Amarjit Kaur vs State of Punjab

Rameshwar Singh Malik, J

Feeling aggrieved against the alleged illegal selection of private respondents, petitioner has approached this court by way of present writ petition, under Articles 226/227 of the constitution of India, seeking a writ in the nature of Certiorari, for quashing the impugned select list dated 3.2.2012 (Annexure P-8).

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that once the petitioner was not selected, she filed the representation, but the same was also not considered by the respondent authorities. He further submits that even the representation dated 6.6.2014 (Annexure-P-13) submitted by the petitioner for consideration of the respondent authorities is still pending decision. He concluded by submitting that in such a situation, petitioner will have continuing cause of action and there was no delay in filing the writ petition. He prays for allowing the present writ petition, by setting aside the impugned selection.

Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length, after careful perusal of the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition is wholly misconceived and the same is liable to be dismissed, for the following more than one reasons.

It is the settled proposition of law that the law helps only those who are alert and vigilant about their rights. It is neither pleaded nor argued case on behalf of the petitioner that she was not aware about the selection of private respondents, which came to be finalised as early as on 3.2.2012 vide Annexure P-8. Thereafter, petitioner kept on sleeping and did not challenge the selection. Although, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that petitioner submitted her representations, however, there is no such representation available on the record. The only representation available on the record is dated 6.6.2014 (Annexure P-13), which has been submitted by the petitioner after more than 2 years and 4 months.

The argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner filed representations earlier also, has been found to be fallacious for the reason that the petitioner has not referred to any such earlier representation even in her representation dated 6.6.2014 (Annexure P-13). That being the factual and undisputed position on record, the petitioner has not been found entitled for any kind of indulgence at the hands of this court at this belated stage, while exercising its extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

In the interregnum, appointments have been issued in favour of the selected candidates. Petitioner has chosen only the six persons i.e. Respondents no. 4 to 9 for impleadment as party-respondents in the present writ petition. There is not even a passing reference in the writ petition that the private respondents were the only likely to be affected parties and no other person was likely to be affected. The petitioner cannot be permitted to chose the respondents, out of selected candidates. It was for the petitioner to take a specific and categoric averment that except the private respondents, there was no other necessary party and no other selected/appointed candidate was going to be adversely affected, by allowing the present petition.

Further, petitioner is not seeking quashing of the selection of private respondents only. She is seeking quashing of the entire selection without impleading all the selected candidates as party-respondents, which is not permissible in law. Having said that, this court feels no hesitation to conclude that present writ petition is without any merit and the same is likely to be dismissed, for this reason also.

The principle of delay and laches was evolved in the year 1874 by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp 1874(5) PC 221. This principle is being followed consistently by the courts of law. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in its recent judgment in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, has laid down the law, while making following observations in paras 13 to 16 of the judgment, which can be gainfully followed in the present case and the same, read as under:-

First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and Others, the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp 1874(5) PC 221, which is as follows:-

Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.

In State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar, while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person''s entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.

In State of M.P. and Others Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others, the Court observed that it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice.

Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years'' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others'' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons-who compete with ''Kumbhakarna'' or for that matter ''Rip Van Winkle''. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.

Similar view was taken by this court in CWP No. 3124 of 2011 (Harnam Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others). Reverting back to the facts of the present case and respectfully following the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Murali Babu''s case (supra), it is unhesitatingly held that since the petitioner has been sleeping over her rights. There is no explanation for inordinate long delay, particularly when the petitioner was intending to challenge the selection of private respondents. It is too late in the day for this court to interfere in the selection matter, at this belated stage.

No other argument was raised.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this court is of the considered view that present writ petition is misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance. Thus, it must fail. No case for interference has been made out.

Resultantly, instant writ petition stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.