Tikka Lal vs Shrimati Kamla Rani

Mehar Singh, C.J.—The eviction of the tenant, who is the applicant here, has been sought by the landlady on the ground that she requires the demised premises for her own occupation in that, at the instance of the Lions Club, she wishes to open a free maternity Hospital in the demised premises. The Rent Controller dismissed the eviction application on a conclusion that the ground does not fall u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act 3 of 1949), but, on appeal the Appellate Authority has reversed the order of the Rent Controller and the basis of the order of the Appellate Authority are two derisions of this Court, in one of which a trust was permitted to obtain eviction of a tenant from a residential building for starting a school, and in the other a juristic person was permitted to obtain eviction of a tenant from a residential building to carry out its purpose as a juristic person.

The ground in section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act is.

(3)(a) A landlord any apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, (i) in the case of a residential building, if

(a) he requires it for his own occupation;

(b) he is not occupying another residential building, in the urban area concerned; and

(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient came after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area.

Conditions (b) and (c) do not directly arise in this case and eviction of the tenant is sought with reference to condition (a) in sub clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act, but it is obvious that the word ''occupation'' has to be given meaning when the three conditions in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section 3 of Section 13 are con. side red together. This is obvious, but if an authority was needed, though it is not directly under this part, there is the case of Attar Singh v. Inder Kumar (1967) 69 P.L.R. 83 in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in regard to a parallel provision relating to ''rented land'' in section 13 (3) (ii) that three similar conditions in sub-clause (ii), just the same has in sub-clause (i) have to be read together. Their Lordships pointed out that meaning of the words ''his own use'' in condition (a) of sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 13 of the Act has to be taken not in isolation but when conditions (b) and (c) of the same are read along with that condition. Exactly the same is the position so far as condition (a) of sub clause (i) of clause (a) of sub section (3) of section 13 of the Act is concerned. All the three conditions (a), (b) and (c) of section 13(3)(a)(i) have to be read together. And when that is done, it is obvious that the words ''own occupation'' in condition (at mean own occupation for residential purposes, and not for any other purpose. It is not denied the that demised premises have been let for residential purposes Section 11 of the Act clearly provides that without the written permission of the Controller a residential building. Can not be converted into a non residential building. A residential building has been defined in section 2(g) of the Act to mean any building which is a non-residential building, and in section 2(d) a nonresidential building is defined as a building used solely for the purpose of business or trade. Now, it would depend upon facts whether the running of a free maternity hospital is a business or trade purpose. What is urged on the side of the landlady is that no profit motive is involved and, therefore, the question of the purpose being business or trade when a free maternity hospital is to be run does not arise. I am not convinced that the matter is so simple, for there may be a business or trade in which a profit motive may not be involved. This revision application by the tenant, however, has to succeed on another basis and that is that the landlady does not require the demised premises for her own occupation. She requires the same to start a free maternity hospital, which would not be her own occupation. She would take possession of the demised premises after eviction of the tenant and then hand the same over to the management of the free maternity hospital. Assuming for a moment that she is to run the free maternity hospital herself then she would not be requiring the demised premises for her own occupation u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act because she would not be requiring the same for residential purposes. The learned counsel for landlady has referred to the cases of a trust and of a juristic person in which artificial persons have been allowed to obtain eviction of their tenants u/s 13(3)(a)(i), In the case of trust to open a school and in the cause of juristic person to use the demised property for its purposes, but, I should have thought, it was quite obvious, that there is no comparison between the position of a juristic person in this respect and a natural person. While a natural person may reside in a building, a juristic person cannot be said to do so in the physical sense. Of course it may be that when the agents of the juristic person occupy the property it may be said in a way that the juristic person resides in it, but the property to which section 13(3)(a)(i) refers is obviously a property required for residential purposes of the landlord himself. The opening of a free maternity hospital, a laudable public object, is not the requirement of the demised premises for personal occupation as in section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act.

The result is that this revision application is accepted, the order of the Appellate Authority is set aside, and that of the Rent Controller is restored, so that the eviction application of the landlady is dismissed. There is, however, no order in regard to costs in this application.