Vijay Kumar vs State of Punjab

Jai Singh Sekhon, J.

The accusedpetitioners have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashment of the FIR Annexure PI for offences under secs. 420, 467 and 468, Indian Penal Code, Police Station, Kotwali Nabha, inter alia, on the ground that continuance of the Criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Criminal Court as civil litigation between the same parties is already pending regarding the genuineness of the agreement dated 2.8.1988 pertaining to sale of 33 per cent share of Swami Rice Mills by Tek Chand Bansal and Baldev Krishan Bansal in favour of the present accused petitioners.

The brief resume of facts are that an agreement dated 2.8.1988 was allegedly executed by Tek Chand Bansal and Baldev Krishan Bansal Complainants for agreeing to sell 33 per cent share in the Swami Rice Mills for two lacs. Out of it 11/2 lacs is purported to have been paid as earnest money and the remaining amount of Rs. 50,000/ was required to be paid at the time of the registration of the sale deed. The complainants along with the affidavit of Dev Raj, an attesting witness of this agreement had file a written complaint to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patiala, on the basis of which first information report Annexure P1 was recorded for the abovereferred offences.

The accusedPetitioners aver in this petition that they had already filed a suit on 13.6.1989 for a permanent injunction in order to restrain the proposed vendors of this agreement from interfering in the running of the above rice mill and the civil Court had already granted an ad interim injunction in this regard. It is further averred that on. 13.10.89. the present accusedpetitioners had filed a suit for specific performance of the contract contained in the said agreement and that the plaintiffs had already concluded their evidence in that case. Thus, it is maintained that the registration of the first information report on 19.4.1990, on the basis of the application dated 7.10.1989 is a pressure tactic in order to force the accused to with draw the abovereferred suits. It is further averred that the continuance of the civil and criminal proceedings regarding the same dispute would amount to the abuse of the process of the criminal Court especially when the judgment of the civil Court is binding on the criminal court. Mr. R. L. Batta, the learned counsel for the petitioners further elaborated this aspect of the matter, contending that if the civil court finds the agreement to be forged one then under the provisions of section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, complaint can be lodged against the accused by the Court concerned or by the complainant.

The learned counsel for the complainant, on the other hand, contends that where criminal offence as well as civil wrong is constituted by the same set of facts then there is no legal impediment in continuance of the parallel proceedings for the same. It is further maintained that the delay in the institution of the criminal proceedings under section 340 of the Code may prove fatal to the case.

There is no dispute regarding the legal position that both civil as well as criminal proceedings can continue side by side if the same set of facts give rise to cause of action under the civil law as also under the criminal law. There is also no dispute that the judgment of the civil Court between the parties on the same controversy is binding on the criminal court. Admittedly, the decision of the civil Court in the suit for specific performance on the basis of the agreement directly involves the determination of the controversy whether the abovereferred agreement is genuine or forged one. The gravamen of the charge for the offences under sections 420, 467 and 468, Indian Penal Code, on the criminal side is based on the forging of the agreement by the accusedpetitioners. Yet, all the same. quashing of the criminal proceedings for the abovereferred offences is not called for as the accusedpetitioners may decide to withdraw the civil suit at some point of time from the civil Court. Moreover, in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab, 1986(2) Recent Criminal Reports 481(FB) : AIR 987 P&H 19 that the bar to take cognizance under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable to those documents only where the forgery has been committed in connection with such documents after these had been tendered in the Court concerned, there is no jurisdiction in quashing the proceedings at this stage. Although the ratio of the Full Bench decision is under challenge before a larger Bench of this Court in Cr. M. No. 342M of 1985 (The Registrar, High Court v. Madan Lal Sharma), yet all the same, this decision still holds the field and is binding upon this Court. If that is so, then there is no question of the application of the provisions of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the facts and circumstances of this case.

Admittedly, as per the allegations in the first information report, the abovereferred offences are exfacie made out if the agreement is proved to be forged. Thus, the genuineness or forgery of the agreement is a matter of evidence to be gone into by the trial Court.

However, keeping in view that the judgment of the civil Court is binding on the criminal Court regarding the genuineness or forgery of the agreement, it is directed that the final order by the trial Court in the case in hand shall either be passed simultaneously with the civil suit or after the decision of the civil Court in the suit dated 13.10.1989.

For the reasons recorded above, except for abovereferred directions about nonpronouncement of the order by the trial Court, there is no merit in this petition. It is ordered to be dismissed.