DARSHAN LAL JAIN vs KOTAK MAHINDRA FINANCE LTD.

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') is directed against order dated 9.1.2003, passed by District Forum, New Delhi in Complaint Case No. OC/654/2001 - entitled Shri Darshan Lal Jain v. Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly, stated, are that the appellant Shri Darshan Lal Jain had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act before the District Forum averring therein that he had booked two vehicles for his ailing wife who was bed ridden and had made payment for the same to the respondent. It was stated that later on he advised the respondent that order for one vehicle may be cancelled and the amount be refunded to him. It was stated that later on again he wrote to the respondent to refund the amount of both the vehicles as his ailing wife, for whom he had booked the vehicles had expired in between. THE grievance of the appellant in the complaint, before the District Forum, in nutshell, was that the respondent had not refunded the amount in question to him despite repeated requests. In the complaint, filed by him before the District Forum, it was prayed that the respondent be directed to refund the amount in question to him along with damages. The learned District Forum vide impugned order has held that the complaint, filed by the appellant, was barred by time and on the above ground has dismissed the complaint, filed by the appellant.

Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act.

WE have heard the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, a person, aggrieved by an order, made by the District Forum, can prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, proviso to Section 15 of the Act provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the above said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the above said period. The words ''sufficient cause'', occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'', though deserves to receive a liberal interpretation, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though, no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case, yet, again, as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied. Admittedly, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of 30 days because the order being impugned in the present proceedings was passed by the learned District Forum on 9.1.2003 and the present appeal has been filed by the appellant on 5.4.2003. Therefore, the question requiring consideration at the very threshold is as to whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time within the meaning of proviso to Section 15 of the Act.

THE appellant, along with the appeal has filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. THE reason for not filing the appeal in time has been stated in the last para of the above said application which reads as under : "That the delay in making this appeal is not at all intentional or deliberative as otherwise it will not in any way harm the interest of the opposite party/respondent as the opposite party never appeared before the District Forum." On a bare perusal of the contents of the above para, it is apparent that the reasons given by the appellant for not filing the appeal in time are no reasons what to say of ''sufficient cause'' within the meaning of proviso to Section 125 of the Act. The appellant has not given any details as to when he received a copy of the impugned order and the circumstances which prevented him from filing the appeal in time. Only a bald statement has been made that the delay in filing the appeal is not at all intentional or deliberate and the same would in no way harm the interest of the respondent. Delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity. Proof of ''sufficient cause'' is a condition precedent for the exercise of such discretion by the Appellate Authority. In our above views, we stand fortified by a decision of the Hon''ble National Commission in case Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, reported as III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-96 ConSUMER-2731 (NS). In the presence of the above facts and the position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words ''sufficient cause'' it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence on the part of the appellant. In our opinion, as a matter of fact, the appellant has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal and, therefore, the present appeal, is hopelessly barred by limitation.

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant besides being barred by limitation is also devoid of substance on merits because as already stated, the complaint, filed by the appellant, has been dismissed by the learned District Forum vide impugned order on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. THE learned District Forum has rightly held that cause of action for filing the complaint had arisen to the appellant finally on 18.5.1998 and as the complaint was not filed within two years from the date of cause of action and there was no application seeking condonation of delay in filing the complaint the learned District Forum was fully justified in passing the impugned order. Thus, viewed from all angles, the present appeal, filed by the appellant is devoid of substance. THE same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.