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Judgment
J. Kanakaraj, J.—This Special Tribunal Appeal has had a chequered career. The appeal also illustrates the different between the
proceedings under the Inam Abolition Act and proceedings before the civil court. We will first set out the facts before we refer to the question of
law relating to the precedence to be given to the judgment of civil court over the judgment of the Revenue court, according to the circumstances of
the case.
Town Survey Nos. 1756, 1757, 1758 and 1760 in ward No. 2, Kancheepuram Town originally comprised in T.D. No 1152 were inam lands.
The inam character of the lands stood abolished with effect from 15.2.1965, by virtue of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams Abolition Act XXX of
1963 (hereinafter referred to as the ""Act""). The settlement Tahsildar took up suo motu enquiry in his proceedings S.R.2880/A.C.T./K.P.M., dated
13.6.1968 granted ground rent patta u/s 13(1) of the said Act 30 of 1963 in favour of several persons. In respect of T.S.No. 1758/ 2 with which
we are concerned, he gave patta in favour of the Kancheepuram Co-operative Society, Kancheepuram. As against this grant of patta to the
society in respect of T.S.No. 1758/2, only the appellant before us namely Jothimani filed an appeal before the tribunal in C.M.A.No. 21 of 1969.
No doubt, the respondents got themselves impleaded in the above appeal, as per orders in I.A.No. 136 of 1969 dated 1.2.1973. At this juncture,
one important turn of event relates to the filing of the suit by the appellant in the District Munsif''s Court, Kancheepuram in O.S.No. 823 of 1968
seeking a declaration of title to the very same property and for an injunction against the respondent herein. The suit was decreed on 13.4.1971. An
appeal against the said decree was allowed in A.S.No. 98 of 1971 on 30.8.1973. A further appeal to this Court in S.A.No. 81 of 1974 was again
allowed on 3.9.1976 subject to certain conditions. The High Court upheld the order of the District Munsif relating to the title, but made it subject
to the proceedings under Act 30 of 1963. In other words, if either party was in a position to get patta under Act 30 of 1963, he was to be
declared as the owner of the property. It is under these circumstances that C.M.A.No. 21 of 1969 came for final disposal and the tribunal by an
order dated 30.11.1976 remanded, back to the Assistant Settlement Officer. It is seen that the order of remand was passed at the request of both
the parties. Thereafter, a series of proceedings which do not have any relevance to the case, happened. But all the same, we will advert to the facts
seriatim. By an order dated 12.5.1978, the Assistant Settlement Officer, on remand, granted patta in favour of the respondent. On revision, the
settlement officer again remanded the case back to the Assistant Settlement Officer. Again the Assistant Settlement Officer granted patta to the
respondent on 17.4.1979. Again the appellant herein filed a revision petition and succeeded and the matter was remanded to the Assistant
Settlement Officer. It is on such a remand that the present order, which is the subject-matter of the S.T. Appeal came to be passed on 9.8.1982.
In and by this proceedings, The Assistant Settlement Officer granted patta in favour of the respondent. The appellant promptly filed an appeal to
the tribunal in C.M.A.No. 86 of 1982 and the appeal came to be dismissed on 30.4.1983. Against the said order in C.M.A.No. 86 of 1982, the
present S.T.A. came to be filed and it so happens that a Division Bench of this Court on 10.8.1988 allowed the appeal on the short ground that
the appellant had succeeded in S.A.No. 81 of 1974. The Division Bench then purported to follow the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of
Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, with State of Tamil Nadu v. K.L.M. Ramamurthy and Ors., and held that the decree of the civil court
was conclusive. Therefore, the Division Bench held that the appellant was entitled to patta. In doing so, with great respect, the Division Bench did
not consider the conditions under which the Second Appeal No. 81 of 1974 was allowed. The condition was that if in the proceedings under Act
30 of 1963 one of either of the parties were able to get patta, such party alone should be declared as owner of the property. It is for this reason
that we had allowed the review application and we have re-opened the matter and heard the S.T. Appeal at length.
With a view to render justice to both the parties, we looked into all the various proceedings we find that the judgment of the Civil Court in
O.S.No. 823 of 1963 which came to be rendered on 13.4.1971 is an important piece of document which the revenue authorities should have
taken note of. As already stated, we are concerned with the correctness of the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated 9.8.1982 as
confirmed in C.M.A.No. 86 of 1982 dated 30.4.1983. We therefore proceed to find out whether the learned District Munsif had analysed the
evidence in the proper manner and to what extent Was the said judgment binding on the revenue authorities.
Before that, we will deal with the legal questions as to the scope of the civil proceedings in a matter relating to patta proceedings under the Inam
Abolition Act. In a case arising under the madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI of 1948, Ramachandra Iyer, J (as
he then was) has rendered a decision in Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar (1961)1 M.L.J. 168, which holds the field even to-day. The
learned Judge observed as follows:
But if there are rival claims to the title of the land holder himself there would be no power in the settlement officer of the Tribunal to adjudicate as to
who among them would have a preferential right. This is more so in a case u/s 11 where no question of any decision at all can arise. There is no
provision for any adjudication amongst the rival claimants to patta in respect of a particular land. It would therefore follow that the statute having
declared that the erstwhile ryot (that is the ryot lawfully entitled to be in possession of the holding) would be entitled to patta and not having
designated a Tribunal or machinery to decide as to who amongst the several claimants would be entitled to patta, the dispute if and when its rises
will have necessarily to be decided by the civil court.
In T.K. Ramanujam Kavirayar (Died) and five Ors. v. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandora Sannadhi Aergal and Ors. 1987 T.L.N.J. 91, Srinivasan,
J. (as he then was) while dealing with the question of jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the question of title to lands, to which the provisions of
Act 30 of 1963 were applicable, considered a plethora of cases and came to the conclusion as follows:
I hold that the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the question of title is not ousted by the provisions of the minor Inam Act.
In R. Desiga Thathachariar v. Shanmugam Pillai and Anr., S.T.A.No. 108 of 1973 dated 19.12.1974, a Division Bench of this Court observed as
follows:
The matter falls u/s 10. But the point is whether the appellant or the respondent is entitled to ryotwari patta, the character of the land being ryotwari
not disputed. That being so, a suit is the proper remedy. The appeal is dismissed.
Before us, Mr. T.V. Ramanujam, learned senior counsel has also cited the decision in Kuppuswami Nainar Vs. The District Revenue Officer
and Others, . That case arose out of patta proceedings taken under the Revenue Standing Orders. Even so, the observations of the court are
relevant and they are as follows:
No provision is brought to out notice in the standing orders of the Board of Revenue taking away the jurisdiction of the civil court to adjudicate
upon the question of title relating to immovable property. Revenue officers in a patta proceedings may express their views on the question of title,
but such expression of opinion or decision is not conclusive and it is only intended to support their decision for granting patta. Ultimately, it is the
civil court which has to adjudicate the question as to whether the person claiming patta is the title-holder of the land. Even if the revenue authorities
decide the question of title, that will not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the civil court, which has to decide the question without reference to the
decision of the revenue authorities.
But a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in R. Manicka Naicker Ors. Vs. E. Elumalai Naicker, , brings to light the reason behind the line of
decisions which we have already quoted. That case also arose under Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963 and the Apex Court pointed out that the finality
of the orders passed under the Inam Abolition Acts is only for the purposes of the respective acts, and not for any other purpose. Observed the
Supreme Court:
The main object and purpose of the Act is to abolish all the estates of the intermediaries like zamindars, inamdars, jagirdars etc. and to convert all
land holdings in such estates into ryotwari settlements-which operation in revenue parlance, means conversion of alienated lands into non-alienated
lands to deprive the intermediaries of their right go collect all the revenues in respect of such lands and vesting the same back in the Government.
The enactment and its several provisions are thus intended to serve the revenue purpose of the Government by way of securing to the Government
its sovereign right to collect all the revenues from all the lands and to facilitate the recovery thereof by the Government, and in that process, if
necessary, to deal with the claims of occupants of lands, nature of the lands etc. Only incidentally in a summary manner and that too for identifying
and registering persons in the revenue records from whom such recovery of revenue is to be made. The court further observed that even where the
statute has given finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal, the civil court''s jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is
adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in the suit. We need not, however, examine this aspect at any length because of the
nature of the grant which has been made in the present case which expressly preserves the rights of the respondent in respect of the land.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for the recovery of the land which is earlier the subject
matter of the Inam Abolition Act.
With the above background if we now peruse the judgment of the District Munsif, we will be able to understand that the learned District Munsif
has thoroughly examined the case and upheld the title of the appellant for the suit property. The Judgment of the learned District Munsif in O.S.No.
823 of 1968 has to be appreciated along with the plan which was annexed to the decree. The learned District Munsif rightly refers to the disputed
property being ABEF in the said plan, and proceeds to discuss the case, point by point as to how the appellant had established the title. The first
point referred to by the learned District Munsif is the fixing of the western boundary about which there was a dispute between the parties. The next
point relates to Ex.A-5 which is the extract of Town survey Field Register relating to Town S.No. 1758. It is needless to point out that the dispute
between the parties relates to S.No. 1758/72. Ex.B-45 is the extract of the Survey Re-Settlement Register which shows that the old Survey No.
771-C correspondent to the new Town Survey No. 1758. Reference is made to Exs.A-8 and A-9 which are the notices issued by the Land
Acquisition Officer through the appellant herein who was the plaintiff in the suit. What is more, P.W.3 who happened to be one of the relations of
the respondents defendants gave evidence fully supporting the case of the appellant herein. His evidence was to the effect that he had purchased
three sites from Onnah Sah and three sites from Tulasi Sah and one site from Kandamani Chettiar. According to him, all the seven sites that he had
purchased were sold to the appellant herein. On the other hand, the learned District Munsif found that the evidence of the respondent defendants
was not consistent. In the written statement, the respondents had contended that the property was purchased by their grand father orally in or
about 1920. It was also found that Ex.B-3 dated 17.2.1919 which related to the purchase of a portion of the suit property did not at all relate to
the suit property. This was found by the comparison of four boundaries. Lastly, the learned District Munsif has also decided the issue by referring
to door numbers while the respondents had sought to establish their title to door No. 48, by production of tax receipts, the learned District Munsif
found that door No. 48 did not relate to the suit property. It was found that with reference to the property Tax Registers, the door numbers of the
suit property were 50 and 51.
As against the above analytical and clinical precision with which the learned District Munsif had dealt with the matter, the impugned order of the
Assistant Settlement Officer is cursory and superficial. In fact, the hall mark of a judicial decision is such precision in dealing with the documents
which is not always found in the orders of Revenue Authorities. What is more, the settlement officer has wholly relied upon the report of the
Assistant Settlement Officer, Villupuram. This itself shows that the prescribed authority had not exercised his own mind for coming to the
conclusion as to whether one or the other of the parties is entitled to patta. His findings were also superficial because he says that the documents
relied upon by the appellant are not relatable to the suit property based on the report of the Assistant Settlement Officer. Regarding the case of the
respondents, the officer accepts the oral deed and proceeds to say that T.S.No. 1578/72 was in the possession of respondents. Here again this
finding is based only on the report of the Assistant Settlement Officer. While the learned District Munsif had referred to certain building plans
applied for by the appellant, the Settlement Officer says that there was no sufficient evidence to show that there were buildings in the property.
Therefore, the Settlement Officer proceeds to say that on the basis of the possession of the respondents, he was granting patta u/s 13(1) of the
Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963. The order of the tribunal in C.M.A.No. 86 of 1982 is nothing but a repetition of the order of the Assistant Settlement
Officer, and does not stand scrutiny by this Court.
For the sake of completion, we will refer to the report of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Villupuram which has been held to be sacrosanct by
the Assistant Settlement Officer in the impugned order dated 9.8.1982. The said officer is said to have inspected the suit claim T.S.No. 1758/72
and also adjoining lands. He no doubt describes the suit lands and observes that there is no ridge to draw a boundary line in between T.S.Nos.
1758/71 and 1758/72. The entire plots in T.S.Nos. 1758/70, 1758/71 and 1758/72 arose covered with brick compound walls. The northern side
of T.S.No. 1758/72 is kept open towards the lane. The measurements are found to fit in the Town survey sketch. The above observations go in
support of the appellant''s case. Thereafter, the Assistant Settlement Officer has proceeded to discuss the title deeds namely the following sale
deeds:
Sale Deed 1594 of 1963 (R1)
Sale Deed No. 604 of 1925 (R2)
Sale Deed No. 4085 of 1924 (R3)
Sale Deed No. 1427 of 1917 (R4)
Sale Deed No. 2594 of 1963 (R1).
He accepts that the first document which was the document filed before the learned District Munsif as Ex.A.1 correctly fits in with T.S. 1758/71
and 72. He then proceeds to discuss the earlier documents and finds that the 1925 document relates to 66 feet North to south. For the balance of
23 feet which is claimed by the appellant herein the sale deed 4085 of 1924 was relied upon. This document is also discussed by the officer. But,
without any reason he says that the same does not relate to the suit sites. On the other hand, when he comes to the case of the respondent, he
accepts the oral sale and also holds that adverse possession has been proved in the ""court of law"". He refers to only the Judgment in A.S.No. 98
of 1971 which has been subsequently set aside in S.A.No. 81 of 1974. We are unable to see how this report can at all help their respondent,
whereas the question of title has to be decided only by the civil court. The order of the Assistant Settlement Officer cannot have precedence over
the judgment of the learned District Munsif to which we have made elaborate reference.
On the above discussion, what is baffling to us is that when the matter was remanded to the Assistant Settlement Officer, there was already the
judgment of the civil court in O.S.No. 823 of 1968 available for perusal. The Revenue Officers had not cared to even refer to the said judgment
before taking a final decision. On the other hand, the Revenue Authorities seem to have passed final orders with gross disrespect to the findings of
the civil court and even without referring to the civil court judgment. We have absolutely no doubt in our mind mat the orders of the Assistant
Settlement Officer dated 9.8.1982 and the appellate authority order in C.M.A.No. 86 of 1982 dated 30.4.1983 are liable to be set aside. In this
connection we have to make it clear that we have discussed the case threadbare on the basis of the available documents and we have no doubt
that the appellant has proved his title to the property. In fact in S.A.No. 81 of 1974, A. Varadarajan, J., (as he then was) had confirmed the title of
the appellant, but only left it to the final decision of the Revenue Authorities. We have now finally decided the proceedings under Tamil Nadu Act
30 of 1963 in favour of the appellant.
For all the above reasons, the S.T.A. is liable to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The authorities are
directed to issue patta to the appellant u/s 8(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963, because as on date, there is no building on the suit property.