Waryam Chand Thapa vs State Of J&K And Ors

Iqbal Wani, J

Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C (previously Section 561-A Cr.P.C) is being invoked by the petitioner for quashment of FIR No. 0086/2019 dated 12.06.2019, registered with Police Station, Bishnah.

Record reveals that during the pendency of the instant petition, respondent No. 3 herein came to be impleaded as party respondent on 16.12.2021 upon laying a motion.

The parties are stated to have entered into a compromise and settled their disputes and differences, whereunder the impugned FIR had got registered at the instance of respondent No. 3 against the petitioner and consequently, a compromise deed is placed on record of the instant petition.

In view of the compromise so arrived at between the parties, the petitioner, as also the respondent No. 3 in terms of order dated 08.02.2022 were directed to appear before the Registrar Judicial for recording their statements in support of the deed of compromise. The statements of the petitioner, as also the respondent No. 3 have been recorded on 02.03.2022 by the Registrar Judicial. The same are extracted and reproduced hereunder:-

“Statement of Waryam Chand Thapa: Age (petitioner): 60 years; S/o Harnam Dass R/o Village Badhori Mohra Dera Kartoli, Tehsil Bari Brahmana, District Samba on oath on 02.03.2022:

Stated that I had some dispute over property with my sons. Consequently, one of my daughter in law-Meenakshi (respondent No.3) lodged an FIR bearing no. 0086 of 2019 dated 08.06.2019 under section 354 A RPC at Police Station Bishnah, Jammu against me . Now, with the intervention of senior members of the society and family, I have entered into a compromise with respondent no.3 vide compromise deed executed on 18.10.2021. In terms of the said compromise deed, I have amicably settled my disputes/clarified misunderstanding with respondent No.3. ln view of our compromise, I pray before the Hon'ble Court to quash the FIR No.0086 of 2019 dated 12.06.2019 registered at Police Station, Bishnah, Janmu.

Statement of Meenakshi (respondent No. 3): Age 31 years; W/o Vaneet Thapa R/o Palli Morh, Bishnah, District, Jammu on oath on 02.03.2022:

Stated that I lodged an FIR bearing No. 0086 of 2019 dated 08.06.2019 under section 354 A RPC at Police Station Bishnah, Jammu against my father-in-law-Waryam Chand Thapa (petitioner). Now, with the intervention of senior members of the society and family, I have entered into a compromise with petitioner vide compromise deed executed on 18.10.2021. in terms of the said compromise deed, I have amicably settled my disputes/clarified misunderstanding with petitioner. In view of our compromise, I have no objection in case Hon’ble Court quashes FIR No. 0086 of 2019 dated 12.06.2019 registered at Police Station, Bishnah, Jammu.”

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

Before proceeding to settle the petition finally on the basis of compromise entered into between the petitioner and the respondent No. 3, it would be advantageous and appropriate to refer to the law laid down by the Apex Court in this regard.

In “Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another” reported in 2012 (10) SCC 303”, at para 61 it has been noticed as under: -

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basical private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding of continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding”.

and “Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and Another” reported in 2017 (9) SCC 641”, at Para 16, it has been noticed as under: -

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following propositions:

16.1 Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic wellbeing of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

A perusal of the record would reveal that the petitioner herein has been alleged to have committed an offence under Section 354-A RPC. The Apex Court in case titled, “Shiji @ Pappu and ors. Vs. Radhika and Anr., reported in 2011 (10) SCC 705” has settled an appeal involving the commission of the said offence on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties.

Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles and propositions of law laid down by the Apex Court and having regard to the issues involved in the petition as well as the compromise (supra), it is manifest that the FIR in question has been registered at the instance of respondent No. 3 against the petitioner and the same relates to a dispute predominantly having a civil flavour being basically private and personal in nature and having been amicably settled and resolved outside the Court by the parties.

Thus, in view of the amicable settlement between the parties, the possibility of conviction of the petitioner herein is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case rather would put the petitioner to great oppression and extreme injustice despite full and complete settlement and compromise having been arrived at with the respondent No. 3 and further continuation of the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question would be unfair and contrary to the interests of justice and in essence, would amount to abuse of process of law.

Having regard to the aforesaid position, therefore, it would be appropriate and in the interest of justice to put an end to the proceedings while quashing the FIR in question, as also the consequent charge-sheet filed before the trial Court. Therefore, FIR No. 0086/2019 dated 12.06.2019 and the consequent charge-sheet pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (JMIC), Bishnah shall stand quashed.

The petition stands disposed of, accordingly, along with connected applications.