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Judgment
5 paragraphs · 885 words-THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter refrred to as ''the Act'') is directed against order dated 12.6.2002, passed by District Forum, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi in Complaint Case No. 1776/1996 entitled Shri Vinod Kumar Nagrath v. Delhi Financial Corporation.
THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, lie in a narrow compass. THE appellant Shri Vinod Kumar Nagrath had filed a complaint before the District Forum under Section 12 of the Act alleging deficiency in service on the part of the respondent. That complaint, filed by the appellant, was dismissed in default by the District Forum vide order dated 18.5.1999. THEreafter, after a lapse of more than 3 years the appellant filed an application for the restoration of the complaint, dismissed in default vide order dated 18.5.1999. THE learned District Forum vide impugned order has dismissed that application, filed by the appellant for the restoration of the complaint. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act.
We have heard the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, a person, aggrieved by an order, made by the District Forum, can prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, proviso to Section 15 of the Act provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the above said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the above said period. The words occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'', though deserves to receive a liberal interpretation, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though, no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case, yet again, as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied.
ADMITTEDLY, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of 30 days, because the order, being impuged in the present proceedings was passed by the learned District Forum on 12.6.2002 and the present appeal has been filed by the appellant on 12.5.2003. No application showing ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the appeal in time in terms of proviso to Section 15 of the Act has been filed by the appellant. Even during the course of arguments, the appellant failed to satisfy us on the point as to what prevented him from approaching the Commission within time, specified by the Statute for filing the appeal. Even if the present appeal filed by the appellant is treated as a revision petition under Section 17(1)(b) of the Act, the same is barred by limitation because the Hon''ble National Commission in a recent decision in case Kerala Consumer Protection Centre v. District Executive Officer reported as II (2002) CPJ 142 (NC)=2002 CTJ 264 (CP)(NCDRC) has held in clear-cut terms that though no period of limitation is provided for filing a revision petition, yet, the revision petition should ordinarily be filed within a period of 90 days failing which the same deserves to be dismissed on the ground of laches. Thus, viewed from all angles, the above mentioned appeal, filed by the appellant, is barred by limitation and deserves to be dismissed on the above ground alone. The present appeal, filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation is also devoid of substance on merits because on a bare perusal of the impugned order, it is apparent that the application, filed by the appellant, for the restoration of the complaint, dismissed vide order dated 18.5.1999 has been dismissed by the learned District Forum vide impugned order mainly on the ground that the same had been filed by the appellant after a lapse of more than 3 years and no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay was given by the appellant. In our opinion, no fault can be found with the above finding of the learned District Forum and the learned District Forum, in the given facts, was fully justified in dismissing that application which was filed after a lapse of more than 3 years on the ground of laches alone.
IN view of the above discussion, the present appeal, filed by the appellant, viewed from all angles, is devoid of substance. The same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
