High CourtsDivision Bench

Usman Khan vs Punna Kushwaha

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 26 July 2013 · Citation: (2013) 07 MP CK 0365

HON’BLE JUDGES
B.D. Rathi, J · Ajit Singh, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 372 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 436
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal A. No. 2972 of 2011
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 367 words

B.D. Rathi, J.—Record of the trial Court perused. This appeal has been preferred u/s 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 31/10/11 passed by Sessions Judge, Chhatarpur, in Sessions Trial No. 339/2010, whereby respondent no. 1 has been acquitted of the offence punishable under Sections 436 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short).

2.

Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 20/4/10, complainant Usman Khan lodged a report that on the previous night, while he was asleep, rear portion of his house was set ablaze, due to which he got up and the fire was extinguished by members of the locality. He suspected that Harishchand Kushwaha and Punna Kushwaha were the miscreants as he had a dispute with them two days prior to the date of incident.

3.

Learned Government Advocate has submitted that leave to file appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal, has not been preferred on behalf of the State.

4.

After appreciation of evidence, the trial Court has found that First Information Report (for brevity "FIR") was lodged quite belatedly. Evidence of eye-witnesses Ajit (PW2) and Mahesh (PW5) was not found trustworthy by the trial Court on the ground that the story narrated before the Court by these witnesses was not in conformity with the recitals of the FIR. It was believed by the trial Court that the respondents might have been falsely implicated due to existence of previous enmity between the parties.

5.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

6.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

7.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question. The appeal, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.