The State of Tamil Nadu and The Transport Commissioner, Chennai vs N. Raziuddin and The Registrar, Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Chennai

P. Shanmugam, J.—The respondents before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal namely the Secretary to the Government and the

Transport Commissioner are the petitioners herein. The first respondent herein filed O.A. No.6314 of 1986 praying for an order to quash the

punishment of removal from service made in G.O. Ms. No.1414 dated 24.9.1996 and to pay the consequential monetary and service benefits.

The Tribunal, by the order impugned in this writ petition, allowed the application and directed to grant all consequential monetary and service

benefits to the first respondent herein. The writ petition is against this order.

The brief facts of the case are stated hereunder :

The first respondent joined the services as Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector on 3.8.1972 and was later promoted as Motor Vehicles Inspector

in the year 1976. Charges were framed against him on 18.3.1991 alleging that during the year 1987-88, when he was Motor Vehicles Inspector,

he demanded and accepted bribe for issuing Fitness Certificate. The Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, Madurai Region at Madras, in their

findings, held that the two charges of demand and acceptance of bribe were proved against the first respondent herein. The copy of the enquiry

report of the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings was sent to the first respondent as per the letter dated 28.4.1995 and he was requested to

submit his explanation, if any, on the findings of the Tribunal. He submitted his explanation dated 31.7.1995 and the Government, after examining

the case, ordered to impose a punishment of removal from service for the proved charges. The O.A. was filed against this order.

One of the main grounds raised by the first respondent before the Tribunal was that the Government did not issue a second show cause notice

proposing the penalty to be inflicted upon him, namely the removal from service, which is contrary to Rule 10 of the Civil Service (Disciplinary

Proceedings) Rule, 1955 and is liable to be quashed. The Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal accepted the case of the first respondent and set

aside the order of removal solely on this legal question. The writ petition is against this order of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal.

We have heard the learned Government Pleader and the counsel for the first respondent.

The proviso to Sub-clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, substituted by the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976

with effect from 3.1.1977 says that it shall not be necessary to give any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. Rule 17(b)

of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, as amended by G.O. Ms. No.28, P & AR Department dated 29.1.1996 says that

it is sufficient if a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer is furnished to the delinquent, calling upon him to submit his further explanation, if any.

Any representation received shall be taken into consideration before making any order imposing penalty. The rule specifically provides as follows :

It shall not be necessary to give the person charged any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed.

The Tamil Nadu Civil Services (DPT) Rules, 1955 have also been amended in consonance with Article 311 of the Constitution by G.O. Ms.

No.148, P & AR (N) Department dated 15.3.1996. Therefore, as on the date of passing of the order of punishment of removal on 24.9.1996,

there is no rule requiring a show cause notice indicating the penalty proposed. However, the Tribunal, on the basis of Rule 10 of the DTP Rule

prior to the amendment required to issue a show cause notice before proposing to impose major penalties. The Government, as per the Rule, shall

arrive at a provisional conclusion in regard to the penalty to be imposed and supply the person charged with the copy of the report of the Tribunal

and shall call upon the delinquent to show cause and therefore, according to the Tribunal, the order of penalty is vitiated. We are unable to

appreciate the reasoning of the Tribunal. Firstly, as on the date of the order imposing the penalty, i.e. dated 24.9.1996, there is no provision to

issue a second show cause notice indicating the penalty proposed. As seen earlier, the proviso to Sub-clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution

as well as Rule 17(b) of the Rules and Rule 10 of the DTP Rules imposed no such requirement. Assuming for the sake of argument that the earlier

rule applies, the same can be invoked only in cases where the Government decided to impose any of the major penalties, after coming to a

provisional conclusion in regard to the penalty to be imposed and thereafter, supply the persons with the copy of the report calling upon the

delinquent to show cause. In this case, the Government did not arrive at any such provisional conclusion regarding the penalty proposed to be

imposed. The delinquent was furnished with the copy of the enquiry report calling upon him to submit his explanation, if any, and therefore, the old

rule will not apply to the facts of this case.

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, Vs. Karunakar, etc. etc., , while dealing with the

question as to the effect of non-furnishing of the report on the order of punishment and as to what relief should be granted to the employees in such

cases, held that to direct reinstatement of the employee with backwages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The

theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to

vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rights to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice

has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each

case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have evolved, it would be a perversion of justice to

permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to

stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to ''unnatural expansion of natural justice'' which in itself is antithetical

to justice. Ultimately, their lordships directed in all cases where the inquiry officer''s report is not furnished, to cause the copy of the report to be

furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming the court. The court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside

the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished. The courts should avoid resorting to shortcuts since it is the duty of the

tribunal to apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment. Therefore,

assuming for the sake of argument that even the enquiry report was not furnished as required, the order of punishment cannot mechanically be set

aside.

In this case, as we have seen, even the unamended rules cannot be invoked in order to claim the right of the second show cause notice in the

circumstances of this case. In any event, when the final order was passed on 24.9.1996, the amended rules have come into force which were in

consonance with Article 311 of the Constitution and therefore, the same cannot be set aside on the ground of non-furnishing of the second show

cause notice.

For all the above reasons, we hold that the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained and the punishment imposed cannot be set aside on that

ground. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. Consequently W.M.P. No.19708 of 1998 for stay, is closed.

However, as stated earlier, the Tribunal considered the question on the sole ground of failure to follow the rules and did not consider it

necessary to go into the other grounds. We are, therefore, inclined to remand the matter while setting aside the order for disposal of the matter on

other grounds expeditiously.