be an independent witness in view of his deposition that he had mortgaged his land with the deceased. Evidence of Bahadur and Tattu was also disbelieved, being full of material contradictions, omissions and exaggerations. In the aforesaid premises, the trial Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

6.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court that prosecution has failed to prove it''s case beyond reasonable doubt.

7.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

8.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the judgment of acquittal in question. The application, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.