Yogamaya Pakhira vs Santi Sudha Bose

P.N. Mookerjee, J.—This second appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment. The Appellant before us was the tenant Defendant. The suit was brought by the Plaintiff-Respondent on the ground, inter alia, of her reasonable requirement of the disputed premises as owner of the same.

The Plaintiff''s case in the plaint was that she was the owner of the disputed property and the suit was instituted in that capacity. The learned trial Judge found that the Plaintiff was not owner but only a permanent lessee and as, according to him, none but the owner of the premises in question will be entitled to ejectment on the ground of his or her reasonable requirement for his or her own occupation under the relevant part of the statutory provision (Section 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956) and as, further, he was of the opinion that on the materials before the Court the Plaintiff, even apart from that, had not made out a case of reasonable requirement, he dismissed the Plaintiff''s suit.

On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge has taken a different view of the meaning of the word ''owner'' under the above statutory provision and as, according to him, the Plaintiff, as a permanent lessee of the disputed premises, would come within the said statutory provision or impression, he has reversed the learned Munsif''s decision on the said point and sent down the matter for consideration on the merits. It is against this decision that present appeal has been filed by the Defendant.

To the appeal, a cross objection has been filed on behalf of the Plaintiff-Respondent contending, inter alia, that the learned Appellate Judge ought to have disposed of the whole matter and should not have sent the case back on remand as all relevant materials were present on record.

We will deal with the appeal first and record our decision on the cross-objection thereafter.

In the appeal, the principal point, which has been raised in support of the same, is that the Plaintiff under her document of title cannot claim to be anything more than a permanent lessee and, according to the learned Advocate for the Appellant, a permanent lessee is not included within the expression ''owner'' as used in the above relevant statutory provision.

In our opinion this argument has substance and should be accepted. The two expressions ''owner'' and ''permanent lessee'' are, in our view, not synonymous, and we find nothing in the present statute either in its language or in its scheme, object or purpose to construe the term ''owner'' as used in the above section as including a permanent lessee. On the other hand, it seems to us that it would serve more the object and purpose of the statute and it would certainly be more in consonance with its language and scheme to construe the two expressions differently, that is, in their normal or usual sense. Neither the rule of plain grammatical or literal construction nor the golden rule of intention would support a different view. This construction will also be emphasised and supported and amply made clear if we remember that in the previous Act, namely the Act of 1950, in the relevant part of the statute the corresponding phrase or expression was quite general or unrestricted, namely ''for his own occupation''. There was no limitation on the said phrase or expression and there was no necessity of adding the present qualifying words ''if he was the owner'' unless the Legislature intended to put a restriction or limitation on the above-quoted phrase or expression in question. It is thus clear from the changed or altered language of the statute or the statutory provision in question that, in enacting the present statute (The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956), the Legislature''s intention was to allow the landlord''s claim of ejectment on the ground of reasonable requirement of the premises for his own occupation only in cases where the landlord was the owner of the said premises and, in that view, the word ''owner'' must be given its ordinary dictionary or usual meaning and would not include a permanent lessee.

We may point out further that, if a permanent lessee is included within the word ''owner,'' there will be no reason for excluding a lessee for a long term and, if a lessee for a long term is to be included, it would be hardly possible to limit the period or term in that behalf with the result that the added words or expression ''if he is the owner'' would become meaningless and unnecessary and wholly redundant. This will plainly go against the settled rule of statutory construction that no words in a statute should ordinarily be held to be redundant there being, in the matter of the present statute, no exceptional circumstances or compelling reasons for holding the contrary.

In the premises we would accept the Appellant''s argument that the term ''owner'', as used in the section before us, should receive its ordinary connotation in the sense of meaning a person who has the full or absolute ownership of the disputed property. We would accordingly hold that the Plaintiff Respondent, who is only a permanent lessee of the property in question, would not be entitled to the relief of ejectment in the instant suit.

In the above view, we would allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge and restore the decree of the learned Munsif dismissing the present suit.

In view of the above order no order need be passed on the connected cross-objection except that the same will stand dismissed as a result of the said order.

There will be no order for costs in the cross-objection and no order for costs in the appeal too, either in this Court or in any of the Courts below.

A.K. Dutt, J.

I agree.