Tilak Raj vs State of Haryana

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

By virtue of the present petition Tilak Raj petitioner seeks setting aside of the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal and for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner.

The relevant facts are that on 28.12.1987 the Government Food Inspector intercepted the petitioner at Neelokheri. Dr. Balbir Singh was also present. The petitioner was having two drums of cow milk for public sale. The Food Inspector purchased the milk from the petitioner after stiring it. Rs. 2.50 were paid for 660 grams of milk. It was divided into three parts and bottled in 3 dry, clean and empty bottles. Two drops of 40% formalise per 25 mls. were added as preservative in each bottle. The bottles were stoppered tightly and sealed. They were labelled and wrapped with a strong thick paper. A paper slip bearing Code No. 1, serial number and signatures of the Local Health Authority were pasted on each bottle. It was secured by means of strong twine and sealed with the seal of Medical Officer and that of the Food Inspector. The signatures of the accused were obtained. One sealed bottle was sent to the Public Analyst, Haryana, Chandigarh for analysis. The other two bottles were deposited with the Local Heath Authority. The report of the Public Analyst was received. It was found that the fat contents were 15% deficient. On these broad facts, the complaint was filed against the petitioner.

The learned trial court tried the complainant with the procedure of a warrants case and held the petitioner guilty of the offence punishable under Sections 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short ''the Act''). The petitioner was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/. In default of payment of fine, the petitioner was to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. He preferred an appeal in the Court of Sessions. The learned Additional Sessions Judge accepted the appeal and remanded the case to the learned trial Court to try the same in a summary way. While doing so it was observed :

"In the present case in the order dated 8.8.1988 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate mentioned that he was of the opinion that on conviction, sentence of imprisonment of more than one year can be passed, so that case be tried as warrant case. There is no mention in this order that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate might have passed this order after hearing both the parties as laid down in Section 16(A) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Similarly, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the sentence of 6 months and no reason has been given as to why the sentence of less than one year has been passed. Admittedly, the case has been tried as a warrant case whereas as per mandatory provisions of Section 16(A) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the accused should have been tried in a summary way, so that the trial of the case stands vitiated and this view is supported by a Full Bench Authority of our own Hon''ble High Court reported in C.L.R. 1985(2) page 29 Budh Ram v. Sate of Haryana, and in a case reported in Chandigarh Criminal Cases 1989 page 40 Brij Lal v. State of Haryana."

By virtue of the present petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner assails the findings and contends that after 10 years de novo trial of the petitioner will be improper. He pressed into service Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

To appreciate the said argument, reference can be made to Section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. It reads as under :

"16A. Power of Court to try cases summarily. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under subsection (1) of Section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial :

Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;

Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code."

The provisions referred to above indicate that all offences punishable under subsection (1) of Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act have to be tried in a summary way. The second proviso to Section 16A clarifies that after hearing the party, if it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that sentence exceeding one year, may have to be passed, he may try the same as a warrants case. The witnesses thereupon have to be recalled.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge found that the order passed under Section 16A of the Act was not in conformity with the said provision. There was no challenge to it before this Court. What is urged, therefore is that after 10 years de novo trial would not be proper. The said contention of the learned counsel indeed cannot be ignored in the peculiar facts of this case.

It is of utmost importance that all proceedings in criminal cases should be expedited and concluded at the earliest. Speedy trial means expeditious trial. It is an integral and essential part of the Fundamental rights to life and liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the peculiar facts when 10 years have already elapsed when the occurrence took place, directing de novo trial would be certainly against the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in the peculiar facts, it would be patent injustice if the trial is allowed to be continued. The order remanding the case necessarily cannot be sustained. In fact the proceedings deserves to be quashed.

For these reasons, the petition is accepted. The Complaint and the proceedings pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karnal are quashed.