The State of Madhya Pradesh vs Jaipal Singh

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This application for grant of leave to appeal has been preferred u/s 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 16/08/2012 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Pawai, District Panna, in Sessions Trial No. 52/2010, whereby respondents have been acquitted of the offence punishable under Sections 327 & 436 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short), but convicted u/s 323 of the IPC and sentenced accordingly.

Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 09/04/2009 at about 8 pm, upon refusal of complainant to give money for consuming liquor, respondents along with co-accused Jeetu Singh Thakur, a juvenile, not only filthily abused him but after dragging him out of his Pan Gumti, beat him with kicks and fists and set fire to the Gumti. On the basis of the said report FIR (Ex. P/1) in respect of crime No. 49/09 for the offences punishable under Sections 294, 323, 327, 435 & 506 Part II read with Section 34 of the IPC was registered and after investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

Learned Government Advocate submitted that the trial Court had not properly appreciated the evidence on record and the judgment of acquittal deserved to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by learned Government Advocate, we have perused the impugned judgment.

Complainant Shivshankar Chaturvedi (PW1) has admitted in his cross-examination that his Gumti was not set on fire by the respondents before him. Prabhashankar Garg (PW2) has also admitted in his cross-examination that when he was on the spot, Gumti was not set on fire by anybody. Other witnesses have also deposed that they had not seen that by whom the Gumti was set on fire. Accordingly, the trial Court found that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the judgment of acquittal in question. The application, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.