Veeramma Hengsu vs The Secretary

B.V. Nagarathna, J.—Petitioner has assailed order dated 11.9.1981 passed in LRT - 253-1, TRI - 4726-77-78 by the Additional Land Tribunal, Kundapur Taluk (Annexure-C)

Briefly stated the facts are that petitioner claiming to be a tenant, had sought grant of occupancy rights in respect of several extents of lands in several survey numbers by filing Form No. 7. By the impugned order dated 11.9.1981, occupancy rights of survey No. 308/5A2 to an extent of 83 cents were granted to the rival tenant, mother of respondent No. 3. In fact, petitioner was granted several extents in several survey numbers by order dated 29.8.1975. The impugned order dated 11.9.1981 was assailed by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 19343/1982 before this Court. On 22.7.1986, this Court transferred the proceeding to the Land Reforms Appellate Authority and the proceeding was numbered as LRA:TT-2891;86 KND. On the abolition of the Appellate Authority, the proceeding had to be retransmitted to this Court by filing a Civil Petition. That has not been done in the instant case. Petitioner being aggrieved by the grant of occupancy rights of the aforesaid survey numbers to the mother of respondent No. 3 is questioning the order dated 11.9.1981.

I have heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned Government Pleader for respondents 1 and 2.

On a query with regard to delay of 33 years in filing the writ petitions assailing the impugned order, learned ''counsel for the petitioner pointed out that petitioner is an illiterate person. Secondly, the possession continues with her and thirdly she was unaware of the fact that on the abolition of the Appellate Authority, Civil Petition had to be filed before this Court seeking transfer of the proceeding to this Court. He therefore pointed out that illiteracy is a sufficient ground for condoning the delay in approaching this Court, which had to be by filing a civil petition within the prescribed date.

I have considered the submission, in light of the material on record. Petitioner had filed an application in Form No. 7 seeking grant of occupancy rights of various extents of lands in several survey numbers including survey No. 308/5A2, measuring 83 cents. The mother of respondent No. 3 had also sought the aforesaid survey number. By the impugned order dated 11.9.1981, mother of respondent No. 3 was granted occupancy rights of the above said survey number. It is stated that being aggrieved by that order, petitioner had filed W.P. No. 19343/1982 before this Court. Therefore, she was aware of the fact that the impugned order was against her and had taken steps to assail it. On constitution of the Appellate Authority, matter was transferred to that authority by this Court on 22.7.1986. However, on the abolition of the Appellate Authority, petitioner did not take steps to file a Civil Petition seeking re-transfer of the proceeding to this court for purpose of prosecuting it as a writ petition. Abolition of the Appellate Authority took place in September 1990 and within 90 days a Civil Petition had to be filed before this Court. Petitioner who was prosecuting the proceeding before this Court by way of writ petition and thereafter before the Appellate Authority did not take steps to file a Civil Petition before this Court. The implication is that she has abandoned the prosecution of the proceeding assailing the impugned order dated 11.9.1981. Nearly 23 years thereafter, petitioner has filed these writ petitions once again assailing order dated 11.9.1981. There is gross delay in filing these writ petitions. Illiteracy cannot be construed as a sufficient cause to condone the delay, particularly when petitioner had already approached this Court in the year 1982. The writ petitions are therefore hit by delay and laches and are liable to be rejected.

A plethora of decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows:-

a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in State of Orissa and Another Vs. Mamata Mohanty, the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches.

b) In the case of Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar and Others, , the Apex Court at para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows;

"53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay."

c) Similarly, the Apex Court in Sawaran Lata etc. Vs. State of Haryana and Others, has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged.

d) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. D.R. Laxmi and Others, , wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

e) Similarly in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, , it has been opined thus:

"The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay."

f) In fact in S.S. Balu and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, , it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time.

The aforesaid decisions are squarely applicable to the present case.

In the result, writ petitions are rejected on the ground of delay and laches.