Yatin Hariram Ruparel vs Bhavana Harish Ruparel & Ors.

By this Appeal, the Appellant challenges the Interlocutory Order dated 27^th June, 2025 (impugned order) passed by the learned Single Judge in the Interim Applications moved in Testamentary Petition filed for grant of Letters of Administration to the property and credits of one Shantadevi Ruparel (the deceased).

Shantidevi expired on 19^th November 2007. Her husband Hariram Ruparel expired on 20^th May 1970. Her three daughters Vijayalaxmi, Indira and Bhagwati and one son Harish too predeceased her. She was survived by two sons Ashwin and Yatin. Yatin (son) has instituted the Petition seeking Letters of Administration to the property and credits of the deceased asserting the deceased died intestate. The contesting Respondents are Ashwin (son), wife and children of Harish (predeceased son) and son of Indira (predeceased daughter).

Mr. Dhakephalkar, learned Senior Counsel for Yatin (the Appellant), challenges the impugned Order to the limited extent that it directs release of only 50% of the Appellant's share and withholds 50%, while directing Rs.2,00,00,000/- to be set aside as a buffer for future estate expenses and liabilities, and certain adverse observations recorded therein. Counsel contends that the learned Single Judge provided no rationale for setting aside the buffer amount of Rs.2,00,00,000/-.

Counsel further submits that the Court-appointed Auditor has not quantified future expenses or liabilities beyond outstanding income tax demands. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge was not justified in withholding Rs.2,00,00,000/- (approximately 18% of the estate's Rs.11,03,37,790/-) as a buffer. Additionally, a sum of Rs.1,50,50,000/- for outstanding professional fees relating to land acquisition proceedings has been directed to be withheld.

He drew our attention to a chart that consisted of the estate of the deceased as well as another chart that estimated the future liabilities to his expenses.

The charts are reproduced herein below for ready reference.

He asserted that, considering all the expenses for the future, an amount of Rs.85,00,000/- would be sufficient to be set aside and the balance of Rs.1,15,00,000/- could be distributed amongst the legal heirs. He sought modification of the impugned Order to that extent.

Dr. Chandrachud, appearing for the Respondents, submits that a party who has accepted benefits under an interlocutory order cannot subsequently challenge it on collateral grounds. He relies on the judgement in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu (2014 15 SCC 144) for the proposition that the principle of approbation and reprobation prevents such challenges. He relies on the judgement in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi vs. Harish Ambalal Choksi and Ors. reported in (2024) 11 SCC 351 to submit that the scope of interference by the Appellate Court in an Appeal from an interlocutory Order is narrow.

We have heard Mr. Dhakephalkar for the Appellant, Dr. Chandrachud for Respondents and perused the entire record and the impugned Order.

Before addressing the substantive merits, we note the factual and legal complexities underlying the impugned Order. The testamentary Court was seized of a Petition for Letters of Administration to the estate of Shantadevi (the deceased). The estate comprises both properties acquired by the deceased de novo and allegedly, properties inherited from or shared with other family members (particularly properties claimed to be joint family assets). The central jurisdictional question as to whether certain properties in Schedule A represent self-acquired property of the deceased or joint family property—falls outside the testamentary Court's jurisdictional scope. Similarly, disputes concerning the testamentary status of Harish (whether he died testate or intestate) and consequential questions of succession may implicate issues beyond the letters of administration proceedings. Against this backdrop, the Single Judge adopted a conservative approach, setting aside buffer amounts pending clarification of boundary disputes. We are called upon to evaluate whether this exercise of discretion was reasonable and justified.

The impugned Order must be assessed in the context of several pending and interrelated disputes. First, the testamentary status of Harish (deceased's son) remains contested: whether he died testate (in which case his Will would govern succession) or intestate (in which case intestate succession law would apply). Second, Ashwin (son) claims that properties listed in Schedule A (serial Nos. 1-13) constitute joint family property acquired from joint family funds. If Ashwin's claim succeeds, the deceased's interest in these properties would be reduced; conversely, if these properties are self-acquired by the deceased, her entire interest vests in her estate for distribution to legal heirs. Third, the composition and value of the deceased's self-acquired property is therefore contingent on the resolution of the Harish succession issue and the joint family property claim.

Critically, questions concerning the status of properties as joint family assets or self-acquired property lie outside the testamentary Court's jurisdiction. A testamentary Court's role is limited to granting Letters of Administration and overseeing administration and distribution of the deceased's estate as defined by law. Determination of whether specific properties form part of joint family property or are self-acquired involves complex questions of Hindu succession law, family constitution, and property acquisition that require a plenary proceeding (such as a suit for declaration or partition), not a testamentary proceeding.

It is settled law that testamentary courts lack jurisdiction to determine disputes involving questions of title or family property claims independent of succession. Similarly, where property ownership is disputed on grounds unrelated to succession, the testamentary proceeding cannot determine such disputes.

Given these jurisdictional constraints, the learned Single Judge adopted a prudent approach: pending clarification of whether the Schedule A properties form part of the estate corpus, he directed retention of buffer amounts sufficient to meet admitted liabilities (income tax, professional fees) and to preserve the estate against unforeseen claims. This approach accords with the Court's inherent power to preserve assets pending resolution of title disputes.

While the Appellant contends that Rs.2,00,00,000/- and Rs.1,50,50,000/- are excessive, the Single Judge was entitled to adopt a cautious approach at this interlocutory stage. The buffer allows the estate to satisfy obligations without distributing assets that may later be found to belong to third parties (Ashwin or other joint family members). As Dr. Chandrachud rightly submits, the Appellant cannot simultaneously (a) accept the benefit of 50% distribution of recognized estate assets, and (b) challenge the withholding of buffer amounts designed to protect the estate's integrity pending resolution of rival claims. This constitutes acceptance of the benefit while seeking to escape its correlative burdens.

Turning to the standards prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court applicable to interlocutory orders, we are guided by Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi (2024 11 SCC 351), wherein it reiterated that an appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion in an interlocutory application unless the trial court's order is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or to have ignored settled legal principles.

As held in Wander Ltd. v. Antox Pvt. Ltd. (1990 Supp SCC 727), the appellate court's role is confined to satisfying itself that the discretion was reasonably exercised; reassessment of material or substitution of the appellate court's view is not permissible merely because it might reach a different conclusion.

The Appellant has not demonstrated that the learned Single Judge acted arbitrarily or that he ignored relevant principles governing discretionary relief in testamentary proceedings. It appears to us that, rather the learned Single Judge carefully considered all material facts, rival contentions and the Auditor's report. His exercise of discretion, to retain buffer amounts pending clarification of title disputes is reasonable, judicious, and grounded in sound principle. We find no justification for appellate interference.

Having examined the impugned Order against the established principles of law as stated above, we find no, arbitrariness or perversity in the learned Single Judge's decision. The discretion was exercised in aid of justice and to preserve the estate pending resolution of pending title disputes. The buffer amounts, while substantial, are justified given the uncertain scope of the estate corpus and the potential for competing claims. The Appellant's argument that Rs.85,00,000/- would suffice as a buffer is speculative and assumes resolution of all pending disputes in his favor, a premature assumption at this interlocutory stage. We therefore find no reason to disturb the impugned Order.

The Appeal is dismissed.

In light of the interlocutory nature of the proceedings and the pending clarification of title disputes, we make no Order as to costs.

In view of the disposal of the Appeal, Interim Application No.4126 of 2025, does not survive and is accordingly disposed off.

In view of the disposal of Appeal No.94 of 2025, Appeal Nos.87 of 2025, 90 of 2025, 89 of 2025, 88 of 2025 and 93 of 2025 and connected Interim Application Nos.5694 of 2025, 4124 of 2025, 4125 of 2025, 5707 of 2025 and 4143 of 2025 stand disposed off. No order as to costs.