AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
465 paragraphs · 10,814 wordsShanmukham, J.—This Appeal has a chequered career; in that after hearing arguments at length advanced by both the learned Counsel, I
had to postpone my judgment awaiting a decision of a Division Bench, which has since been reported, in Subramania Guruckal v. Arulmighu
Thirumaleswara Swami Deity 97 L.W. 243. The only substantial question of law that falls for determination in this Second Appeal is:
Whether the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit for declaration and injunction is barred by reason of the provisions of Act 30 of 1963
and Ex.B1 order granting patta for the defendant under S.8 (2)(ii) of the Act.
Maheswaran, J., in Second Appeal No. 1598 of 1979, had referred the, same question to be decided by a larger Bench because, according to
the learned Judge, there are two conflicting decisions of two Division Benches of this Court in Udaiyappan v. Karuppan 1982 T.N.L.J. 490, and in
Subramania Guruckal v. Arulmighu Thirumaleswaraswami Deity 97 L.W. 243, I, therefore, feel it prudent to refer the matter, to a larger Bench
and to be posted with Second Appeal No. 1598 of 1979.
The papers are directed to be placed before My Lord the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.
Pursuant to the reference made by the Hon''ble Mr. Justice Shanmukham, the matter having been posted before the Hon''ble the Chief Justice and
the Honourable Mr. Justice Srinivasan, the Court delivered the following Judgment:--
2nd December, 1986/S.A. 898 of 1979
M.N. Chandurkar, C.J. and Srinivasan, J.
M.N. Chandurkar, C.J. S.A. 898 of 1979:--This Second Appeal of the year 1979 was referred by an order dated 25th September, 1984 to a
Full Bench in view of the fact that in another appeal S.A. No. 1598 of 1979 Maheswaran, J. had referred the question as to the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court to entertain a suit for declaration and injunction whether it is barred by reason of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963 and by
virtue of a patta granted under S.8(2)(ii) of Act 30 of 1963, because he found that there were two conflicting decisions with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court both the decisions being of Division Benches. One decision is the decision of the Division Bench in S.A. Nos. 904
and 1250 of 1978 dated 22-10-1982. In that decision the Division Bench was expressly considering the question with regard to the bar of the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court in view of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948, namely, Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act. The Division Bench took the view that the finality of a decision rendered by the authorities constituted under special Acts is
confined only to the decision within the four corners of the Act. It held that the question of title to the properties with reference to which an order
has been passed by a Settlement Officer granting patta under S.11 of the Act can be agitated in a civil suit in which the patta may serve as one of
the items of evidence of title and that merely because the question of title will have to be gone into collaterally in the proceedings under S.11 for
deciding whether a particular land is included ought to have been included in the holding of a ryot, it cannot be said that the said adjudication for
the limited purpose will bar the exercise of jurisdiction by the Civil Court in the matter of determination of title unless such bar is specifically laid
down in Act 26 of 1948. After elaborate discussion the Division Bench followed the view taken by this Court in The State of Madras v.
Ramalingam Swamigal Madam 1969 II M.L.J. 281, and T. M. Laksminarayana Ayyar and Others Vs. Nallachi Ammal and Others, , which were
both decisions of Division Benches in which the view taken was that, when a question arose as to the title to the land in respect of which the
Settlement Officer had issued patta the mere act of issuing patta could not be regarded as conclusion or act as a bar to a consideration by the Civil
Court, of the question of title. Ramanujam and Sengottuvelan, JJ. who decided S.A. Nos. 904 and 1250 of 1978 distinguished the two decisions
of the Supreme Court in Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, , and Oduru Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru
Subrahmanya Reddy, , on the ground that, though the Supreme Court had in those decisions taken the view that the decision of the Settlement
authorities relating to the issue of patta is final in the matter of title and the question of title cannot be re-agitated in a Civil Court, those cases would
apply to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Estates Abolition Act in which S. 56 was still in force. It was pointed out that so far as the Tamil
Nadu Act was concerned S.56 of the Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948 had been repealed by Tamil Nadu Act 34 of 1958 and in its place S.64-C had
been added.
4a. When a similar question arose before another Bench consisting of V. Ramaswami & Ratnam, JJ. in Subramania Gurukkal v. Arulmighu
Thirumaleswara Deity 97 L.W. 343 which was a case arising under Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963 (Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and
Conversion into Ryotwari (Act), the Division Bench referred to the earlier decision of Ramanujam and Sengottuvelan, JJ. and observed that they
were unable to agree with that view. The reason given was that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana
and Another, and Oduru Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, , did not support the view taken by the earlier
Division Bench. Indeed in paragraph 26, it was pointed out that the distinction drawn by the earlier Division Bench was not acceptable to the
Bench.
It may, however, be pointed out that V. Ramaswami, and Ratnam. JJ. had accepted the position that the provisions of Tamil Nadu Minor Inams
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, (30 of 1963) were analogous to those in Act 26 of 1948 and the language used in S.11 relating to
the determination of the person who is entitled to ryotwari patta is very similar to the one in S.15 of the Act 26 of 1948 and observed as follows:
There could, therefore, be no doubt that the finality attached under S.46 would cover not only the determination of the nature of the land but also
the determination of the person entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of that land. These two matters being questions to be determined for the
purpose of the Act and are matters falling within the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer and the Appellate Tribunal under S.11, they shall
also be binding on the parties and persons claiming under them in any suit or proceeding in a civil court under S.43.
Normally, a Full Bench could have been constituted to hear this appeal to decide which of the two views is correct. However, the decision of
this court in Ramalinga Swamigal Madam v. State of Tamil Nadu 1969 II M.L.J. 281, which was followed by the Bench of Ramanujam, and
Sengottuvelan, JJ. became the subject matter of an appeal before the Supreme court in Civil Appeal No. 474 with No. 1633 of 1971 which came
to be decided on 1-5-1985 and it is reported in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, . The Supreme Court expressly affirmed the
view of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam 1969 II M.L.J. 281, and held that the Civil Court''s jurisdiction to
adjudicate on the real nature of the land is not ousted under S.64-C of the Act by reason of the Settlement Officer''s decision to grant or refuse to
grant a patta under S.11 read with the proviso to S.3(d) of the Act. The other decision of this Court from which an appeal was taken is in
Ramamoorthy and others v. State of Madras ILR (1970) 2 Mad 788. That is a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court Natesan, J., in
which the learned Judge held that the patta granted under S.11 to 14 of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948 was nothing more than a bill and did not itself
confer title. This decision was also confirmed by the Supreme Court in the same decision State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, . In
Paragraph 15 of the Judgment the Supreme Court referred to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam
Narayana and Another, , and in Oduru Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, which were distinguished by
Ramanujam and Sengottuvelan, JJ. and held that the two decisions were distinguishable. The contention raised before the Supreme Court on the
basis of these two decisions was that the Civil Court''s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the land should be held to have been excluded under S. 64-
C of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948 which also accorded finality to the Settlement Officers order refusing to grant ryotwari patta to a ryot under S.
11 of the Act on the ground that the land in question is not ryoti land. This contention was rejected with the following observation:--
It is not possible to accept this contention for the two decisions are clearly distinguishable. In the first place S.56 with which the Court was
concerned in those cases does not contain the words for the purposes of the Act which occur in S.64-C; and presumably in view of the absence of
those words in the section this Court in Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, observed that there was no warrant for taking
the view that the Settlement Officer''s decision. Under S. 56(1)(c) on the question as to who was the lawful ryot of the holding was only for the
purpose of identifying the person liable to pay the arrear of rent. Secondly under S.56(1)(c) the Settlement Officer is expressly required to make
an enquiry into and decide the question as to who is a lawful ryot of the holding between two rival claimants whereas as stated earlier there is no
express provision directing an inquiry into the question of the real nature or character of the land while considering a ryot''s application for a patta
under S.11 read with the proviso to S.3(d). In other words the two provisions are dissimilar. Moreover, it may be pointed out that so far as the
Madras Act is concerned by Madras Act 34 of 1958, S.56, itself has been repealed with effect from 27th December, 1958 and S.9(2) of the
repealing Act (No. 34 of 1958) has gone on to provide that all proceedings pending before a Settlement Office or Tribunal under that Section shall
abate. As a result of such repeal the Madras High Court in two decisions, Krishnaswami Thevar''s case 1969 II M.L.J. 281, and A.R. Sanjeevi
Naicker''s case, has held that now there is no machinery available under the Madras Act to have a determination of the dispute between two rival
claimants regarding their title as to who would be entitled to the patta and S.11 does not contain machinery for deciding disputed questions of title.
Whatever be the position in regard to dispute concerning rival claims or titles, the ratio of the two decision of this Court on which counsel placed
reliance is inapplicable to the issues raised in these appeals for our determination. (Underlining is ours,).
The effect of the decision of the Supreme Court therefore, is that the two decisions Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, , and
Oduru Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, on the basis of which the later Division Bench consisting of V.
Ramaswami and V. Ratnam, JJ. took their view have been held to be inapplicable to a case under the Madras Act 26 of 1948, and further the
view of Ramanujam and Sengottuvelan, JJ. who had followed the earlier view of the Division Bench in the State of Madras v. Ramalingam
Swamigal Madam 1969 II M.L.J. 281, stands confirmed. The later decision of V. Ramaswami and V. Ratnam, JJ. in Subramaniya Gurukkal v.
Arulmighu Thirumaleswara Deity 97 L.W. 243 cannot therefore be considered now to be good law at all and it is, therefore, not necessary to
constitute any Full Bench to decide any conflict because the conflict now stands resolved by the latest decision of the Supreme Court in State of
Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam,
We have already pointed out that, so far as the Judgment of Ramanujam and Sengottuvelan, JJ. is concerned, that now stands confirmed. If the
contention of Mr. Kumar is that notwithstanding that judgment there are some observations of the Supreme Court which support the view that the
Civil Court has no jurisdiction, he will be at liberty to agitate that question.
Accordingly, this appeal will now go back to a single Judge for decision according to law.
S.A. No. 898 of 1979: Counsel for both sides agree that since the controversy which was referred to a Full Bench now stands expressly
covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, the matter is not now required to be
decided by a Full Bench and now it can be properly decided by a Single Judge in view of the order we have made above in S.A. 888 of 1979.
The second appeal is also remitted back to the learned Judge for decision according to law.
S.A. 1598 of 1979: In view of the order we have made in S.A. No. 888 of 1979 as above, the parties agree that this Second Appeal also
must go back to the learned Judge for decision, according to law.
The Second appeal having been posted before the Hon''ble Mr. Justice Srinivasan for hearing pursuant to the order of the Honourable the Chief
Justice the court delivered the following Judgment:
JUDGMENT (16-3-1987)
The controversy which arises in the present case has already had a fairly long life in Courts of law including the Supreme Court of India and
promises to live for some more years inspite of a recent pronouncement of the Apex Court of the country in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga
Samigal Madam, The subject matter of the controversy is the jurisdiction of a civil court to decide the question of title to lands to which the
provisions of Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 30 of 1963 (hereinafter referred) to as Minor Inams Act'''')
are made applicable.
The relevant facts which are not in dispute in the present case are as follows: The land measuring 4 acres 51 cents comprised in Survey
Number 464/1, the total extent of which is 4 acres 87 cents is situated in Courtalam Township. There is a building called ""Kannadi Bungalow"" on
the western portion of the land which is not the subject matter of the dispute. As the said land is admittedly a Minor Inam land, proceedings for
issue of patta were instituted and the Settlement Tahsildar ordered the grant of the same in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendant was a party to the
said proceedings and his appeal to the Inams Abolition Tribunal, Tirunelveli was dismissed. On a further appeal to the Special Appellate Tribunal
(High Court, Madras), the orders of the authorities below were reversed and patta was directed to be issued in favour of the defendant. The only
reason given by the Special Appellate Tribunal in support of its order is that the land was Iruvaram Minor Inam granted for the support or
maintenance of a religious institution and that the plaintiffs herein were not claiming any right thereto by virtue of any transfer from the Inamdar.
Thereafter the plaintiffs filed the present suit for a declaration of their title to the suit property and for an injunction restraining the defendant from
interfering with their possession. The trial Court held that the documents produced by the plaintiffs in support of their case were clinching and they
proved their possession over the suit property for over 100 years. It was also found that the defendant had not produced any documents to show
that it had dealt with the property at any time. It is better to extract the relevant observation of the trial court which read as follows:
...In the face of the documents produced by the plaintiffs, they cannot be of any help to the defendant. The defendants have not produced any
document to show that they have dealt with the suit property. They have not whispered in the statement the mode of enjoyment of the suit land
whether they are in enjoyment of the land directly or through the lessee. No scrap of paper has been produced to prove their alleged possession of
the suit land.
In that view, the trial court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to The suit property. Issue No. 4 framed by the trial court related to the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court to entertain the suit. The issue was answered in favour of the plaintiffs on the following reasoning:--
...The defendant contends that since in the Settlement Proceedings after elaborate enquiry, patta has been granted in his favour affirming his right,
the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. The law is well-settled that the Statutory machinery created by either Act 26 of
1948 or Act 30 of 1963 could exercise jurisdiction only in respect of those matters which were specified in the enactments and could not pervade
the field of civil litigation which is exclusively that of the Civil Court. Vide Division Bench reported in The State of Madras represented by the
Collector of Ramanathapuram at Madurai v. Kasthuriammal and others 87 L.W. 531 = 1974 II M.L.J. 139 at 144. The Settlement authorities
cannot grant the relief of declaration or injunction. Therefore the orders passed or the decision rendered by them under the Act cannot operate as
a bar to the Civil Court entertaining a suit involving the relief of declaration or injunction. The contentions of the learned counsel for the defendant
that this case is not a case of rival claimants to the suit property cannot be countenanced. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the court has
jurisdiction and issue No. 4 is answered accordingly.
Consequently, the suit was decreed by the trial court. On appeal by the defendant, the learned Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli confirmed the
finding of the trial court with regard to the merits of the claim. After referring to the documents filed by the plaintiffs, the learned Additional District
Judge observed:�
...All these documents leave me no doubt that the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-title have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit
property for over 100 years. The defendant has not produced any document to prove that during the past 100 years he was in possession of the
suit property at any time. I therefore find under this point that the plaintiffs were entitled to the suit property.
However, the learned Additional District Judge while dealing with point No. 2 which related to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the
suit, took the view that once patta is granted under the provisions of the Minor Inams Act, the matter cannot be agitated once again in a Civil
Court. After referring to some of the decisions of this Court, the learned Additional District Judge observed thus:�
...In the present case though there is abundant evidence to show that the plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-title have been in possession and
enjoyment of the suit property for over 100 years they have not proved that the defendants transferred the suit property in favour of their
predecessor-in-title. Consequently they are not entitled to patta under S.8. Since the accrued right is extinguished and anew right is created under
the provisions of the Act, the plaintiffs cannot base their claim on their extinguished right.
In the result, the learned Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
It is the correctness of the said judgment and decree which is challenged before me in this second appeal. The concurrent findings of the Court
below that the plaintiffs had been in enjoyment and possession of the property for over 100 years and had prescribed title therein are not
challenged before me by the defendant/respondent. The only question which was argued at considerable length is whether the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court is ousted by the provisions of Minor Inams Act 30 of 1963. Learned counsel on both sides argued the question both on general
principles and on the basis of decisions of this court and the Supreme Court. I should place on record my appreciation of the thorough and
exhaustive manner in which learned counsel on both sides argued the matter. Reference was made to all the available decisions laying down the
general principles of law applicable to the question of ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court under any Special enactment in addition to the
decisions under the Minor Inams Act, Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Act 26 of 1948), and Tamil Nadu
Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 26 of 1963.
Though learned counsel were at pains to trace the entire case law on the subject, I do not think it necessary to refer to the whole of it.
Fortunately for me, the task has been made easier by the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga
Samigal Madam, , which in my opinion puts a seal on a major portion of the controversy. It is also my view that the ratio of the said decision
applies to the facts of the present case, and enables me to decide this matter in favour of the plaintiffs.
Before referring to the actual decision of the Supreme Court, it will be necessary to highlight one aspect of the matter viz., the provisions of the
Minor Inams Act are in pari materia with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Estates Abolition Act 26 of 1948 and Tamil Nadu Inam Estates
Abolition Act, 26 of 1963 to as large extent. It has to be remembered that the aforesaid Acts as well as the Tamil Nadu lease-holds (Abolition and
Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 27 of 1963 formed part of series of legislations made in furtherance of the country''s policy of agrarian reforms. The
first effective step in that direction was taken in this State by the enactment of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act 26 of 1948 (hereinafter called ""the Abolition Act"" for the sake of convenience). Under the abolition Act, the intermediaries in the Zamindari
and under-tenure estates and the whole inam villages in which the grant consisted of melvaram alone were abolished and ryotwari settlement was
introduced. The next step was taken 15 years later in 1963 when three acts, the Minor Inams Act 30 of 1963, the Inam Estates Abolition Act 26
of 1963 and the Lease-hold Abolition Act 27 of 1963 were passed. The object of the three enactments was the introduction of ryotwari settlement
in respect of lands held under certain inams and lease-hold tenures under the Government which were left out in the Abolition Act. The pattern of
legislation in the matter of abolition and conversion and providing for a ryotwari settlement was almost the same as in the Abolition Act and a
departure was made whenever necessitated by reasons of the difference in tenures.
Most of the decisions of this Court dealing with the question of ouster of Civil Court''s jurisdiction, proceeded on the footing that the provisions
of Minor Inams Act were analogous with those of the Abolition Act and the ratio of the decisions rendered under the Abolition Act would apply to
cases arising under the Minor Inams Act. The decision of a Division Bench of this Court referred to by the trial court in its Judgment viz. State of
Madras represented by the The State of Madras Vs. Kasthuri Ammal and Others, lays down that what applies the house sites in Gramanatham in
estates taken over under Act 26 of 1948 should mutatis mutandis apply to minor inams taken over under Act 30 of 1963. In that case, the Division
Bench applied the ratio of the earlier decisions of this Court in cases which arose under the Abolition Act 26 of 1948. Similarly Mohan, J. in
Sornathammal v. Ramachandran and other 1975 T.L.N.J. 151, arising under Minor Inams Act applied the reasoning of the decision in T. M.
Laksminarayana Ayyar and Others Vs. Nallachi Ammal and Others, , which was a case under Act 26 of 1948. Another instance following a
decision under the Abolition Act in a case arising under the Minor Inams Act is found in Jumma mosque, Salavakkam v. Sulaiman Sheriff 1978 2
M.L.J. 99, wherein Sethuraman, J. applied the reasoning in a decision of his own in Rajasekaran and Others Vs. Elumalai Goundan and Others, .
In Rangabashyam Naidu v. V. Premkumari and others 1981 2 M.L.J. 232, which was a case under Minor Inams Act, Suryamurthy, J. followed
the decision in T.M. Lakshminarayana Ayyar v. Nallachi Ammal 87 L.W. 276= 1974 1-M.L.J. 24, and agreed with that of Mohan, J. in
Sornathammal v. Ramachandran 1975 T.L.N.J. 151.
But, a different note was struck by Varadarajan, J. in The Madras State Wakf Board v. Vellayan Chettiar 1975 T.L.N.J. 151 and in The
Madras State Wakf Board Vs. Vellayan Chettiar and Others, . In the former case, the learned Judge observed that the decision rendered under
the provisions of Act 26 of 1948 would not apply to cases governed by Minor Inams Act 30 of 1963 and that the decisions of the Tribunal and
Special Appellate Tribunal under Act 30 of 1963 could not be questioned in any court of law in view of S. 46 of the Act. The same view as
reiterated by him in the latter case, viz., Chinnappa Gounder v. S. Seshadri AIR 1981 Mad. 8. The learned Judge held that whenever the question
of title to the property is sought to be raised in civil suits for possession it is open to the defendants to contend that the question cannot be gone into
by the civil Court having regard to the provisions contained in Act 30 of 1963.
Though the decision of Varadarajan, J. in Chinnappa Gounder v. S. Seshadri AIR 1981 Mad. 8 was referred to with approval by a Division
Bench of this Court in Subramania Gurukkal and others v. Arulmighu Thirumaleswaraswami Deity, rep. by the Executive Officer & another 97
L.W. 243, the Bench proceeded on the footing that the provisions of the Abolition Act and the Minor Inams Act were in pari materia. The Bench
did not take note of the distinction sought to be made by Varadarajan, J. between the provisions of the Abolition Act and those of the Minor
Inams Act. However, the Bench held that the decision of the authorities under the Act in a proceeding for grant of patta would conclude the
question of title and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction thereafter to consider the same. While taking that view, the Division Bench referred to an
earlier decision of another Division Bench of this Court in Second Appeal No. 904 and 1250 of 1978 Udaiyappan and another v. Karuppan and
others 1982 T.L.N.J. 490 and expressly dissented therefrom. It will be useful to extract the following relevant observations of the later Division
Bench at this stage:-
The provisions of Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963), are analogous to
those in the Abolition Act and the language used in S.11 relating to the determination of the person who is entitled to ryotwari patta is very similar
to the one in S.15 of the Abolition Act. There could, therefore, be no doubt that the finality attached under S.46, would cover not only the
determination of the nature of the land but also the determination of the person entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of that land. These two matters
being questions to be determined for the purpose of the Act and are matters falling within the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer and the
Appellate Tribunal under S.11 they shall also be binding on the parties and persons claiming under them in any suit or proceeding in a civil court
under S.43.
The learned counsel for the seventh claimant temple brought to our notice the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Second Appeals
Nos. 904 and 1250 of 1978 dated 22nd October, 1982. In that case, the second appeal originally came up before a learned Single Judge who
referred the following questions for determination by a Division Bench.
Whether the grant of patta under the Estates Abolition Act is conclusive on the question of title; in other words, whether the civil courts are barred
from deciding the dispute relating to rival claims?
The answer given by the Bench was that a determination as to who is entitled to patta will not bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to decide the
question of title and in the words of the Division Bench for the following reasons.
Act 26 of 1948 is primarily intended to determine the class of land whether the land is ryoti or non-ryoti;
The question of title is only incidental in the proceedings for the grant of patta and such a decision cannot be said to be final amongst contesting
claimants.
The patta issued under S.11 of the Act is only a Bill of Revenue and one piece of evidence of title and the same cannot be said to be conclusive
in the matter of ownership.
The purpose of enquiry under the Act is only to effect a settlement, viz. to decide the assessment in respect of the land and ensure the payment
of such assessment to the State.
There is no provision under the Act to decide the disputes as to title between the two rival claimants.
S.64-C only states that the orders passed in respect of matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act shall not be questioned in any could
of law and nowhere in the Act it is stated that the institution of civil suits to decide the question of title in respect of properties dealt with under the
provisions of the Act is prohibited and exclusion of civil courts jurisdiction can be inferred only, if S.64 creates a hierarchy of authorities to finally
decide the dispute.
We have no quarrel with the first reasoning. We are unable to agree with the second, third and the fourth reasonings. It has been held in a
number of Bench decisions and the decision of Ismail, J. (as he then was) in Narayanaswami Velalar v. Rangaswamy Konar and others 86 L.W.
276, and that of Varadarajan, J. (as he then was) in P.A. Shukur v. K.S. Sundara Mudaliar and another ILR 1976 Mad. 366, and Chinnappa
Gounder v. Seshadri Iyengar AIR 1981 Mad. 8, that the determination of title is neither incidental to the effecting of ryotwari Settlement nor
incidental to the proceedings for the grant of patta and that the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the authorities was to decide the ""entitlement"" or the
right of a person to a ryotwari patta, and that the grant of ryotwari patta is merely a consequential act following the determination of the right of the
person to obtain the patta in respect of a particular land. In fact it is more or less in the nature of a decree following the judgment, and the decision
that is contemplated by S.15 is a judgment. The very reasoning found in the third and the fourth grounds above referred to was specifically
mentioned and rejected. We are also unable to agree that there is no provision under the Act to decide the disputes as to title between two rival
claimants or to the scope of S.64-C of the Abolition Act. In fact, this point in our view is covered by the decisions of the Supreme Court in
Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, and Oduru Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, . The
Division Bench of this Court distinguished these two cases on the ground that they related to cases under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh
Estates Abolition Act in which S. 56 is still in the statute book and that the two decisions cannot apply to a case relating to S.64-C of the Tamil
Nadu Abolition Act. It is true that provisions similar to S.56 of the Tamil Nadu Abolition Act which was omitted later was there in the statute book
in Andhra Pradesh (Andhra area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and the decisions specifically refer to S.56. However, we
have no doubt that the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court is much wider and could not be restricted as a decision rendered under S.56
alone.
In Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, after tracing the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates
(Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:--
Now, the Act broadly confers on every tenant in an estate the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti lands which were included or
ought to have been included in his holding before the notified date and on the landholder the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of lands
which belonged to him before the notified date as his private lands. The Act mikes express provision for the determination of claims of a landholder
for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of his alleged private lands, surely, is an Act aimed at the abolition of intermediaries and the introduction of
ryotwari settlement, there must be a provision for the determination of the claims of ryots for the grant of ryotwari patta.
Then the learned Judge referred to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cherukuru Muthayya Vs. Gadde
Gopalakrishnayya and Others, , wherein it was held that S. 56(1) (a) was intended for the determination as to who the lawful ryot was only for a
limited purpose of fastening the liability to pay arrears of rent which had accrued before a notified date and for no other purpose. Holding that the
approach of the Full Bench was wrong, the Supreme Court observed as follows:--
The anomaly is that while express provision is found in S.15 of the Act for the adjudication of claims by landholders for the grant of ryotwari
pattas, there is, if the Full Bench is correct, no provision for the adjudication of claims by ryots for the grant of ryotwari pattas. It would indeed be
anomalous and ludicrous and reduce the Act to an oddity, if the Act avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari pattas on ryots and
the abolition of intermediaries is to be held not to contain any provision for the determination of the vital question as to who was the lawful ryot of a
holding. The object of the Act is to protect ryots and not to leave them in the wilderness.
This forcible observation of the Supreme Court could not be restricted as merely referring to the provisions of S.56. It could not have been the
intention of the Legislature when omitting S.56 from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Abolition Act that they wanted to leave the ryots in
wilderness. Having regard to the object and purposes of the Abolition Act, there could be no doubt that the Assistant Settlement Officer has
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the claims of ryots for the grant of ryotwari patta. Such an adjudication being essential for the purposes of the Act
would be covered by S.64-C. The decision in Oduru Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, , followed the
decision in Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another,
In fact, as observed in Sanjeevi Naicker v. Shanmuga Udayar 78 L.W. 390, the decisions of this Court had taken the view that both before
and after the repeal of S.56, the issue of patta would not take away the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to adjudicate upon competing titles to lands.
Different reasonings have been given in different decisions and it is not necessary for us to trace all those judgments, as, in our view, the decision of
Varadarajan, J. (as he then was) in P.A. Shukur v. K.S. Sundara Mudaliar and another ILR 1976 Mad. 366, and Chinnappa Gounder and others
v. Seshadri Iyengar and another AIR 1981 Mad. 8, the decision of Ismail, J. (as he then was) in Narayanaswami v. Rangaswami 86 L.W. 276,
and the decision in Arulandu Udayar v. Palaniappa Ambalam 95 L.W. 134= 1982-1 M.L.J. 257, have referred to all the decisions and held that
the decisions as to the nature of the land and the person entitled to patta under S.11 or a similar finding that it is a ryoti land and not a private land
are final and not liable to be questioned in a civil court and those judgments, in our view, are consistent with the ratio of the two decisions of the
Supreme Court above referred to. Since we are of the view that the Supreme Court decisions clearly cover this question, we are unable to agree
with the reasoning and the judgment of the learned Judges of the Division Bench.
It has to be noted that the later Division Bench did not refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Madras v.
Ramalingaswamigal Madam 1969 II M.L.J. 281, which was relied upon by the Division Bench which decided the Second Appeal Nos. 904 and
1250 of 1978. At the time when second appeal Nos. 904 and 1250 of 1978 were disposed of and when the case in Subramania Gurukkal and
others v. Arulmighu Thirumaleswaraswamy Deitye 97 L.W. 243, was decided by the later Division Bench, Civil Appeals against the decisions of
this Court in State of Madras v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam 1969 II M.L.J. 281, K.L.M. Ramamoorthy and others v. State of Madras ILR
1970 2 Mad. 788, were pending in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the said Civil Appeals by its judgment dated 1-5-1985
confirming the decisions of this Court. The Supreme Court has held that the Civil Court''s jurisdiction to adjudicate on the real nature of the land is
not ousted under S.64-C by reason of the Settlement Officer''s decision to grant or refuse to grant a patta under S.11 read with the proviso to S.3
(d) of the Abolition Act 26 of 1948. While referring to the general principles of law regarding ouster of civil Court''s jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court relied upon the proposition laid down by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Dhulabhai and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, After
referring to the relevant provisions of the Abolition Act, the Supreme Court held that the said Act is intended to serve the revenue purposes of the
Government, by way of securing to the Government its sovereign right to collect all the revenues from all the lands and to facilitate the recovery
thereof by the Government and in that process, if necessary, to deal with claims of occupants of lands, nature of the lands, etc., only incidentally in
a summary manner and that too identifying and registering persons in the revenue records from whom such recovery of revenue is to be made. It
was observed that ""the object of granting a ryotwari patta is also to enable holder thereof to cultivate the land specified therein directly under the
Government on payment to it of such assessment or case that may be lawfully imposed on the land."" Referring TO the expression ""for the purposes
of this Act"" found in S.64-C, the Supreme Court observed that the same has been designedly used in the section to make it clear that any order
passed by the Settlement Officer either granting or refusing to grant a ryotwari patta to a ryot under S.11 of the Act must be regarded as having
been passed to achieve the purposes of the Act, namely, revenue purposes, that is to say for fastening the liability on him to pay the assessment or
other dues and to facilitate the recovery of such revenue from him by the Government. It was therefore held that any decision impliedly rendered
on the aspect of nature or character of the land on that occasion will have to be regarded as incidental to and merely for the purpose of passing the
order of granting or refusing to grant the patta and for no other purpose. The Supreme Court placed reliance also on the fact that the Settlement
Officer had no power to do what Civil Court would normally do in a suit and it is, therefore, difficult to imply ouster of Civil Court''s jurisdiction
simply because finality has been accorded to the Settlement Officer''s order under S.64-C of the Act.
The Supreme Court proceeded to explain its two earlier decisions in Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, , and Oduru
Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, , that they were based upon the provisions contained in S. 56 of the
Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 26 of 1948. They pointed out that S.56 of the Madras Act
having been repealed, in 1958, there is no machinery available under the Madras Act to have a determination of a dispute between two rival
claimants regarding their title as to who would be entitled to the patta and S.11 does not contain machinery for deciding disputed questions of title.
The Supreme Court expressly held that the ratio of the two decisions viz. Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, , and Oduru
Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, , was inapplicable to the issue raised in the appeals before them under
consideration.
It is already seen that the Division Bench which decided Subramania Gurukkal v. Arulmighu Thirumaleswaraswamy Deity 97 L.W. 243 placed
reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, , and Oduru Chenchulakshmamma
and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, , taking the view that the removal of S. 56 from the Provisions of the Madras Abolition Act did
not make any difference. Now that it is made clear by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, that the
decisions in Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, , and Oduru Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya
Reddy, , will not apply to cases under the Madras Act, the basis of the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in Subramania Gurukkal v.
Arulmigu Thirumaleswaraswamy Deity 97 L.W. 243, knocked off. Consequently, the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench in Second Appeal
Nos. 904 and 1250 of 1978 has to be taken as upheld by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, .
I have already referred to the fact that the distinction sought to be made by Varadarajan, J. in Chinnappa Gounder v. S. Sashadri AIR 1981
Mad. 8, was impliedly disapproved by the Division Bench in Subramania Gurukkal v. Arulmigu Thirumaleswaraswamy Deity 97 L.W. 243, when
they proceeded on the footing that the abolition Act and the Minor Inams Act were analogous to each other. Hence, the ratio of the Division
Bench in Udaiyappan and another v. Karuppan and others 1982 T.L.N.J. 490, will apply to cases arising under Minor Inams Act. It has to be
held that the finality conferred by S.46 of the Minor Inams Act on the orders passed by the authorities constituted under the Act will not oust the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide questions of title. S.46 of the Minor Inams Act which deals with res judicata corresponds to S.64-A of the
Abolition Act. S.3(d) of the Minor Inams Act contains the same language as S.3(d) of the Abolition Act. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme
Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam AIR 1986 S.C. 794, will apply to cases arising under Minor Inams Act.
I have to refer at this stage to the fact that this second appeal was originally directed to be posted before a Full Bench in view of the conflict
between the two Division Bench judgments referred to above. After the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga
Samigal Madam, , was reported, the matter was placed before the first Bench for orders as to the necessity of the matter being considered by a
Full Bench. The first Bench, to which I was a party, passed an order on 2-12-1986 directing the matter to be posted before a single Judge for
disposal. The following observations made by the Bench in the said order may be usefully referred to:�
Normally, a Full Bench could have been constituted to hear this appeal to decide which of the two views is correct. However, the decision of this
Court in Ramalinga Swamigal Madam v. State of Tamil Nadu 1969-II M.L.J. 281, which was followed by the Bench of Ramanujam and
Sengottuvelan, JJ. became the subject matter of an appeal before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 474 with No. 1633 of 1971 which came
to be decided on 1-5-1935 and it is reported in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, . The Supreme Court expressly affirmed the
view of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, and held that the Civil Court''s jurisdiction to adjudicate on the real
nature of the land is not ousted under S. 64-C of the Act by reason of the Settlement Officer''s decision to grant or refuse to grant a patta under
S.11 read with the proviso to S.3(d) of the Act. The other decision of this Court from which an appeal was taken was in Ramamurthy and others
v. State of Madras ILR 1970 2 Mad. 788. That is a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court, Natesan, J. in which the learned Judge held
that the patta granted under Ss. 11 to 14 of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948 was nothing more than a bill and did not itself confer title. This decision
was also confirmed by the Supreme Court in the same decision in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, . In paragraph 15 of the
judgment the Supreme Court referred to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another,
and in Oduru Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, which were distinguished by Ramanujam and Sengottuvelan
JJ. and held that the two decisions were distinguishable. The contention raised before the Supreme Court on the basis of these two decisions was
that the Civil Court''s jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the land should be held to have been excluded under S. 64-C of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948
which also accorded finality to the Settlement Officer''s order refusing to grant ryotwari patta to a ryot under S.11 of the Act on the ground that the
land in question is not ryoti land. This contention was rejected with the following observation:
It is not possible to accept this contention for the two decisions are clearly distinguishable. In the first place S.56 with which the Court was
concerned in those cases does not contain the words for the purposes of Act which occur in S.64-C; and presumably in view of the absence of
those words in the section this Court in Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, observed that there was no warrant for taking
the view that the settlement officer''s decision, under S. 56 (1)(c) on the question as to who was the lawful ryot of the holding was only for the
purpose of identifying the person liable to pay the arrear of rent. Secondly under S.56(1)(c) the Settlement Officer is expressly required to make
an inquiry into and decide the question as to who is a lawful ryot of the holding between two rival claimants whereas as stated earlier there is no
express provision directing an inquiry into the question of the real nature or character of the land while considering a ryot''s application for a patta
under S.11 read with the proviso to S.3(d). In other words, the two provisions are dissimilar. Moreover, it may be pointed out that so far as the
Madras Act is concerned by Madras Act 34 of 1958, S. 56 itself has been repealed with effect from 27th December 1958 and S.9(2) of the
repealing Act (No. 34 of 1958) has gone on to provide that all proceedings pending before true Settlement Officer or Tribunal under that section
shall abate. As a result of such repeal the Madras High Court in two decisions, Krishnaswami Thaver''s case 1961 1 Mad. L.J. 168, and A.R.
Sanjeevi Naicker''s case 1965 2 Mad. L.J. 204, has held that now there is no machinery available under the Madras Act to have a determination
of the dispute between two rival claimants regarding their title a to who would be entitled to the patta and S.11 does not contain machinery for
deciding disputed questions of title. Whatever be the position in regard to dispute concerning rival claims or titles, the ratio of the two decisions of
this court in which counsel placed reliance is inapplicable to the issue raised in these appeals for our determination. (underlining is ours).
The effect of the decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, is that the two decisions Maddada Chayanna Vs. Karnam Narayana and Another, and
Oduru Chenchulakshmamma and Another Vs. Duvvuru Subrahmanya Reddy, , on the basis of which the later Division Bench consisting of V.
Ramaswami and V. Ratnam, JJ. took their view have been held to be inapplicable to a case under the Madras Act 26 of 1948, and further the
view of Ramanujam and Sengottuvelan, JJ. who had followed the earlier view of the Division Bench in The State of Madras v. Ramalinga
Swamigal Madam 1969 II M.L.J. 281 stands confirmed. The later decision of V. Ramaswami and V. Ratnam, JJ. in Subramania Gurukkal v.
Arulmighu Thirumaleswara Deity 97 L.W. 243 cannot therefore be considered now to be good law at all and it is, therefore, not necessary to
constitute any Full Bench to decide any conflict because the conflict now stands resolved by the latest decision of the Supreme Court in State of
Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, .
We have already pointed out that, so far as the judgment of Ramanujam and Sengottuvelan, JJ. is concerned, that now stands confirmed. If the
contention of Mr. Kumar is that notwithstanding that judgment there are some observations of the Supreme Court which support the view that the
Civil Court has no jurisdiction, he will beat liberty to agitate that question.
In view of the liberty given by the First Bench as aforesaid, Mr. Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent urged that the present case will not
be governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, According to learned counsel, the
Supreme Court considered only a claim which could fall under S. 11 of the Abolition Act and held that by the finality attached by S.64-C of the
said Act, the orders under S.11 could not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Learned Counsel submitted that the Supreme Court has expressly
left open the question relating to the finality of orders passed under S.12 to 15 of the Abolition Act. He relies upon the following observations in
paragraph 13 of the Judgment of the Supreme Court.
...Since a full-fledged inquiry on the nature and character of land is provided for under S. 15 in the case of an application by a landholder the
character of the Settlement Officer''s decision on such issue may be different but that question is not before us.
Learned counsel submits further that the provisions of Ss.8 and 11 of the Minor Inams Act are analogous to the provisions of Ss. 12 to 15 of
the Abolition Act and if an order passed under S. 15 of the Abolition Act is final, capable of excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the order
under S.11 of the Minor Inams Act should also have a similar effect. This contention of learned counsel is based on the fact that the Minor Inams
Act provides for determination of the claims by a machinery consisting of a hierarchy of authorities just like the Abolition Act with reference to
claims under Ss.12 to 14 of that Act.
I am unable to agree with that contention and here are my reasons:- There is a basic difference between the provisions of S. 15 of the
Abolition Act and S.11 of the Minor Inams Act. Under the former, the Settlement Officer has to examine the nature and history of the lands in
dispute and decide the character thereof. It is the jurisdiction to enquire into and ascertain the character of the land in claims made under S.12 to
S.14 of the Abolition Act which has been excluded from the purview of the Civil Courts. But, under S.11 of the Minor Inams Act, there is no
question of deciding the character of the land as such. If the land is notified as minor inam and in the classification is to be challenged, it has to be
made before the Tribunal constituted under Tamil Nadu Inams (Supplementary), Act 31 of 1963. Hence, the scope and nature of a dispute under
Ss. 12 to 14 of the Abolition Act are entirely different from that of S.8 Minor Inams Act. Just because a machinery is provided under the Act to
decide certain matters, it does not mean that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the question of title to the land is excluded. The decision
by the authorities under the Act is only ""for the purposes of the Act"". In such cases, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a
liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be
determined by the Tribunals so constituted and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Court are prescribed by the statute or
not. There is no doubt that the remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are riot prescribed by Minor Inams Act. Nor can it be
said that the Act creates a special right in favour of any particular person. On the other hand, a reading of the provisions of the Act makes it clear
that there is a recognition of the pre-existing rights. The proviso to S.3(d) of the Minor Inams Act protects the possession of any person who is
considered prima facie to be entitled to a ryotwari patta under the Act pending the decision of the appropriate authority. If the Act is to be
construed as one wiping out all the pre-existing rights and starting with a clean state, there would have been no necessity for the inclusion of the
aforesaid proviso. Again, S.8(1) of the Minor Inams Act declares that every person who will be lawfully entitled to the kudivaram in an inam land
immediately before the appointed day, shall be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of that land. The exception thereto is provided in S.8(2). The
provisions of S.11 of the Abolition Act. In all cases which are not covered by S.8(2) of the Minor Inams Act, the Settlement Officer will have to
decide the question as to who is lawfully entitled to the kudivaram immediately before the appointed day. This necessarily involves a recognition of
a pre-existing right.
While dealing with the question whether the Abolition Act created new rights, Natesan, J. in K.L.M. Ramamurthy v. State of Madras ILR
1970-2 Mad. 788, said thus:--
..It is clear from a reading of S. 11 to 14 that it is in recognition of the rights of a ryot in ryoti land that ryotwari patta is granted to him; there is no
extinguishment of such rights with the notification of the estate. The idea behind the Act so far as a ryoti holding is concerned, is to affirm the
holding to the ryot on a more permanent basis under the ryotwari system. The ryot, the holder of Kudiwaram interest in an estate as defined in the
Estates Land Act 1908, has only permanent right of occupancy. It is certainly a very valuable legal right. His position might have been equated to
that of a co-owner; but it is not the same thing as proprietorship. It is a right resembling emphyteusis in Roman law, the right of a person who is not
the owner of a piece of land but uses it as his own in perpetuity subject to forfeiture of the same on non-payment of the fixed rent and on certain
other contingencies. The ryotwari settlement made on the abolition of estates completely changes the position of a ryot in relation to his holding.
Under S.11 of the Act, every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the notified dale, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of his ryoti
land. As a result of the Abolition Act, a cultivator having only occupancy right in law is raised to the stature of proprietor of the land, subject to the
prerogative of the State to impose assessment on the land varying from time to time. Under the Ryotwari system, the Government does not purport
to grant any title deed to the proprietor or holder of the land. But what is granted is only a patta which, as has been repeatedly pointed out in
decisions, is not a title deed not only a bill or documentary evidence of the fiscal arrangement between the ryotwari proprietor and the
Government. The pattadar, that is, the person registered as the owner of a ryotwari holding, is, as regards the Government, the responsible
proprietor of the ryotwari land registered in his name in the Land Register of the District. As pointed out in Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal
Konar 1961-I M.L.J. 168, the patta granted under S.11 to 14 also is nothing more than a bill and does not itself confer any title. Of course, with
the abolition of the estate, ryoti lands undergo a statutory change but that is as regards their tenure. They become ryotwari entitling the holder to a
ryotwari patta. To use the convenient expression, they become ryot''s freehold property.
The appeal against the said decision was also heard along with the Civil Appeal in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, , and
was dismissed. It is no doubt true that there are some observations in the judgment of the Supreme Court that the Abolition Act could be said to
be creating new rights in favour of landholder and ryot, but the question was not decided finally in that case. However, the Supreme Court did not
disapprove the reasoning of Natesan, J. in the judgment which was under appeal before it. While I respectfully agree with the reasoning of
Natesan, J., I hold that the same will apply to the provisions of the Minor Inams Act.
Under S.8(2) of the Minor Inams Act, the only question to be considered is whether the original grant was of an iruvaram minor inam for the
support or maintenance of a religious institution or for the performance of a charity or service connected therewith or of any other religious charity.
If the land in such iruvaram minor inam had been transferred by way of sale, the provisions of clause (i) of sub-S.(2) would apply, and in other
cases, clause (ii) would apply. There is no scope for enquiry by the Settlement Officer with reference to the rights of a person in occupation vis-a-
vis the lands covered by sub-S.(2) of S.8 as on the date of the notification. Nor is there any provision for deciding any dispute between two rival
claimants who claim to be the inamdars or two rival claimants who claim to be lawfully entitled to kudivaram on the date of the notification. In so
far as the lands covered by S.8(2) are concerned, the authorities under the Act are only to apply the formula prescribed under the sub-section and
issue ryotwari patta. It is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Kumar that all the rights of persons in occupation of minor inam lands as on
the date of the notification stood wiped out and the legislature intended only to create fresh rights. If that is so, the language of S.8(1) of the Minor
Inams Act would be different and the proviso to S.3(d) would be absent.
When a specific question was put to the learned counsel for the respondents whether there is a provision in the Act for deciding disputes inter
se between two persons claiming as inamdars or two persons claiming as kudivaramdars, or two persons claiming as kudivaramdars, the learned
counsel could not answer the same in the affirmative. There is no section in the Minor Inams Act similar to S.56 of the Andhra Pradesh Estates
Abolition Act. According to Mr. Kumar, this case is one between an inamdar on the one hand and a person who claims to be a kudivaramdar on
the other and, therefore, the decision of the authorities under the Act will be final and conclusive. The machinery provided under the Act for
deciding the claims for ryotwari patta is a common one. There is no separate machinery for deciding the claims under S.8(1) of the Act and a
different machinery for deciding claims under S.8(2). Once it is found that a dispute between two persons claiming as rival Kudivaramdars cannot
be finally decided by the authorities under the Act, it has to follow that any decision of such authorities cannot conclude the matter and exclude the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It is not possible to hold that while a decision of a claim under S.8(2) of the Act will exclude the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court, a decision of a claim under S.8(1) of the Act will not have that effect.
According to Mr. Kumar, several sections of the Act relating to determination and payment of compensation would become otiose if the patta
issued under the Act is to be construed as a mere bill enabling the Government to collect kist or tax from the pattadar. Reference is also made to
S.50 of the Minor Inams Act wherein, the Authorised Officer appointed under Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Act of 1961
shall exclude minor inam land while fixing the ceiling area of any person until the grant of ryotwari patta under the Minor Inams Act. Sub-section
(2) of S.50 provides for calculation and recalculation of the ceiling area of any person based upon the grant of ryotwari patta under the Minor
Inams Act. I do not find any substance in this argument. If a Civil Court holds that the person to whom patta is granted under the Act is not entitled
to the land, the Revenue Authorities have to take note of the same and amend the registers accordingly. It is only the person who succeeds before
the Civil Court who will be entitled to get patta from the Government. The various provisions in the Act which are consequential to the grant of
patta under the Act, will also apply to such cases. In my view, the ratio of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal
Madam, will apply to cases arising under the Minor Inams Act. I hold that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the question of title is not
ousted by the provisions of the Minor Inams Act. Consequently, the judgment of the learned District Judge, Tirunelveli, has to be set aside. The
Second Appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli in O.S. No. 221 of 1974 are restored. The
plaintiffs will have their costs throughout.