The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Lakhan

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This application for grant of leave to appeal has been preferred u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 12/10/2007 passed by VI Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court) Chhatarpur in Sessions Trial No. 137/06, whereby respondents have been acquitted of the offence punishable u/s 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "the IPC").

Prosecution case, in brief is that, on 11/6/06 at about 8.30 p.m., near the house of Kishore Kachchi at Gangasagar Mohalla, Chhatarpur, respondents in furtherance of their common intention, caused the death of Purshottam alias Bhaiya Dhobi.

Learned Dy. Advocate General submitted that the impugned judgment was passed without proper appreciation of evidence on record and the same deserved to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned Dy. Advocate General, impugned judgment and record of the trial Court were perused.

After taking into consideration, the evidence of Maniram (PW1), Gudde (PW2), Smt. Sunita (PW5), Shri Ramkishore (PW6), Rakesh (PW8), Kamlesh (PW9), Investigating Officer R.S. Rawat (PW11), Assistant Sub Inspector Shiv Shankar (PW12) and other material available on record, trial Court held that evidence of these witnesses being fraught with material contradictions, omissions and exaggerations, did not inspire confidence. Sunita, wife of deceased, admitted that deceased was a criminal and had enmity with many people. All the material witnesses except Maniram belonged to the same family. Independent witness Maniram deposed that he could not see the assailants due to darkness. Darkness on the spot, was also admitted by Investigating Officer Shiv Shankar Mishra (PW 12). In the aforesaid premises, the trial Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the judgment of acquittal in question. The application, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.